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Davis: Judicial Review of Administrative Action in West Virginia--A Stud

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADIhNISTRATIVE ACTION
IN WEST VIRGINIA - A STUDY IN
SEPARATION OF POWERS
KENNETH

C.

DAviSO

This article attempts to bring together and to analyze critically
the West Virginia cases dealing with review by courts of action
taken by administrative officials and tribunals. Although a
wealth of legal literature on federal administrative law is rapidly
developing, studies of some phases of state la~y in this field are still
relatively rare. The need for research in state administrative law
is indicated by the seemingly unscientific approach of many courts
to some problems, by an apparently high degree of incoherence in
the decisions,' and by the striking inadequacy of the case finders.
This article proceeds upon the hypothesis that a more intensive
study of the law of one jurisdiction is preferable to a less intensive
examination of the general law, even though no assurance can be
given that West Virginia is typical.'
Between fifty and seventy-five4 state administrative agencies
are now at work in West Virginia, and the legislature adds to their
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1 State courts often seem to be inadequately informed of their own previous

decisions in this field. An extreme example is West Penn Power Co. v. Board of
Review, 112 W. Va. 442, 164 S. E. 862 (1932), in which the supreme court took
jurisdiction of a tax assessment problem "because of long practice 1, when the
supreme
court from 1896 until 1924 had consistently denied such jurisdiction.
2
Even such new works as the Fourth Decennial Digest, Corpus Jurs
Secundum, and American Jurisprudence have no headings on Administrative
Law. Shepard's Citator and the Annotated Code are the only case finders that
are quite useful in finding West Virginia cases on this subject.
3 In an article written sixteen years ago on the review of the work of the
State Corporation Commission of Virginia, Dean Dobie said of judicial review of administrative action: "Virginia's experience should tend to be quite
typical and altogether normal."
Dobie, Judicial BIview of Administrativo
Action in Virginia (1922) 8 VA. L. REV. 477, 483. Yet a comparison of the
article with this one indicates that the Virginia cases have little in common
with the West Virginia cases. On account of the peculiar provision in the
Virginia Constitution concerning the State Corporation Commission, it may be
that West Virginia is more likely to be typical than Virginia.
4Some of them are: Public Service Commission, Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner and Appeal Board, Department of Mines, Unemployment Compensation Advisory Council and Board of Review, State Road Commission and
Commissioner, Insurance Commissioner, Commissioner of Securities, Tax Commissioner, Department of Labor and Commissioner of Labor, State Health
Department and Public Health Council, Water Commission, Department of
Banking and Banking Commissioner, Liquor Control Commission, Board of
Aeronautics, State Board of Education and Negro Board of Education, Conservation Commission and Director of Conservation, Department of Public Safety, Department of Public Assistance, Board of Control, Board of Public Works,
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number at every session. No figures are available as to the volume
of work of such agencies, but according to a recent article, "The
number of claims and controversies decided by the administrative
agencies and tribunals of the United States is many, many times
greater than all of the Federal civil cases decided during a corCommissioner of Weights and Measures, Bureau of Negro Welfare and Statistics, Forest and Parks Commission, Geological and Economic Survey Commission, Public Land Corporation, Board of the School Fund, State Armory Board,
State Sinking Fund Corporation, Parole Board, Athletic Commission, Library
Commission, Commission on Historic and Scenic Markers, Department of Purchasing, Adjutant General, Department of Archives and History, Director of
Budget, State Board of Finance, Commission on Uniform State Laws, Commission on Interstate Cooperation, Judicial Council, Agricultural Advisory
Board, Planning Board. Some which grant, refuse, suspend or revoke licenses
to engage in occupations are: Board of Dental Examiners, Board of Pharmacy,
Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors, Board of Examiners for Nurses,
Board of Optometry, Board of Certified Public Accountants, Veterinary Examining Board, Board of Architects, Board of Engineers, Board of Osteopathy,
Chiropractic Board of Examiners, Committee of Barbers and Beauticians, Real
Estate Commission, Racing Commission.
Some which perhaps should not be counted in an enumeration are: Carnifex
Ferry Battle Ground Park Commission, Droop Mt. Battlefield Commission,
Philippi Battlefield Commission, Pricketts Fort St. Park Commission, Pt.
Pleasant Battle Monument Commission.
Perhaps others listed above should not be counted. The functions of some,
such as the Judicial Council, for example, are wholly advisory. However, it
may be that some should count for more than one. The State Road Commission,
for instance, has at least seventeen subdivisions, variously known as "Divisions", "Bureaus", and "Departments", and the State Road Commissioner
has some powers not possessed by the Commission.
Perhaps the seven so-called "executive officers" should be included: Governor, Secretary of State, State Superintendent of Free Schools, Auditor,
Treasurer, Commissioner of Agriculture, Attorney General. The Governor,
for example, may conduct a hearing and remove certain officers for cause. Is
not the Governor an administrative tribunal when he so acts? If this power
were conferred upon an independent board it would be an administrative
tribunal. Nothing can hinge upon the question whether a tribunal is headed
by a single official or is multiple-headed. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is thus as much an administrative tribunal as would be a commission
consisting of several officials.
There is considerable overlapping. For example, the same man is Auditor,
Insurance Commissioner, and Commissioner of Securities.
An administrative "tribunal"
has been defined as an agency which exercises either legislative or judicial powers, or both. See Stason, Reorganization
of Administrative Tribunals (1938) 36 MioH. L. Rnv. 533, 536. Some of the
agencies listed above might readily be classified on this basis, but so many
powers exercised are not susceptible of such classification that it is believed
impossible accurately to classify these agencies according to judicial, legislative, executive and administrative functions.
In addition to state administrative agencies, innumerable county and municipal agencies exist. Indeed, the county courts and the circuit courts, in performing functions held to be nonjudicial, are among the most important of
West Virginia administrative tribunals.
(Much of the material of this footnote was taken from a chart prepared by
Professor Clifford E. Garwick of the Department of Political Science, West
Virginia University.)
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responding period by all of the Federal courts combined.' ' It
may well be that the work of West Virginia administrative agencies
rivals in magnitude that of the West Virginia courts.
The impact upon the traditional legal system of the many
boards, commissions, bureaus and other administrative officials and
tribunals is portrayed in the cases dealing with judicial review of
administrative action. Such cases are not primarily concerned, as
might be expected, with appraisals of the quality of the work of
administrative agencies and with a consideration of the consequent
need or lack of need for judicial review. Instead, the cases seem
to involve for the most part, at least in their language, an abstraction known as the doctrine of separation of powers. It is
sought to demonstrate in these pages that, although the soundness
of this doctrine rightly interpreted is not questioned, it has been
so interpreted in the West Virginia cases as to work positive harm
in the formulation of the practice with respect to judicial review
of administrative action. What is thought to be a perversion of
the doctrine of separation of powers has culminated in a series of
cases decided since 1931 which, it is believed, have quite unnecessarily held several important statutes unconstitutional and
cast doubt upon the constitutionality of much existing legislation.0
TAXATiON
If one may believe the language of judicial opinions in West
Virginia tax cases, the judicial review of the action of tax officials
revolves around seven labels. Probably all kinds of functions are
performed in the administration of the tax laws - judicial, legislative, and executive, as well as ministerial, administrative, quasi
judicial, and quasi legislative.
Any particular function is
theoretically suseeptibl.e of being characterized by one of these
seven labels. And the choice of labels is vital, for it determines
whether or not article'V of the West Virginia constitution has
been violated: " ... . nor shall any person exercise the powers of
5 McGuire, Beforms Needed in the Teaching of Administrative Law (1938)
6 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 171, 174-5. The article indicates that in 1936 not more
than 16,658 civil cases were decided by all federal courts, and that during the
same year 603,246 cases arose in one department alone of the federal govern3nent. In 1937 the Federal Trade Commission, whose cases are probably relatively both lengthy and difficult, "decided a total of 920 cases or 278 cases

less than all of the federal civil cases decided by the circuit courts of appeal
during the preceding fiscal year."
6 See the section entitled, "The Hodges Case and Its Aftermath", infra, p.
352, et seq., and the section entitled, "Existing Legislation of Doubtful Constitutionality", infra, p. 366, et seq.
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more than one [department of the government] at the same time
. . .,,
The assumed necessity for determining whether a given
function is, for example, judicial, nonjudicial, or quasi judicial
frequently becomes little more than a game of word logic which
may well be denominated, in Mr. Justice Cardozo's phrase, a
"tyranny of labels."" According to the opinions the primary
basis for decision is not whether or not it is desirable that the same
official or tribunal should have power, from the standpoint of
practical expediency or convenience, to perform functions which
are somewhat legislative in character and also to perform functions
which are somewhat judicial in their nature. The theory that pervades judicial language is that questions of desirability and workability have been conclusively answered, by Montesquieu and by
those who drafted article V.
An examination of the cases which proceed on this theory
leads irresistibly to the conclusion that such a basis for decision
is wholly artificial and unworkable. Syllogistic constructions cannot be erected upon foundations of abstract concepts which are
undefined and undefinable. And the word "judicial", for example,
is, not susceptible of precise definition. The judicial shades into
the legislative and the executive, and some powers fall into a
borderland which is neither wholly one nor wholly another. It is
not surprising, therefore, that attempts to fit all powers into one
of three or seven rigid categories have resulted only in inconsistency and confusion.
Specific results are more instructive. In 1886 the action of
the circuit court in changing the valuation of land for assessment
purposes was held to be "plainly ministerial and not judicial.'' 9
In 1893 it was held that such action of the circuit court was the
exercise of "a legislative power, and in no sense judicial". 10 The
supreme court in 1894 granted a writ of mandamus to require a
circuit court to determine a question of valuation, declaring that
7

Article V provides: I IThe Legislative, Executive and Judicial Departments

shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers properly
belonging to either of the others; nor shall any person exercise the powers of
more than one of them at the same time, except that justices of the peace shall
be eligible to the Legislature."
s In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 114, 54 S. Ct. 330, 335, 78 L. Ed.
674, 90 A. L. R. 575 (1934) Mr. Justice Cardozo said: "A fertile source of
perversion in constitutional theory is the tyranny of labels."
oPittsbijrgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. v. Board of Public Works, 28 W.
Va. 264 (1886).
10 Mackin v. County Court, 38 W. Va. 338, 18 S. E. 632 (1893).
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"the ascertainment of the values of property is strictly judicial.""1
A separate concurring opinion rendered in 189612 constituted the
beginning of a line of cases 1'3 which consistently declared until 1929
that valuation of property is a legislative function but that the
determination of questions of taxability is judicial. Since 1929
questions of valuation apparently are again judicial. 4 In other
words, the action of the circuit court in determining a question of
valuation is nonjudicial, judicial, nonjudicial, and judicial, in that
order. All this with only one express overruling!' 15
The assertions of the foregoing paragraph call for a statement
of the cases in greater detail.
The question in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. v.
Board of Public Works' was whether or not the supreme court of
appeals had jurisdiction of a case in which the circuit court in the
exercise of a power conferred by statute had reduced a tax assessment made in the first instance by the board of public works. It
was necessary to determine whether the function of the circuit
court was judicial or nonjudicial since "The writ of error must
be not only from a court of record, but it must be from a judgment,
of such court rendered in a judicial proceeding. . . ." and since
"the Constitution of this State confines the jurisdiction of this
Court exclusively to judicial matters". The court held that the
acts of both the board and the circuit court were "plainly
ministerial and not judicial". The supreme court therefore had
no jurisdiction.
11 Wheeling Bridge & Terminal Ry. v. Paul], 39 W. Va. 142, 19 S. E. 551
(1894).
12 Judge Dent's concurring opinion in Charleston & Southside Bridge Co. v.
County Court, 41 W. Va. 658, 673, 24 S. E. 1002 (1896). To the same effect
is a concurring opinion by the same judge in State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42
W. Va. 80, 107, 24 S. E.688 (1896).
13 Hannis Distilling Co. v. County Court, 69 W. Va. 426, 71 S.E.576 (1911);
Copp v. State, 69 W. Va. 439, 71 S.E. 580 (1911); State v. McDowel Lodge,
96 W. Va. 611, 123 S.E.561 (1924). In the latter case the court declared that
"this distinction runs through all of our cases on the subject'1.
14 At least, the supreme court has jurisdiction to decide valuation questions.
The holdings to this effect are discussed at length below, beginning at p. 276.
- In Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry.v. Board, 28 W. Va. 264 (1886)
the court declared: "We frankly overrule the proposition contained in the
second point of the syllabus in Low v. County Court, 27 W. Va. 785" (1886).
The overruled syllabus declared merely that the supreme court had jurisdiction to determine a question of taxability. This proposition has since become frmly established West Virginia law. See, e. g., the three cases cited in
note 13, supra. The overruling occurred before the court began to distinguish
valuation questions from taxability questions for purposes of determining
jurisdiction.
16 28 W. Va. 264 (1886).
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In Mackin v. County Court17 an assessor's valuation had been
affirmed by the county court but reduced by the circuit court on
appeal, and the supreme court declined jurisdiction on the ground
that "that important function of government, the assessment of
taxes .. is a legislative power, and in no sense judicial".
8
A taxpayer in WhTeeling Bridge & Terminal Ry. v. Pau11
was
dissatisfied with an assessment made by the board of public works
and petitioned the circuit court without avail to exercise its statutory power to review the assessment. The circuit court's ruling
was placed on the ground that the power was nonjudicial. The
supreme court, in granting a writ of mandamus to require the
circuit court to act, declared: "The ascertainment of the values
of property is strictly judicial. .. ."
In Charleston & Southside Bridge Co. v. County Court,9 the
county court had assessed property for taxation at fifty thousand
dollars, and the circuit court on appeal had reduced the valuation
to twenty-five thousand. On writ of error to the supreme court,
the supreme court's jurisdiction was first discussed. The court
declared that under Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. v.
Board,20 the constitution limits the jurisdiction of the supreme
court to matters which are "strictly judicial" and that therefore
the question was whether the action of the circuit court was "administrative or executive" or judicial. The conclusion upon this
question was that "We must then regard this judgment of the
court in fixing the valuation of this bridge property upon the
testimony introduced in the cause as a judicial act." The court
then proceeded to reverse the finding of the circuit court and to
affirm the finding of tie county court. The rationale of the case
is the very antithesis of Pittsburght, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. v.
Board and of Mackin v. County Court.
In separate concurring opinions in the Charleston & Southside
1738 W. Va. 338, IS S. E. 632 (1893). After the decision of the Pittsburgh
Railway case, and before the decision of the Mackin case, the court took jurisdiction in a valuation case without discussing whether the question was legislative or judicial. Bank of Bramwell v. County Court, 36 W. Va. 341, 15 S.
E. 78 (1892). The court declared that there was a "controversy" in a "civil
case" involving more than $100, and that therefore "we are of opinion that
the case is properly before us for consideration ...
Is 39 W. Va. 142, 19 S. E. 551 (1894).

19 41 W. Va. 658,24 S. E. 1002 (1896).
20 28 W. Va. 264 (1886).
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Bridge case and in the Soutlh Penn Oil Co. case2" Judge Dent set
forth a distinction which was consistently recognized in several
later cases: " . . . the circuit court, in hearing appeals in tax
assessment cases, necessarily acts in a dual capacity, to wit: (1)
As a mere assessor representative of the legislative branch of the
state government, in the ascertainment of assessable valuations for
the purposes of taxation; (2) as a court representative of the
judicial branch of the state government in the determination of
the constitutional and statutory right of taxation. In cases coming
under the first division solely, this Court is without jurisdiction;
this Court has
but, as to cases coming under the second division,
' '22
appellate jurisdiction, by means of writ of error.
The validity of this distinction, first drawn in 1896, was
declared in two decisions of 191123 to be "often adverted to" and
"generally conceded", and in a 1924 decision 2' it was still more
emphatically stated: "The taxability of property is jurisdictional
and calls for judicial determination; whereas, the fixing of values
for taxation is merely ministerial. This distinction runs ihrough
all of our eases on the subject." The apparent vitality of this
distinction, which persisted without judicial contradiction from
1896 until 1924, seemingly had settled the law. It was somewhat
surprising, therefore, when, in 1929, in Liberty Coal Co. v. Bassett,2 the supreme court assumed jurisdiction in a case which involved only a question of valuation. Not a word was said in the
opinion of the legislative, ministerial or judicial nature of the
question presented. The only mention of jurisdiction consisted in
a quotation of the statute permitting an "appeal" to the supreme
court where the value of the property is fifty thousand dollars or
more. In the light of the previous state of the law, it might be
reasonable to believe that the Liberty Coal case involved merely an
oversight. But in four succeeding cases" the court also assumed
21 Charleston & Southside Bridge Co. v. County Court, 41 W. Va. 058, 673,
24 S. E. 1002 (1896) ; State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 107, 24 S. H.

688 (1896).
22 Quoted from the South Penn Oil case, at p. 107.
23 Hannis Distilling Co. v. County Court, 69 W. Va. 426, 71 S. E. 576 (1911);
Copp v. State, 69 W. Va. 439, 71 S. E. 580 (1911).
24 State v. McDowell Lodge, 96 W. Va. 611, 612-13, 123 S. E. 561 (1924).
25 108 W. Va. 293, 150 S. E. 745 (1929).
2.6
Central Realty Co. v. Board of Review, 110 W. Va. 437, 158 S. E. 537
(1931); Cochran Coal & Coke Co. v. Board of Equalization & Review, 110 W.
Va. 556, 158 S. E. 906 (1931); West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review. and
Equalization, 112 W. Va. 442, 164 S. E. 862 (1932); Crouch v. County Court,
116 W. Va. 476, 181 S. E. 819 (1935).
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jurisdiction to determine valuation questions, and in one of them,
West Penn Power Co. v. Board,2 7 the court stated a reason for its
assumption of jurisdiction. After a lengthy discussion of evidence
as to the proper valuation of the property the court declared:
"Matters of this sort are primarily administrative. By virtue of
statute they are appealable here where the assessment is $50,000.00
or more. Code 1931, 11-3-25. Though doubting the right of the
legislature thus to clothe this court with authority and duty of reviewing assessments we have submitted to it because of long practice." The reason, then, why the supreme court had jurisdiction
in 1932 of a question which is "primarily administrative" is simply "long practice". But the "long practice" dated just two and
one-half years - only since the decision of the Liberty Coal case.
Even though "matters of this sort are primarily administrative",
as the court recognized in this case, and even thqugh, as the court
had consistently held in earlier cases, "It is a plain proposition,
that the Constitution of this State confines the jurisdiction of this
Court exclusively to judicial matters",28 yet the "long practice"
of two and one-half years justifies the violation of the constitution!
Of course, that is hardly reasonable. It seems probable that the
court acted under a misapprehension as to its earlier holdings. The
explanation may lie in the fact that for the proposition concerning
"long practice" the court cited the 1931 decision of Hodges v.
Public Service Commission, 9 for in that case, holding unconstitutional a statute regarded as conferring a legislative power upon
a circuit court, the court said that its decision was "not to be taken
to entertain appeals
as unsettling the practice of circuit courts ....
from boards of equalization and review on the valuation of property for taxation. This practice has been pursued in such a great
number of cases and over so many years, that we are of opinion
that it should not be disturbed now." In the Hadges case, the
question concerned the jurisdiction of the circuit court, and the
reference was to the powers in taxation which may be exercised by
circuit courts. The jurisdiction of the supreme court was not dis.
cussed, and, as has been long recognized, there is a difference in
the jurisdiction of the circuit court and that of the supreme court
27 112 W. Va. 442, 446, 164 S. E.862 (1932).
28 Quoted from Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. v. Board, 28 W. Va.
264, 270 (1886).
20 110 W, Va. 649, 654, 159 S. E. 834 (1931).
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in this respect."' It is reasonable to believe that the citation of the
Hodges case for the proposition about "long practice" in the West
Penn case indicates that the c6urt simply failed to distinguish between the jurisdiction of the circuit court and that of the supreme
court. At all events, whatever may be the reason or absence of
reason, the supreme court now reviews valuations in tax assessment cases.
In the most recent case on the general question, Crouch v.
County Court," the scope of that review is defined. The supreme
court reversed an assessment which had been affirmed by a county
court sitting as a board of equalization and review and again approved by the circuit court on appeal from the county court. The
court declared in the syllabus: "Where an assessment of real estate
of an amount ($50,000 or fnore: Code, 11-3-25) reviewable by the
supreme court of appeals appears to have been made without
proper regard to requisite elements and to have been approved by
the circuit court without substantial evidence to sustain the
assessed valuation, the appellate court will reverse the circuit
court's order of affirmation and will remand the case for further
proceedings."
The foregoing cases relate to the functions of the supreme
court and circuit courts. The seven labels are also applied to the
county courts, the assessors, and the board of public works. Thus,
the county courts, in determining the valuation of taxable property, act judicially, nonjudicially, and quasi judicially, depending
upon whether the question is decided in 1884, 1893, or 1896. In
Ex parte Low,3" a county court's action in reducing an assessment
was held to be "judicial in its nature", so that a legislative enactment providing a method for determining valuation was "judicial
legislation" 33 and therefore unconstitutional. In Mackin v. County
Court14 it was declared that "it is clear that the action of the
County Court in such a matter [valuation] is not judicial". In
so E. g.: Mackin v. County Court, 38 W. Va. 338, 348, 18 S. E. 632 (1893)
(with respect to assessments for taxation: '' ow there is a difference between
the Supreme Court of Appeals and Circuit Courts in respect to their capacity
to have conferred upon them such jurisdiction.")
31 116 W. Va. 476, 181 S. E. 819 (1935).
32 24 W. Va. 620 (1884).
33 The phrase "judicial legislation"
ordinarily relates to legislation by the
courts. The phrase was apparently used in this case to mean judicial action
by the legislature.
34 38 W. Va. 338, 344, 18 S.E. 632 (1893).
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State v. South Penn Oi7 Co., "' the court declared the action of the
county court in determining valuation to be "quasi judicial".
Apparently the the court thought the "quasi" had some meaning,
for in the same opinion the court said that the same function performed by the circuit court was "judicial", without the "quasi".
It would be reasonable to suppose that whether an act is
judicial or nonjudicial depends upon the lcharacter of the act, and
not upon the nature of the official or tribunal performing the act.
Thus, it is said in one case that "the fact, that a ministerial act is
performed by a court, does not change the nature of the act and
make it judicial. '"" And in another case the court reasoned that
since the county court's action in fixing valuation was not judicial,
the performance of the same function by the circuit court could not
be judicial, because "Surely the inherent nature of the act has not
been so quickly changed by its transfer to the Circuit Court.'' '"
Such a proposition is almost too obvious to state, and yet the view
is taken in some cases that the classification of acts under the
separation of powers clause depends not only upon the character
of the act but also upon the nature of the official or tribunal. One
of the best examples is State ex rel. Hallanan v. Rocke.38 Previous
cases3" had consistently held that the courts in determining questions of taxability act judicially, and 'at least two decisions40 had
taken the view that the assessor also acts judicially in determining
questions of taxability. Accordingly, there seemed to be some
basis for the serious contention made in the Rocke case that the
assessor, said to be an executive officer, could not constitutionally
determine questions of taxability because that would be to exercise
a judicial function in violation of the separation of powers clause.
Of course, the court might well have rejected this contention by
holding that it was predicated upon a misconception of the separation of powers clause, which, properly interpreted, does not pre35 42 W. Va. 80, 24 S. E. 688 (1896).
30 Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. v. Board, 28 W. Va. 264, 268 (1886).
37 Mackin v. County Court, 38 W. Va. 338, 344; 18 S. E. 632 (1893).
38 91 W. Va. 423. 113 S. E. 647 (1922).
39 See notes 12, 23 and 24, supra. Four months before the decision of the
Rocke case, it had been argued in Humphreys v. County Court, 90 W. Va. 315,
110 S. E. 701 (1922) that a circuit court could not properly review by
certiorari a county court's decision on a question of taxability because the
county court's action was nonjudicial. This contention was rejected on the
ground that the county court had acted judicially.
40 Wheeling Bridge & T. Ry. v. Paull, 39 W. Va. 142, 146, 19 S. E. 551
(1894)'- Charleston & Southside Bridge Co. v. County Court, 41 W. Va. 658,
671, 24 S. E. 1002 (1896).
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vent an assessor from performing such judicial acts as are necessary
to the determination of the taxability of property. Instead, the
court held that the assessor does not act judicially in determining
taxability. That the difference in the assessor's action and that of
a court lies not in the character of the function performed but in
the nature of the performer is even indicated in the court's opinion,
for the following reasoning is advanced to show that the action
was nonjudicial: "That an assessor is not a judicial officer, within
the meaning of the Constitution is clear. He is not mentioned in
Art. VIII, dealing with and defning the judicial department. The
office is provided for in Art. IX, creating local executive and administrative officers ....
" In another case it is said that the circuit
court acts judicially in deciding whether or not property is taxable, because the court is "a tribunal having power to determine
questions of law and fact, either with or without a jury; and there
were parties litigant who contested the case on the one side and on
the other." 4 ' The Rocke case overlooks the assessor's "power to
determine questions of law and fact", and the fact that the parties
to the case are the same parties to the same case when it reaches
the circuit court. There is no difference in the character of the
function, but it is judicial when the court performs it and nonjudicial when the assessor performs it!4
If the character of an act under the separation of powers
clause depends in part upon the nature of the official or tribunal
who does it, then it is pertinent to inquire whether the county court
is a judicial, legislative or executive institution. Perhaps it is a
unique institution of so anomalous a character that a new label
should be invented for it,4 3 for even the West Virginia supreme
court has specifically recognized that the county court violates the
41

State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 96, 24 S. E. 688 (1896).

The circuit court does not merely "review"
the finding of the county
court or of the board of public works. The circuit court takes now evidence
and makes a finding de novo, substituting its judgment for that of the county
court or the board. See, e. g., W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c. 29, § 129.
Compare the reasoning of the court in the Pittsburg Railway case, 28 W.
Va. 264, 268 (1896): "It is true the judgment of the court must succeed that
of the board and is in review of the latter, but that does not alter the mature
of the act to be performed."
43Article VIII, § 24, confers upon county courts, for instance, "jurisdiction in all matters of probate", and also prescribes that they shall "have
the superintendence and administration of the internal police and fiscal affairs
of their counties, including the establishment of roads, ways, bridges, public
landings, ferries and mills, with authority to lay and disburse the county
42

levies."
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principle of separation of powers: ".. . in moulding county courts,
the Constitution has entirely disregarded the separation of governmental powers commanded in Article V, and has blended in
44
such courts both administrative and judicial powers .....
If we are committed to a tyranny of labels, if every power
must have one of three or seven labels, then why not turn to the
authority on labels - the dictionary ? The court did so in at least
one case.4Y The question was whether or not the action of the circuit court in changing a valuation from fifty thousand to twentyfive thousand dollars was "executive" action. The court quoted
Webster as follows: "In government, 'executive' is distinguished
from 'legislative' and 'judicial'; 'executive' being applied to that
which carries the laws into effect, or secures their due performance." The court then declared: "The judgment complained of
did carry the statute into effect. . ." Apparently on the basis of
this analysis the court concluded that the action was judicial! Since
it is not known what is meant by "that which carries the laws into
effect", one can hardly quarrel with the statement that the
judgment did carry the statute into effect, and yet, since this reasoning led to the conclusion that the action was not exeeutive, it
may be that the court intended to say that the judgment did not
carry the statute into effect. Indeed, it would be fair to say that
a reading of the opinion suggests that one might go through some
opinions on what is judicial and what is nonjudicial and insert
or delete a "not" here and there with nothing lost!
The labels remain undefined. The criteria for applying them
change from case to case. Each opinion, considered alone, has its
convincing qualities, but an attempt to correlate the opinions, so
far as the theory of separation of powers is concerned, reveals little
more than a delirious jumble. This does not imply that the confusion is attributable to judicial shortcoming in determining what
is judicial or nonjudicial. The truth is that the court has undertaken a task which is probably impossible to perform. The interpretation given to the separation of powers clause is so unreal
that it must in the nature of things break down miserably when
it comes to be applied to the practical workings of government. It
4 Poling v. County Court, 116 W. Va. 580, 584, 182 S. E. 778 (1935). It is
curious that the supreme court has not found in the county court a hint of
what the framers of the West Virginia Constitution may have meant by the
separation of powers clause.
45 Charleston & Southside Bridge Co. v. County Court, 41 W. Va. 658, 664,
24 S. E. 1002 (1896).
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is the essence of artificiality to -say that every function performed
by tax officials and tribunals is wholly judicial, wholly legislative,
or wholly executive.
The chief difficulty has been that the court has purported to
decide cases on the basis of the theory of separation of powers but
in fact has not always done so. The theory in some cases has had
to yield to practical necessities - necessities which have not always
found their way into the opinions. Even if it were possible to
formulate a theoretically perfect system of separation of powers
that system would be wholly unworkable. rf the court had consistently recognized this fact, if it had limited its talk about separation of powers and had addressed itself to the true bases for decision, much confusion might have been avoided.
The court might well have taken greater advantage of the
insight of Judges Dent and Brannon who seemed to be fully aware
of the artificiality of the theory of separation of powers. 4" For
example, Judge Dent declared in the Charleston & Soutside
Bridge case :7 "The ascertainment of values for assessment purposes is a judicial function, strictly belonging to the legislative or
administrative branch of the state government...." To one steeped
in the theory of separation of powers this does not make sense, any
more than does a reference by the same judge in a case not involving taxation to "legislative judicial functions' '.4 But Judge
Dent 49 may have perceived a truth not always grasped by other
46It is not meant to imply that all other judges were not aware of such
artificiality. See, for example, the language of Judge Holt in State v. South
Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 97, 24 S.B. 688 (1896).
47 Charleston & Southside Bridge Co. v. County Court, 41 W. Va. '658, 681, 24
S. E. 1002 (1896).
48 In re Town of Union Mines, 39 W. Va. 179, 182, 19 S.E. 398 (1894).
49 Itcould not have been lack of understanding that caused Judge Dent to
talk about "legislative judicial functions". The depth of his insight into
the nature of separation of powers is illustrated by his language in Wheeling
Bridge & Terminal Ry. v. Paull, 39 W. Va. 142, 144-45, 19 S. E.551 (1894):
"The constitution, within itself . . . proceeds to make many laps of the
various departments, so as to make them mutually dependent upon and supporting each other; thus welding them into an harmonious whole, or three
distinct departments in one... Were it practicable to keep these three departments wholly distinct, the increase of the necessary offices and officers would be
so great, and the expense thereof so burdensome, as to render the cost of the
administration of the government unbearable . . .So that, while we find that
the constitution, as much as possible keeps the heads of the three departments
comparatively distinct and independent of each other, yet as we move down the
scale these several powers become more complicated and interwoven with each
other, until we find the common council of every village exercising legislative,
executive and judicial functions, indiscriminately, by authority of the same
constitution which declares that these functions shall be kept distinct."
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judges: that all powers are not necessarily wholly judicial, wholly
legislative, or wholly executive. To hold that a function is judicial
and belongs to the legislative branch of the government is to violate the theory of separation of powers, but so to hold may nevertheless be thoroughly realistic.
Judge Brannon openly rejected a strict theory of separation
of powers in the Mackin case, 0 holding that the circuit court could
properly exercise a legislative power. Judge Brannon's reasons
consist in something other than labels and word logic. Referring
to article VIII, § 12, he declared: "I think this clause authorizes
the legislature to confer upon the Circuit Court the right to entertain this appeal. The presence of this very important court among
the people in every county; its readiness, facility and competency
in the hearing and trial of matters by witnesses, juries and otherwise; - the obvious necessity of a power in the legislature to
render available and useful its functions in the administration of
government by charging it with jurisdiction of additional matters,
as time and expediency may suggest; - the whole cast, structure
and purpose of this court, as seen in the constitution - tell us that
we ought not to give a narrow construction to this clause. To do
so would defeat the purpose of the convention, which framed the
constitution, and cramp the usefulness of the Circuit Courts."
The opinions in the tax cases involving judicial review of admihistrative action have revolved around words: judicial, legislative, executive. What an improvement it would be to suibstitute
Judge Brannon's words: "facility... necessity ...expediency ...
usefulness . . ."I
ro Mackin v. County Court, 38 W. Va. 338, 348-49, 18 S. E. 632 (1893).
r1 Federal jurisdiction often depends upon whether a determination by a
state tribunal is judicial or administrative. Under Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. 150 (1908), a doctrine of socalled comity has been established that state administrative remedies must
be exhausted before a federal court will take jurisdiction. On the other hand,
it is clear that if a state judicial remedy has been resorted to, the federal
court must refuse to reopen the question decided, according to the doctrine of
res judicata. Thus, if the action in the circuit court is only administrative
in determining the valuation of property for tax purposes, the federal court
will not take jurisdiction of the case until after the administrative remedy
in the circuit court has been exhausted. But if the action in the circuit court
is judicial, the decision of the circuit court bars any action in the federal
court. One who has a case which it is desirable to bring before a federal
court is thus confronted with a dilemma. He must decide, often at his peril,
whether the action of the circuit court in reviewing a question of valuation,
for instance, is administrative or judicial. If his guess is wrong, he may be
barred from further remedy.
Several decisions of federal courts are of especial interest in this connection.
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The leading West Virginia case on judicial review of action
of the Public Service Commission is United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public
Service Commission.5 2 The commission had ordered the company
to cease discrimination between two classes of domestic consumers
and to reduce rates to a specified maximum. The company
petitioned the supreme court, in accordance with section 16 of the
act," which provides: "Any party feeling aggrieved by the entry
of a final order by the commission, affecting him or it, may present
his or its petition in writing to the supreme court of appeals....
praying for the suspension of such final order.... The court shall
decide the matter in controversy as may seem to be just and right."
Among the arguments of the company were several contentions that
The early decision of the United States Supreme Court in Upshur County v.
Rich, 135 U. S. 467, 10 S. Ct. 651, 34 L. Ed. 196 (1890), held that a West Virginia county court acted only administratively and not judicially in fixing the
valuation of property for taxation, and, partly because of this reason, the pro-

ceeding was not properly removable to the federal circuit court before action
had been taken by the county court. Mr. Justice Bradley declared of the
West Virginia county court: " It has no judicial powers except in matters of
probate. In all other -matters it is an administrative board, charged with the
management of county affairs."
A somewhat more difficult question was presented by the recent case of
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Board of Public Works, 17 F. Supp. 170 (N. D. W.
Va. 1936), decided by a three-judge federal court. The railroad brought a
bill in the federal court to enjoin the assessment of taxes, alleging that the
assessment was excessive and discriminatory, and asserting certain constitutional objections. The property had been assessed by the board of public
works, but the railroad had not taken advantage of its statutory right of appeal to the circuit court, which, under the statute had the power to take now
evidence and to "correct the valuation so made and ascertain and fix the true
and actual value of such property according to the facts proved." In thus
seeking relief in the federal court before taking the case to the circuit court
of the state, the railroad may well have been relying upon Norfolk & Western
Ry. v. Board of Public Works, 3 F. Supp. 791, 796 (S. D. W. Va. 1933), in
which a three-judge federal court declared with respect to action of a West
Virginia circuit court: 11... the question of discrimination was raised in the
suit before the circuit court of McDowell county, and the decision of that
court on this question was a judicial action and not administrative, as was
the act of that court in fixing the value for purposes of taxation." In the
Baltimore & Ohio case, however, one of several grounds on which the court
decided against the railroad was that "the plaintiff has not exhausted its
administrative remedies with respect to the valuation and assessment of its
property for the purposes of taxation". The court relied upon West Penn
Power Co. v. Board of Review, 112 W. Va. 442, 164 S. E. 862 (1932), in holding that the remedy before the circuit court was at least in part administrative.
The court did not deny, however, that the circuit court also had power to act
judicially, but, instead, declared: "The fact that a court possessed of administrative powers might pass upon judicial as well as administrative questions
5273 W. Va. 571, 80 S. E. 931 (1914).
53 Now W. VA.

zv. CoDs (1931) c. 24, art. 5, § 1.
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its constitutional rights had been infringed.54 The court first considered the question of its own jurisdiction. It cited numerous
West Virginia decisions to support the proposition that "the appellate jurisdiction of this court is limited by the Constitution and
statutes to judicial matters, in judicial proceedings, and . . . we
have no power to review by writ of error or appeal the decisions
of an inferior tribunal, officer or board, as to matters which are
merely administrative, executive or legislative, and not strictly
judicial in nature, except when such power may be expressly conin reviewing the assessment and making the correction is no reason for not
requiring that relief be sought before such tribunal before resorting to a
court of equity possessing judicial powers alone; for the administrative proceeding cannot be said to be exhausted so long as the administrative review
provided by statute has not been invoked."
This reasoning seems to be the precise antithesis of the reasoning in a 1934
decision of the United States Supreme Court. In City Bank Farmers' Trust
Co. v. Schnader, 291 U. S. 24, 54 S. Ct. 259, 78 L. Ed. 628 (1934), a taxpayer
filed a bill in a federal district court to enjoin the imposition and collection of a
Pennsylvania inheritance tax, alleging both that the property was not taxable
and that the valuation was excessive. The statute gave to the Dauphin county
court the power to review the decisions of the Department of Revenue, both
as to taxability and as to valuation. The tax officials contended that the bill
in the federal court was premature because the taxpayer had not yet exhausted
his remedy by taking the statutory appeal to the court. Mr. Justice Roberts,
in behalf of a unanimous court, rejected this contention on the ground that,
. ..... while the action of the appraiser in a case like the present is purely
administrative, the function of the court upon appeal is judicial in character, if,
when the case is brought into the court, the Commonwealth becomes plaintiff
and the taxpayer defendant, and the action is tried as an ordinary action, resuiting in a judgment, which is final and binding on the parties, subject only
to appeal to a higher state court, as permitted by the Act. This renders the
proceeding judicial, and gives it the character of a suit or action at law ...
If the Dauphin County court were by the act of Assembly granted only the
right to revise the valuation of the appraiser, and precluded from considering
any other question, its proceedings would be purely administrative, and the
contention that the appellant had failed to pursue to the end its administrative
remedy would be sound...."
It is of interest to observe that in the Baltimore & Ohio ease, the West Virginia circuit court had not only "the right to revise the valuation" but also
had power to consider taxability. Under the decision of the three-judge federal court in the Baltimore & Ohio case, if the state court may act both judicially and administratively, the federal court will not take jurisdiction until
remedies in the state court have been exhausted. Under the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in the Schnader case, if the state court may act
both judicially and administratively, the federal court will take jurisdiction
before remedies in the state court have been exhausted.
514The petition alleged that the orders violated section 10 of article III and
section 9 of article V of the West Virginia Constitution, and the due process
and privileges and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution.
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ferred by the Constitution." The cases cited-" were interpretations
of the separation of powers clause of article V of the West Virginia constitution. In rejecting a contention that the statute
could properly allow an appeal under article VIII, section 3, providing that the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction
"in cases involving ... the constitutionality of a law" and "such
other appellate jurisdiction, in both civil and criminal cases, as
may be prescribed by law", the court declared that the appellate
jurisdiction is limited to judicial proceedings, and an appeal will
not lie to the court from "some legislative, executive or administraThe appellate jurisdiction
tive proceeding of the government."
must relate to "some judicial proceedings begun in an inferior
judicial tribunal." The court pointed out that it had "denied
appellate jurisdiction to review the judgments or decrees of the
circuit courts on appeal from the orders of the Board of Public
Works, 6r other boards, involving simply executive or administrative matters, such as valuation of property for taxation" and observed that "never have we entertained jurisdiction from such
decrees or orders of the circuit court unless the same have related
to the taxability of the property.'O' The action of the court in
entertaining an appeal from rate-making orders would be "extrajudicial, and legislative or administrative the same as that of the
Commission." And the making or regulation of rates "is legislative, not judicial". Therefore, the court had "no jurisdiction
to review as upon appeal the order complained of."
The constitution provides, however, that the supreme court
shall have "original jurisdiction in cases of habeas corpus,
mandamus, and prohibition";" and the court declared that the
statute may be construed "as intended to confer original jurisdiction by process akin to mandamus or prohibition". The court
thus held that it had jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for,
"But we cannot construe the statute as intended to give us the
r5 Nine cases are cited. Six had to do with the nature of the function of the
circuit court in reviewing tax assessments, one with an election board, one with
the circuit court's incorporation of cities, and- one with the circuit court's
function in settling a county boundary dispute. All nine are discussed elsewhere in this article.
56 It is of interest to observe that although this statement was true when
made, in several cases since 1929 the Supreme Court has entertained jurisdiction in tax assessment cases involving only questions of valuation. 'See
notes 25 and 26, supra.
§ 3.
5 Art. VI,
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power and authority to substitute our judgment for that of the
Commission, in a matter purely legislative or administrative."
Because the United Fuel Gas case is much cited and quoted in
subsequent cases, a detailed analysis of the opinion will be profitable.
The West Virginia constitution prescribes both the original
and the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court of appeals. In
addition to the appellate jurisdiction prescribed, it provides for
"such other appellate jurisdiction . . . as may be prescribed by
law"." No provision is made for original jurisdiction except that
specifically conferred by the constitution. Yet the United Fuel Gas
case holds that the legislature may enlarge the original jurisdiction
of the court but may not enlarge its appellate jurisdiction! Why?
The only reason given is the separation of powers principle.
Because of that principle "the appellate jurisdiction ... is limited
. . to judicial matters, in judicial proceedings . . ."
Therefore,
the court says, there may be no appeal to the court from the Public Service Commission, because the commission, in fixing rates, acts
legislatively, and the action of the court on appeal would be "extrajudicial, and legislative or administrative the same as that of the
Commission.'""
It is suggested, with all deference, that this step
in the court's reasoning is plainly fallacious. It is not true that
review by a court of legislative action of a commission is necessarily
itself legislative. This was settled by the United States Supreme
Court as early as 1894. The court may, for instance, consider the
question whether or not under the constitution the rate fixed is
confiscatory, without acting legislatively. The determination of
such a question is the very essence of the judicial function. The
court overlooks the clear difference between performing the same
function the commission has performed and merely reviewing the
legality or the constitutionality of the commission's order.
*

The court itself, in another part of the opinion, recognizes this,
for it holds that the commission's action may be reviewed "by
s Ibid.
50 In

Howell v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 78 W. Va. 664, 666, 90 S. E. 105 (1916),
the court seemed again to express the thought that legislative action of an
administrative tribunal does not call for judicial review: "When the legislature enacted the water power act it evidently regarded the granting of such
permission, as is here complained of, as a purely legislative function, and,
therefore, made no provision for reviewing the public service commission's
decision on that matter by any of the courts."
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-process akin to mandamus or prohibition." 60 Such review must
be judicial, or the constitution, according to the language of the
opinion, would not permit it. But if the review "by process akin
to mandamus or prohibition" is judicial, why would not review
by appeal or writ of error be judicial? It is the nature of the
action taken by the court, and not the manner in which the case
is brought to the court, that should determine whether the court's
action is legislative or judicial. If the court issues its own order
to take the place of the order issued by the commission, then, according to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court 01 the
court's action would be legislative, whether the case is brought to
the court by appeal or by writ of error or by "process akin to
mandamus or prohibition". If the court merely determines the
legality or constitutionality of the commission's order, and upholds
it or sends the case back for further action by the commission, then
the court's action is judicial, no matter how the case may have
been brought before the court.
Another premise necessary to the court's reasoning is the
court's assumption, on the authority of the Prentis case, that the
action of the commission was entirely legislative. This premise
may likewise be questioned. The Prentis case did hold that fixing
rates for the future is legislative. But the United Fuel Gas case
involved two orders of the commission, only one of which fixed
60 In Howell v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 78 W. Va. 664, 90 S. E. 105 (1916), a
later case involving a similar question, the court did not follow this technique.
By statute enactea subsequent to the enactment of the Public Service Commission Act, the commission was given jurisdiction to grant permission to
hydro-electric companies to erect dams. The new act contained no provision
for judicial review, and the court held that the provision of the original act
for review was "meant to relate only to matters over which the public service
commission was then given jurisdiction". A petition to the court to review
an order of the commission was accordingly dismissed. The court did not, as
in the United Fuel Gas case, hold that it had jurisdiction "by process akin
to mandamus or prohibition". There is a difference in the two cases in that
one statute contained a provision for petitioning the supreme court and the
other did not, but inasmuch as jurisdiction by mandamus or prohibition does
not depend upon a special statutory grant of jurisdiction, this difference becomes unimportant. Perhaps it is the result of the two cases, taken together,
that even though jurisdiction by mandamus or prohibition need not be specially
conferred, yet jurisdiction "by process akin to mandamus or prohibitionI' does
not exist unless it is specially conferred by statute. The decision in the Howell
case was followed in Royal Glen Land & Lumber Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 91
W. Va. 446, 113 S. E. 749 (1922).
61 See discussion infra, p. 304, et seg.
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rates.0 2 The commission made a finding "That the United Fuel Gas
Company is violating the law by maintaining in the City of Huntington two rates for natural gas for domestic purposes. . .

."

Ac-

cordingly, it was "therefore ordered by the Public Service Commission that the United Fuel Gas Company do cease and desist
from a continuation of this practice in discriminating between the
two classes of domestic consumers." Is this action legislative or
judicial? Is a decree of a court of equity restraining a defendant
from continuing an unlawful practice legislative or judicial? There
is here no creative action of the commission, no promulgation of a
rate schedule for the future. The commission merely investigated,
found that the company was "violating the law", and ordered the
practice to cease. Before the advent of public service commissions,
the courts prevented such discrimination by public service corporations. And, as Mr. Justice Holmes said in the Prentis case, the
question whether proceedings are judicial or legislative "depends
not upon the character of the body, but upon the character of the
proceedings."
Whether rightly or wrongly, the court held in the United Fuel
Gas case that it had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from
the commission. But it went on seemingly to nullify the effect of
this holding by further holding that it had jurisdiction of the case
"by process akin to mandamus or prohibition". The pertinent inquiry, then, is: What practical difference is there between jurisdiction by appeal and jurisdiction "by process akin to mandamus
or prohibition"?
62 It
is even questionable whether the action of the commission in issuing
the rate-fixing order was entirely legislative. The commission found that the
rate theretofore in effect was "excessive and exorbitant". It is undeniable
that a court in determining whether or not a rate is "excessive and exorbitant" acts judicially. If the commission peforms precisely the same function
as the court, is not the commission's action of the same character as that of
the court7 It is very persuasively argued that it is, in Hardman, The Extent
of the Finality of Commissions' Rate Regulations (1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 111.
Dean Hardman in that article agrees with the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice
Fuller in the Prentis case, in saying: "I cannot see why the reasonableness
and justness of a rate may not be judicially inquired into and judicially determined at the time of the fixing of the rate, as well as afterwards."
The
conclusion of the majority of the court in the Prentis case that "the nature
of the final act determines the nature of the previous inquiry" has been much
criticized. Indeed, the West Virginia court in a later case, Well v. Black, 76
W. Va. 685, 692, 86 S. E. 666 (1915), recognized that in determining reasonableness the Public Service Commission performs a " Iquasi judicial" function:
"In so far as they are empowered to investigate rates and charges of public
service corporations, and to determine their reasonableness or unreasonableness, they would seem to be performing a quasi judicial function ....
"
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There is no substantial difference in the procedure. Indeed,
the proceedings are so much alike that the court no longer takes
the trouble to distinguish them in its own terminology. If the form
prescribed by the United Fuel Gas case were followed, the proceeding would be a "petition" 63 to the supreme court of appeals, and
the court's disposition of the case would be "Order suspended' '1 4
or "Order of suspension refused" ' 5 or "Petition dismissed"." It
is probably not without significance that such terminology was followed for only a short time after the decision of the United Fuel
Gas case. Thus, as early as 1923 the court changed its language,
beginning an opinion with the statement, "This is an appeal ...
from an order of the Public Service Commission . . ." and entering the order "Findings of defendant reversed, and cause remanded"'
In nearly all of the more recent cases the proceeding
is called an "appeal" and the order of the commission is either
"affirmed" or "reversed" or "reversed and remanded".08
In trying to ascertain the difference between jurisdiction by
appeal and jurisdiction by "process akin to mandamus or prohibition", one must take special note of the words "process akin to".
If these words were omitted, there would be a difference of vast
consequence, for the traditional scope of mandamus and prohibition
is indeed limited. Thus: "The writ is purely jurisdictional and
will not lie to correct errors or be allowed to usurp.the functions
of a writ of error or certiorari, or the remedy by appeal."'3"
63 As in nearly all of the cases in the first six or eight years after the decision
of the 'United Fuel Gas case.
64 E. g.: City of Huntington v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 89 W. Va. 703, 110 S. E.
192 (1921).
65 E. g.: Collins v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 94 W. Va. 455, 119 S. E. 288 (1923).
66 B. g.: Bluefield Water Works & Imp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 89 W. Va.
736, 110 S. E. 205 (1921).
67 City of Charleston v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 95 W. Va. 91, 120 S. E. 398 (1923).
68 E. g.: Huntington Development & Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 105 W. Va.

629, 143 S. E. 357 (1928) ("The ....
Company ....
obtained this appeal
from an order of the Public Service Commission ....
I'; "Reversed in part;

affiimed in part; remanded."); Huntington Brick & Tile Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 107 W. Va. 569, 149 S. E. 677 (1929) ("This is an appeal from an
order of the Public Service Commission. . . . "; "I Reversed, with directions. "1);
Morton Motor Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 111 W. Va. 22, 160 S. E. 226 (1931)
(" The complainants .... protested this charge before the public service commission . . . and upon a dismissal of their petition secured an appeal here.";
"Affirmed.") ; City of Wheeling v. Natural Gas Co., 115 W. Va. 149, 175 S.
E. 339 (1934) ("The City of Wheeling appeals from an order of the Public
Service Commission . . ."; "Reversed and remanded.")
69 Johnston v. Hunter, 50 W. Va. 52, 40 S. E. 448 (1901)

(syllabus 1).

A collection of West Virginia cases to the same effect may be found in W. VA.
ANN. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 53, art. 1, § 1.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1938

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1938], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Similarly: "Mandamus will not be awarded unless it appears that
the officer has clearly and wilfully disregarded his duty, or that his
action was extremely wrong or flagrantly improper and unjust, so
that his decision can only be explained as the result of caprice,
passion, partiality or corruption. '' 70 In other words, mandamus
and prohibition cannot be used to correct errors of judgment. Accordingly, if the jurisdiction of the court were limited by the scope
of the writs of mandamus and prohibition, the jurisdiction would
be much narrower than the jurisdiction which might be exercised
on appeal . 7 1 Although there is a difference between "mandamus
and prohibition" and "process akin to mandamus and prohibition", how much difference the court does not indicate. But the
court does say: "By the broad language used we may assume perhaps that the legislature intended to enlarge somewhat the scope
of our original jurisdiction as upon mandamus or prohibition, by
bringing under it matters not included within the scope of those
writs at common law." It is the next declaration that is of the
greatest import: "But we cannot construe the statute as intended
to give us the power and authority to substitute our judgment for
that of the Commission, in a matter purely legislative or administrative." The court's meaning is clear that the court has a jurisdiction the scope of which lies between the narrow power which
may be exercised through the writs of mandamus and prohibition
and the broad power to substitute judicial judgment for administrative judgment. But the vital inquiry is why the court does
not have the power to substitute its judgment for that of the commission. Is it because of the reasoning in the early part of the
court's opinion which applied the separation of powers clause in
such a way as to lead to the conclusion that there was no jurisdiction by appeal but only by "process akin to mandamus or proThe doctrine is some70 Dillon v. Bare, 60 W. Va. 483, 56 S. E. 390 (1906).
times differently stated: "Where an inferior tribunal is authorized to use its
discretion and proceeds to exercise such discretion, it can not be controlled by
nandainus in judicially determining questions properly presented for its conMiller v. County Court, 34 W. Va.
sideration and within its jurisdiction."
285, 12 S. E. 702 (1890). For other cases see the W. VA. ANN. CODE (Michie,
1937) c. 53, art. 1, § 1.
71 The only provision of the constitution defining the original jurisdiction
of the supreme court is art. VIII, § 3, providing that "It shall have original
jurisdiction in eases of habeas corpus, mandamus, and prohibition." It was
held in the United Fuel Gas case that the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme
court could not be expanded by the legislature. The court gives no explanation
for its conclusion that the original jurisdiction may be broadened by legisla-

tive enactment.
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hibition ",7 or is it only because of the court's interpretation of the
intent of the legislatur6 in enacting the statute? The court seems
to say that both reasons support the conclusion, that is, that the
court does not have power to substitute its judgment for that of
the commission because of two independent reasons: (1) under the
separation of powers clause there may be no appeal from commission to court but the action of the commission may be reviewed
only "by process akin to mandamus or prohibition", and, (2) it
was not the intention of the legislature in enacting the statute that
the court should substitute its judgment for the commission's
judgment.
But what an extraordinary conclusion results from the United
Fuel Gas case so interpreted! If the separation of powers clause
prevents the court from substituting -its judgment for that of the
commission on fact questions, then the separation of powers clause
of the West Virginia constitution, so interpreted, violates the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,
as interpreted by the Federal Supreme Court, and is therefore unconstitutional! For it was held in the well-known decision of Ohio
Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough3 that if the owner in a
rate case "claims confiscation of his property will result, the state
must ptovide a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a
judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent
judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise the order is void because in conflict with the due process clause, Fourteenth Amendment." The case held that the power in the court to determine
whether or not the commission's order was "reasonable and in conformity with law" and whether "there was competent evidence
tending to sustain the commission's conclusion and no abuse of discretion" did not satisfy the requirement. There must be power
in the court to substitute its judgment for that of the commission
as to both law and facts.
If, then, the proper interpretation of the opinion in the United
Fuel Gas case is that the separation of powers clause forbids the
72 This is apparently the interpretation given in Hardman, supra n. 62:
... it was held that, as a rate regulation involves legislative action, not
judicial action, the court had no power to substitute its judgment for that of
the commission in a matter purely legislative or administrative."
73 253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed. 908 (1920). To substantially the
same effect, see St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 56
S. Ct. 720, 80 L..Ed. 1033 (1936). See also Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. United
States, 298 U. S. 349, 56 S. Ct. 797, 80 L. Ed. 1209 (1936). '
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court from exercising an independent judgment as to both law and
facts, the separation of powers clause, as interpreted, violates the
Fourteenth Amendment. From the standpoint of the legislature,
a perfect dilemma is presented.14 The power of substituting
judicial judgment for administrative judgment must be either
granted or withheld. If it is granted, the separation of powers
clause of the West Virginia constitution is violated, under the
United Fuel Gas case. If it is withheld, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution is violated. If something must
yield, it must be the separation of powers clause of the state constitution, which, accordingly, is unconstitutional. Separation of
powers, the cardinal principle upon which the federal and all the
state governments are founded, a great American contribution to
the science of government, violates the due process clause! Such
an absurd result surely proves the unsoundness of either the United
Puel Gas case or the Ben Avon case, or both.
Of course, it is not clear that the court in the United Fuel Gas
case meant to hold that the separation of powers clause stands in
the way of independent judicial judgment. Perhaps, by analogy
to the practice of interpreting an ambiguous statute so as to render
it constitutional, we should interpret the court's opinion in such a
way as to save the constitutionality of the separation of powers
clause. But by doing so we sacrifice the constitutionality of the
Public Service Commission Act, for it is undeniable that the United
Fuel Gas case, either because of separation of powers or because
of the court's construction of the act, or both, holds that judicial
judgment may not be substituted for administrative judgment.
The court convincingly substantiates its interpretation of the intent of the legislature: "Such a construction [permitting the court
to substitute its judgment] would practically emasculate the statute
74 There is one possibility that the dilemma may not be perfect. Judicial
review of the action of the Public Service Commission need not necessarily
be in the supreme court of appeals, but might be placed in the circuit courts.
Under the separation of powers clause, it would seem to be as bad to confer
legislative power upon the circuit courts as upon the supreme court. And it
has recently been held that legislative power may not be conferred upon a circuit court. E. g.: Hodges v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 110 W. Va. 649, 159 S. E. 834
(1931). However, it has sometimes been held that there is a difference between the circuit courts and the supreme court in this regard. B. g.: Mackin
v. County Court, 38 W. Va. 338, 18 S.E. 632 (1893). If this view were taken,
the legislature could escape from the dilemma by transferring to the circuit
courts the jurisdiction to review orders of the commission. There is little
likelihood, however, that since the decision of the Hodges case this view would
be taken, for the Hodges opinion disapproves the Mackin case and similar

holdings.
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and rob it and the Commission of their proper authority and jurisdiction. The salaries *hich the statute attaches to the office of the
Commissioners, and the nature of the subjects to be dealt with by
them, all imply that only persons of the requisite qualifications
should be appointed, and that after appointment they should by
investigation and study become further qualified by learning and
experience, indeed should become experts upon all subjects and
business coming within their jurisdiction. Is it to be presumed
then that the legislature intended to invest in this court jurisdiction on review by original or other process to substitute its
judgment for that of the Commission? We cannot so hold." 7 5
Despite the wisdom of this rationalization, which in the opinion of
many is undoubtedly confirmed by subsequent experience, the
statute as thus interpreted violates the Fourteenth Amendment in
any rate case in which confiscation is claimed.
It is clear, then, that although the reason for the holding is
not free from doubt, the procedure required by the United Fuel
Gas case violates the due process requirement of the Ben Avon case.
But the Ben Avon case was decided six years after the United Fuel
Gas case. If the latter case is followed in subsequent decisions, the
whole West Virginia practice may be unconstitutional.
Since the decision of the United Fuel Gas case, the West Virginia court has handed down sixteen decisions of especial significance on the question of the weight which the court will give to
the findings of fact of the Public Service Commission. If the
language of the court in these sixteen cases is to be taken at its
face value, it is apparent that the court does not substitute its
judgment for that of the commission on fact questions. Three
cases 7 carry syllabi by the court as follows: "Findings of fact
by the Public Service Commission based upon evidence to support
them generally will not be reviewed by this court." In another
case 77 this statement is quoted with approval in the opinion. The
75 This interpretation is in keeping with the terms of the statute. The provision that "the court shall decide the matter in controversy as may seem
to be just and right" leaves open the question whether the court must substitute its judgment on fact questions for the judgment of the commission or
whether the court should set aside findings of fact of the commission only if
they are not supported by the evidence.
76 Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 84 W. Va. 662, 100 S. E.
557 (1919) (syl. 11); City of Charleston v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 86 W. Va. 536,
103 S. E. 673 (1920) (syl. 1); City of Huntington v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 89
W. Va. 703, 110 S. E. 192 (1921) (syl. 1).
77 Collins v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 94 W. Va. 455, 119 S. E. 288 (1923).
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word "generally" seems to imply that exceptions are made to
78
the rule thus stated. But such is not the case, for in four cases
the court made a flat declaration in the syllabus without the word
"generally": "Findings of fact by the Public Service Commission based upon evidence to support them will not be reviewed by
this court." No reason is discernible from the facts of the cases
for including the word "generally" in the statement of the rule
in some cases and for omitting it in others. In four additional
cases79 the practice of the court to refrain from making an independent inquiry into the facts is stated in various forms in the
syllabi. In twelve of the sixteen cases, then, the language of the
court is clear and unequivocal that the court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the commission. It may be noteworthy
that in three of the other four cases the commission's orders were
"set aside" or the cases "reversed and remanded", and the fourth"
was affirmed by the West Virginia court but reversed by the United
States Supreme Court. But even in the cases in which the West
Virginia court reversed the commission, lip service was paid to the
rule stated in the other cases. Thus: " ... a fact, once found by
the commission, will not be disturbed by this court, if there is sufficient evidence to support it.""' ". . .. we have persistently held
that because the commission is 'experienced in rates and familiar
with the intricacies of rate making' we will ordinarily not substitute our judgment for that of the commission on controverted evi-

78 Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 82 W. Va. 408, 96 S. E. 62
(1918) (syl. 2); Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 90 W. Va. 1,
110 S.E.475 (1922) (syl. 3); MacKubin v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 95 W. Va. 546,
121 S.E. 731 (1924) (syl. 2); Town of Harrisville v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 103
W. Va. 526, 138 S.E. 99 (1927).
79 Baltimore & Ohio R.R.v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 99 W. Va. 670, 130 S.E. 131
(1925) ("Findings of fact by the Public Service Commission will not be disturbed upon appeal to this Court, unless the Commission has acted so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to evidence, or without evidence
to support them."); Pittsburgh & W. Va. Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 101
where there is a substantial conflict
W. Va. 63, 132 S. E. 497 (1926) ("...
of evidence on any question of fact, the probative value accorded by the Commission to such evidence will not be disturbed."); City of Huntington v. Pub.
Serv. Comm., 101 W. Va. 378, 133 S. E. 144 (1926); Bluefield Telephone Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm., 102 W. Va. 296, 135 S.E. 833 (1926) ("An order of the
Public Service Commission will not be annulled by this court unless the order
manifests unlawful, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power.")
s Bluefleld Water Works & Imp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 89 W. Va. 736,
110 S. E.205 (1921), 262 U. S.679, 43 S. Ct. 675, 67 L. Ed. 1176 (1923).
1Natural Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 95 W. Va. 557, 561, 121 S.E. 716
(1924).
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dence. 's- ".....although our judgment will not ordinarily be substituted for that of the commission, because of the latter's experience in rates, . . . where it appears that its findings of fact axe
contrary to the evidence or without evidence, or there has been
misapplication of legal principles, it becomes our bounden duty
as a matter of law to set aside the same and remand the case for
further consideration in conformity with law.""
If, then, the practice is what the court seems to say it is, West
Virginia apparently does not accord an opportunity for an independent judicial inquiry in Public Service Commission cases. If
such a practice is followed in cases in which the owner claims confiscation the requirement of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court in the Ben Avon case is violated. But compliance or noncompliance with the Ben Avon doctrine does not necessarily depend
upon the language which the court uses in its opinions in cases in
which it reviews findings of the Public Service Commission. The
question is whether or not the court does in fact make an independent inquiry.8 4 The difference, between what a court does and
what it professes to do in this regard was recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in the St. Joseph case.8 5 The district court
in its opinion in that case had expressed the view that it is not
within the province of the judiciary to weigh the evidence and pass
upon issues of fact. However, the ,Court held: "As the District
Court, despite its observations as to the scope of review, apparently
did pass upon the evidence, making findings of its own and adopting findings of the Secretary, we do not think it necessary to remand
"
the cause for further consideration. ....
It seems indisputable that in many cases the practice declared
But not all of the cases come within the constiis followed.
82 City of Charleston v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 110 W. Va. 245, 248, 159 S. E.
38 (1931).
83 City of Wheeling v. Natural Gas Co., 115 W. Va. 149, 155, 175 S.E. 339
(1934).
84 In the West Virginia workmen's compensation cases the difference between holding and dictum in this connection is much more pronounced than in
the Public Service Commission cases. See infra, p. 313, et seq.
85 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S.38, 56 S. Ct. 720,
80 L. Ed. 1033 (1936).
" Wheeling v. Natural Gas Co., 115 W. Va. 149, 175 S.E. 339 (1934), may
be an exception to the general practice. The case, however, involved no question of confiscation, inasmuch as the city, and not the company, appealed tho
case. After observing that the court was bound to set aside findings contrary
to evidence or without evidence or reached on the basis of a misapplication of

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1938

27

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1938], Art. 3

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
tutional requirement, which is limited to cases in which "the owner
claims confiscation", and eleven of our sixteen cases were not such
cases. The remaining five call for more detailed analysis.
7
In Baltimore and O7tia R. R. v. Public Service Commission8
the commission had entered an order prescribing maximum rates,
and the court declared that there was "but one question, whether
under the evidence the rates are just and reasonable". The court
declared flatly: "We cannot substitute our judgment for that of
the Commission on the weight of evidence." The court also declared: "Nor will such findings be disturbed on appeal unless the
Commission has acted so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates
contrary to evidence, or without evidence to support them." If the
legal principles, the court proceeded in a lengthy opinion to set aside at least
ten specific findings of the commission, concluding .with a verbal chastisement
of the commission in the following words: "Concretely stated we would
caution the commission to give greater heed to actual value and less to
theories."
Most of the findings on which the court reversed the commission
probably involved questions of law and not questions of fact, although some
of the findings illustrate the frequent difficulty of distinguishing questions of
law from questions of fact. The commission was found to be in error in failing to give adequate consideration to the original cost of the property, in
charging to operating expenses certain items which should have been capitalized, in failing to take account of age and obsolescence as well as physical
depreciation, in failing to follow the prevailing practice of using the "rock
pressure" method of ascertaining the depreciated condition of the gas well
account, in including in the valuation leaseholds not presently in use or soon
to be used, in adding an item for going concern value when the company had
not sustained the burden of showing going concern value, in using exclusively
the gas sales method of allocation of value among three states, in failing to
consider salvage value ol worn-out property. Each of these errors of the
commission has to do with the method by which the commission arrived at its
findings of fact, and it is at least arguable that each question is therefore
probably properly considered a question of law and not of fact. The commission stated that its finding as to the reproduction cost of the property was
based upon the lowest price levels for labor and materials available in the
record. Because this statement was untrue, the court reversed the finding! as to
the reproduction cost. Such a correction of a mistake probably comes Within
the court's formula in this instance of setting aside a finding because it is
"contrary to the evidence".

On just one finding, it is more than ar

able

that the court did substitute its judgment for that of the commission.

The

commission found that the future life of the company was thirty year and
included an item for amortization accordingly. The court declared: ''We
cannot accord in the finding that the company will cease to function rithin
a period of thirty years . . . it would be unfair, at this time, to burdn the
consumers in this state with an additional annual charge . . . based on a
thirty year life expectancy."
Even though on this point the court did seem
to exercise an independent judgment on a question of fact, the fact tha such
action was taken in a case in which at least nine other findings were also reversed tends to weaken considerably the effect that this one isolated instance
may have upon the general rule as declared and apparently applied in' fourteen other cases.
87 99 W. Va. 670, 130 S. E. 131 (1925).
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phrase, "contrary to evidence" were taken out of its context, it
would probably mean "contrary to the weight of the evidence",
and if the finding were to be disturbed if contrary to the weight of
the evidence, the court would be exercising an independent
judgment - all that the Ben Avon case requires. However, this
phrase may not properly be read apart from its context, and the
sentence must mean that a finding will not be disturbed unless it
is so clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence that the commission has acted arbitrarily and unjustly. This interpretation is
borne out by the previous statement that the court will not substitute its judgment on the weight of the evidence, and also by the
statement later in the opinion that, "The value of evidence in rate
proceedings varies, and the weight to be given to it is peculiarly
for the body experienced in regard to rates, and familiar with the
intricacies of rate making." The order was therefore "affirmed",
apparently without the court's exercising an independent judgment
as to the facts. The holding therefore seems to be in violation of
the Ben Avon requirement.
Doubt as to the meaning of the opinion in Pittsburgh & W.
Va. Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission"" is somewhat greater.
The company complained of an order of the commission refusing
an increase in rates "on the ground that the rates now in effect are
confiscatory". The main point of error relied upon was the failure
of the commission to accept an estimate that the net earnings in
1925 would be $1,000,000 less than in 1924. After pointing out a
discrepancy between a figure upon which the estimate was based
and a figure taken from an audit of the books, the court observed:
"The probative value of estimates is inconsequential when compared with actualities. The Commission had before it a comprehensive history of the utility, its financial operations, purchases,
expenses, stock transactions, dividends and depreciations, fluctuations in production and sales, and the like, together with its
developed and undeveloped gas territories, all of which could be
considered by it in weighing the testimony of decreased sales and
increased expenses for the year 1925." It is significant that the
court said that these factors were before the commission and could
be considered by it. There is no indication that these factors were
considered by the court. The court seemed to deny that it considered such factors: "We cannot say that the Commission acted
88 101 W. Va. 63, 132 S. E. 497 (1926).
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without evidence; nor can we say that the estimates of decreased
sales and increased expenses founded largely upon conjecture
should outweigh the actual facts and figures considered by the
Commission." 9 The court then defined the scope of its inquiry:
"The courts do not attempt to weigh conflicting evidence in rate
cases; and will not interfere with the rates fixed, unless the Commission has acted so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to evidence or without evidence to support them.''90 (That
this practice rests upon separation of powers seems to be implied
by the court's next statement: "It must be kept in mind that the
fixing of rates is legislative in its character.") So far as appears
from this part of the opinion, it seems rather clear that the court
did not make an independent finding as to the probable reduction
in earnings in 1925. However, after a discussion of other questions, the court declared in the latter part of the opinion: "Confiscation is the basis of the application for reversal of the order,
and we have examined the evidence on which the finding of fact is
based, to ascertain if there has been a misinterpretation of legal
principles or a mistake as to the evidence, or no evidence on which
to base the findings . . ." What is meant by "a mistake as to the
evidence"? Certainly this question cannot be answered with
definiteness. But the opinion should be interpreted to make it consistent with itself, and, since in the early part of the opinion the
court declared without ambiguity or uncertainty that the court
would not weigh conflicting evidence, it seems reasonable to assume
that the court did not mean by the words, "a mistake as to the
evidence", to indicate that the court did weigh the conflicting evidence on the question concerning the probable reduction in earnings in 1925. If this analysis is correct, the case constitutes another failure to follow the Ben Avon doctrine, and the company
was therefore denied procedural due process of law.91
s9ltlics supplied.

9o As pointed out in the preceding paragraph concerning the Baltimore &
Ohio case, the words "contrary to evidence" as used in this context probably
mean "so clearly contrary to the evidence as to be arbitrary and unjust". A
mere difference of opinion between the commission and the court. as to what
was the weight of the evidence would hardly indicate that the commission had
acted "Iarbitrarily and unjustly".
9' In Buchanan, The Ohio Valley Water Company Case and the Valuation of
1Railroads (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 1033, 1076, the Pittsburgh & West Virginia
Gas Co. case is interpreted as following the principle of the Ben Avon case.
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In Bluefield Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission,"
the company complained of an order of the commission "because
of (1) the valuation fixed as the rate base, (2) the rate of depreciation allowed, and (3) the conclusion that the present revenue is
an ample return of the Company's investment." After reviewing
the evidence the court declared: "The solution of problems such as
these is peculiarly within the province of the Commission. In this
case the Commission has exercised its judgment in good faith. We
find no reason to question the result." The action of the court
apparently conformed with the court's statement in the syllabus:
"An order of the Public Service Commission will not be annulled
by this court unless the order manifests unlawful, arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power." Again, so far as can be ascertained
from the case, the Ben Avon requirement apparently was not met.
3
The holding in NaturaZ Gas Co. v. Public Service CommissionC
is not helpful and the language is confusing. The commission had
refused an application for an increase in rates. After paying lip
service to its rule against an independent judicial investigation,
the court observed that the rate base "nowhere appears in this
record; so it becomes necessary for us to review the evidence in
order to determine whether the ultimate finding of the commission
is correct. . . ." The court then proceeded to try to determine the
rate base from the evidence in the record. As to one item, however, "the evidence as to the amount is too uncertain in this case
for us to determine any particular sum." Most puzzling is the
court's statement: "We are asked by the company to exercise our
independent judgment upon'the evidence and determine the rate
base. This we would do if we had sufficient facts before us. We
are not disposed... to shirk our duty. . ." Since the court could
not ascertain the rate base, it concluded, "we think it proper to
reverse the order and send it back for further investigation and
inquiry." Although the court did attempt to exercise its independent judgment in finding the rate base, the decision is not inconsistent with cases holding that the court will not exercise an independent judgment in finding facts, because apparently the only
reason for the attempted exercise of an independent judgment was
the fact that the rate base used by the commission did not appear
in the record. The court might well have remanded the case with92102

93 95

W. Va. 296, 135 S. E. 833 (1926).

. Va. 557, 121 S. E. 716 (1924).
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out attempting to make an independent judicial inquiry, but the
court's own attempt to find the rate base is not inconsistent with
the practice in other cases to refuse to pass upon the weight of the
evidence.
Although the West Virginia practice is seemingly in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court, no West Virginia case has ever been reversed by
that Court because of failure to afford opportunity for an independent judicial inquiry. In one case the Federal Supreme Court did
comment upon the West Virginia practice, Bluefield Water Works
& Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission. 4 The West Virginia court, in affirming the order of the commission, made no
statement with respect to its practice of sustaining findings of fact
based upon evidence to support them, for it happened that the
primary question in the case was not one of fact but one of
law as to the proper method to be followed in finding the valuation
of property. The Supreme Court reversed the West Virginia court
because the commission had considered the original cost and had
not accorded "proper, if any, weight" to the estimated cost of reproduction new. The Court did, however, advert to the practice of
the
est Virginia court of sustaining findings based on evidence
to support them. Mr. Justice Butler declared: "The State Supreme Court of Appeals holds that the valuing of property of a
public utility corporation and prescribing rates are purely legislative acts not subject to judicial review except in so far as may be
necessaiy to determine whether such rates are void on constitutional or other grounds; and that findings of fact by the commission based on evidence to support them will not be reviewed by the
court." In support of this statement, three West Virginia cases
were cited. Then, after pointing out the error of the West Virginia court in sustaining the commission's improper method of
valuation, Mr. Justice Butler observed: "Plaintiff in error is eAtitled under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the independent judgment of the court as to both law and
facts."
For this, the Ben Avon case was cited.
At least some significance must lie in the fact that the United
States Supreme Court went so far afield in its opinion in order
to caution the West Virginia court that opportunity must be
94 89 W. Va. 736, 110 S. E. 205 (1921), rev'd 262 U. S. 679, 43 S. Ct. 675,
67 L. Ed. 1176 (1923).
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given for an independent judicial inquiry in rate cases in which
the owner claims confiscation. A discussion of this requirement
was twice removed from the case before the court, for not
only was the question of an independent judicial inquiry not
raised in that case but the cases cited to show the West Virginia
practice involved no constitutional question and hence even under
the Ben Avon decision were not improperly decided.
If the language of the Supreme Court in the Bluefield case was
meant as a warning to the West Virginia court, that court apparently did not heed the warning. Instead, -itseems that it has
valiantly clung to its view which was first expounded in the United
Fuel Gas case, even though its decisions have been subject to reversal by the Supreme Court. Whether this seeming defiance
should be called a despicable persistence in refusing to comply with
requirements of due process of law, or whether it should be
heralded as a worthy achievement of the West Virginia court in
sustaining a reasonable and efficient system in spite of an unfortunate decision of the Supreme Court, is a question which has already called forth such an abundance of periodical literature that
little new could be added at this late date. Suffice it to observe
that few decisions of the United States Supreme Court have re5
ceived more adverse comment than the Ben Avon case.0 In addition, three judges dissented from both the original decision and
from the 1936 decision in which the doctrine was reaffirmedY' It
is well said by a 1938 commentator of the dissenting justices in
these cases: "Because their reasoning seems more to accord with
the temper of the times, it is they, rather than the majority, who
'0' 7
Indeed, with the
are likely to gain adherents to their position.
95 Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 519;
Beutel, Valuation as a Requirement of Due Process of Law in Rate Cases (1930)
43 H .v. L. REv. 1249; Buchanan, The Ohio Valley Water Case and the Valuation of Railroads (1927) 40 HBAv. L. Rv,. 1033; Wiel, Administrative
Finality (1925) 38 H]ARv. L. REv. 447; Brown, The Functions of Courts and
Commissions in Public Utility Rate Regulation (1924) 38 HAv.L. REV. 141;
Curtis, Judicial Review of Commission Rate Regulations - The Ohio Valley
Case (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 862; Freund, The Right to a Judicial Review in
Rate Controversies (1921) 27 W. VA. L. Q. 207; Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the Federal Supreme Court (1921) 35 HAV.
L. REv. 127; Hardman, Judicial Review as a Requirement of Due Process in
Rate Regulation (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 681; Isaacs, Judicial Review of Administrative Findings (1921) 30 YALE L. J.781.
9a In Baltimore & Ohio R. R.v. United States, 298 U. S. 349, 56 S. Ct. 797,
80 L. Ed. 1209 (1936) four justices joined in an expression of such views.
97 Landis, supra n. 95, at p. 529.
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recent changes in the personnel of the Supreme Court, it seems not
unlikely that the Ben Avon doctrine may soon be discarded. 8
The Public Service Commission Act neither grants nor denies
the power of the Supreme Court to modify an order of the commission. The relevant clause provides: "Any party feeling
aggrieved by the entry of a final order by the commission ...

may

present a petition in writing to the supreme court of appeals ...
praying for the suspension of such final order ...

If the court...

be of the opinion that a suspending order should issue, the court
...

may require bond... The court shall decide the matter in con-

troversy as may seem to be just and right." 99
It might reasonably be argued that since the petition to the
court must pray "for the suspension of such final order" the only
power of the court is to suspend or to refuse to suspend a final
order. Similarly, the provision for bond in case of issuance of a
suspending order, with no mention of a modifying order, might
be interpreted as a denial of the power to modify. But the concluding sentence permitting the court to decide "as may seem to
be just and right" is sufficiently broad to include the power to
modify an order of the commission. In effect, then, the question
is left for judicial decision.
The court has never specifically discussed the question whether
or not it has power to modify an order of the Public Service Commission. In one case, however, the court did modify such an
order.100 After indicating an opinion that the commission's order
had gone too far in one respect, the court declared: "We are of
opinion to modify the order of the Commission in this particular,
and affirm it in all other respects." Accordingly, the order of the
0s United Gas Public Service Co. v. Texas, 58 S. Ct. 483 (1938), may be a
step in the direction of overruling the Ben Avon case. It is there held that
the question of the reasonableness of rates fIxed by a commission may be submitted to a jury and that the requirement of an independent judicial inquiry
is thus satisfied.
99 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 24, art. 5, § 1.
00 City of Huntington v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 101 W. Va. 378, 133 S. E. 144
(1926). The order of the commission provided: "Hereafter, when a local
servic,- area, city or town, moves into another group by reason of the change
in its number of stations, the telephone company may put into effect rates
applicable to the Class Rate of said group by filing with the Commission a
tariff, together with an affidavit setting forth the number of stations in such
local service area, city or town." The order was modified by the court because: "The Commission certainly cannot by such order prevent the patrons
in the future from protesting against, or estop itself from investigating, any
proposed reclassification."
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commission was "Modified and affirmed." Although the absence
of discussion of the court's power may indicate some degree of
inadvertence on the part of the court, the case nevertheless must
be deemed an authoritative interpretation of the act, for it is undeniable that the court did modify the order.201
Important consequences may follow from this' interpretation,
for, according to the analysis made by the United States Supreme
Court in a series of cases, if the court has the power to modify a
legislative order, then the court in reviewing the order acts legislatively, whether the court affirms, reverses, or modifies the order.
Thus, in the leading case of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,102
it was held that the Virginia supreme court of appeals in reviewing rates fixed by the corporation commission of that state acted
legislatively, because the court had the power "to substitute such
order as, in its opinion, the commission should have made". Even
in the very early case of Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,103
in which it was settled that it is a judicial function to set aside
unreasonable or confiscatory rates fixed by a commission, the importance of the fact that the courts had no power to revise or
change was recognized: "The courts are not authorized to revise
or change the body of rates imposed by a legislature or a commission; they do not determine whether one rate is preferable to another, or what under all circumstances would be fair and reasonable as between the carriers and the shippers; they do not engage
in any mere administrative work; but still there can be no doubt
of their power and duty to inquire whether a body of rates prescribed by a legislature or a commission is unjust and unreasonable,
and such as to work a practical destruction to rights of property,
and if found so to be, to restrain its operation." In Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co.,104 the pivotal language was: "Has it [the court]
the power to make the order the Commission should have made? If
it has, then the court is to exercise legislative power in that it will
be laying down new rules, to change present conditions and to guide
future action and is not confined to definition and protection of
existing rights." Accordingly, it was held that the provision for
101 In City of Elkins v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 102 W. Va. 450, 135 S. E. 397
(1926), the court concluded its opinion by an intimation that it, had power to
modify: "We do not find sufficient cause in the action of the Commission ...
justifying setting aside or modification of the order complained of."
102 211 U. S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. 150 (1908).
1 154 U. S. 362, 397, 14 S. Ct. 1047, 38 L. Ed. 1014 (1894).
104 261 U. S. 428, 440, 43 S. Ct. 445, 67 L. Ed. 731 (1923).
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appeal to the Supreme Court from the courts of the District of
Columbia, which had the power to modify, was unconstitutional.
Similarly, in Porter v. Investors Syndicate0 5 it was held that since
a court could "set aside, modify or confirm" an order of the Montana investment commissioner, the court acted, at least in part,
legislatively.
Under such decisions of the Federal Supreme Court, a court
having the power to modify legislative orders of a commission act%
legislatively, whether it affirms, modifies, or reverses. In the absence of a West Virginia holding on the proposition, these decisions
may well be accepted as authoritative. 10 It follows, therefore, that
since the West Virginia court did modify an order of thq Public
Service Commission in one case, and since a court having the power
to modify a legislative order acts legislatively, the West Virginia
court acts legislatively in reviewing orders of the Public Service
Commission. The Public Service Commission Act as mt.rpreted,
then, confers a legislative power upon the supreme court of appeals.
This reasoning proves that the Public Service Commission Act is
unconstitutional in its entirety, under the Hodges case, 107 which
held unconstitutional the West Virginia Water Power Act because
it conferred a legislative power upon a court!
Of course, no one expect the West Virginia Public Serviep
Commission Act to be held unconstitutional on this basis. The
point is that the result of the combination of the two doctrines, that
a court which may modify acts legislatively, and that the separation of powers clause forbids a court from acting legislatively,
serves to demonstrate the extreme artificiality of the two doctrines.
At least since 1926 the West Virginia court has had the power to
modify orders of the commission, if the fact that the court did in
that year modify such an order has any significance. Has any
harm resulted? On a purely conceptualistic basis, the doctrine of
'or 286 U. S. 461, 58 S. Ct. 617, 76 L. Ed. 1226 (1932).
100 Of course it is not necessarily true in the nature of things that the power

to modify a legislative order is a legislative power. Logic seems to break
down completely in the distinctions drawn between the judicial and the legislative. Thus, if the power to modify is legislative, because an order of modification "looks to the future", why is not the power to suspend a Iegilative order also legislativei An order of suspension "looks to the future '
just as the repeal of a statute by a legislature "looks to the future". The
difficulty is one which is intrinsic in any attempt to force powers which are
made up of numberless ingredients in varying proportions to fit three rigia'
categories called judicial, legislative and executive.
107 Hodges v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 110 W. Nra. 649, 159 S. E. 834 (1931).
This case is discussed at length below, p. 352, et seq.
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separation of powers has been violated, for judicial and legislative
powers are combined, and, according to the court in the Hodges
case: "There is no liberty if the powers of judging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers."' 10 8 Would any reasonable person assert that the government of the state since 1926 has
to the extent of the court's power to modify commission orders
been tyrannical and that there has to that extent been "no
liberty"? If it is expedient from the standpoint of convenience
and efficiency in government that a court should have power in its
discretion to modify a legislative order of a commission, should a
jurisprudence of conceptions founded upon the writings of an
eighteenth century French philosopher be allowed to stand in the
way?
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Of all the workmen's compensation cases decided by the West
Virginia supreme court, at least one case in every five involves
primarily a review of the findings of fact of the commissioner. 10 9
Unlike the taxation and Public Service Commission cases, most
workmen's compensation opinions do not involve discussions of
separation of powers. Only in the initial establishment of the
practice did the theory of separation of powers come into play;""
the great bulk of the cases make no mention of it. The fundamental
question raised by the cases is the extent to which the court should
review administrative findings of fact. The court might give no
weight to the commissioner's findings, simply substituting its
judgment for that of the commissioner, or it might regard administrative findings as final and limit judicial review strictly to
questions of law, or it might follow some intermediate practice.
Inquiries concerning what is and what should be the practice, and
the reasons therefor, are important not only in the quest for maximum efficiency in the administration of workmen's compensation,
but they are of immediate consequence to the practitioner, for helpful guides indicating what findings the court is likely to affirm or
reverse might win cases that seem lost or save useless appeals. That
the court's own statements of guiding principles do not accurately
10 Quoted with approval by the court from Alexander Hamilton.
109 The supreme court of appeals has decided about 225 workmen Is compensation cases. Those which, in the opinion of the writer, involve primarily
questions of fact total about 44. Of course, separating questions of fact from
questions of law involves judgment, and opinions may differ in many cases.
110 See infra, p. 311, et seq.
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reflect what the court does in affirming or reversing findings lends
emphasis to the utility of attempting such inquiries.
It is now reasonably clear that constitutional obstacles do not
stand in the way of complete administrative finality on fact questions in West Virginia workmen's compensation cases. At one
time in the development of this law, the constitutionality of such
finality was very much in doubt. The decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon
Borough held that where confiscation is claimed due process of
law requires an independent judicial determination of the value of
public utility property for rate-making purposes."' The Illinois
supreme court held in 1922 that this decision was applicable to the
findings of fact of the Illinois Industrial Commission in a workmen's compensation case 1 2 but the Illinois court in 1925 apparently changed its view and distinguished the Ben Avon case on the
ground that fixing rates for the future is a legislative function and
that the decision is therefore inapplicable to the performance of an
essentially judicial function by an agency which administers the
workmen's compensation act.11 Finally, in 1931, the New York
Court of Appeals distinguished the Ben Avon case on like grounds
and held constitutional a proyision of the New York workmen's
compensation statute making the decisions of the Industrial Board
"final as to all questions of fact", and this holding was unanimously affirmed without opinion by the United States Supreme Court."'
This decision, of course, destroyed what was left of the idea that
the Ben Avon case stood in the way of administrative finality in
workmen's compensation cases. However, in 1932 came Crowell
v. Benson,"' holding that with respect to determinations of facts
which are "fundamental" or "jurisdictional" in the administration of the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act the findings by the deputy commissioner are not final
11 253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed. 908 (1920). The doctrine of the
Ben Avon case was reaffirmed in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
298 U. S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed. 1033 (1936). See list of commentaries on
the Ben Avon case in note 95, supra.
112 Otis Elevator Co. v. Industrial Comm., 302 Ill. 90, 134 N. E. 19 (1922).
113 Nega v. Chicago Rys. Co., 317 Ill. 482, 148 M. E. 250 (1925). In DODD,
ADMINISTRATION OP WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1936) 372, it is said that
the highest court of Oklahoma has upheld finality of fact determination, citing
Pine v. State Industrial Comm., 108 Okla. 185 (1925), but such an interpretation of the ease seems questionable.
"14 Helfrick v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 256 N. Y. 199, 176 N. E. 141
(1931), aff'd 284 U. S. 594, 52 S. Ct. 203, 76 L. Ed. 512 (1932).
'is 285 U. S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598 (1932).
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but that such issues of fact must be tried de novo before a court.
The opinion indicates that questions as to whether or not the injury occurs on the navigable waters of the United States and
whether or not the relation of master and servant exists are questions of "fundamental" or "jurisdictional" facts, and that the
question whether or not the injury was occasioned solely by the
intoxication of the employee or by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another is not such a question
of "fundamental" or "jurisdictional" fact. But the opinion in
failing to make clear the criterion for so classifying questions of
fact leaves in doubt what other questions of fact might be included
within this classification. The opinion is also obscure as to the very
basis of decision. If, as might be reasonably argued, it rests upon
the due process clause, then it is applicable to the administration
of state compensation acts. 186 If, as is more probable but far from
clear, it rests upon Article III of the Federal Constitution, extending the judicial power of the United States "to all Cases of Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction", then it does not affect state
compensation acts, except as it may constitute an analogy for the
interpretation of similar provisions of state constitutions, and it is
clear that no provision of the West Virginia constitution would be
so interpreted." 7 However, even though some doubt remains as
to whether or not the administration of state compensation acts
may in some cases fall within the scope of the holding in Crowell v.
Benson, it happens that the West Virginia e6mpensation act is
elective instead of compulsory and the United States Supreme
Court has held that an employer "who elects to accept the law
may not complain that, in the plan for ...compensation for injury
sustained, there is no particular form of judicial review" n 8 It
probably follows that an employee who seeks to accept the benefits of the act would similarly have no standing to assert the unconstitutionality of the act. Therefore, even if Crowell v. Benson
does apply to state compensation acts it cannot be applied to the
West Virginia elective act because no one is in a position to raise
l' See Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial .leview of Administrative
Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact " (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 1055; Note (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 478.
",7 The only relevant provision is art. VIII, § 1: "The judicial power of the
State shall be vested in a supreme court of appeals, in circuit courts and the
judges thereof, in such inferior tribunals as are herein authorized and in
justices of the peace."
I's Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Comm., 271 U. S. 208, 46 S. Ct. 491,
70 L. Ed. 908 (1926).
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the question of constitutionality, and on this basis the conclusion
is reasonably clear that no constitutional obstacle stands in the way
of giving complete finality to administrative findings.
In many states the workmen's compensation statutes either
provide that administrative findings of fact shall be final or provide for judicial review of questions of law only.1 9 A Maryland
court has thus summed up the state of the legislation: "In nearly
half of the state acts in this country and in federal acts, finality
is given to the findings of the commission on facts."'

20

The West

Virginia statute contains no such. provision, the only indication
in the statute as to the scope of judicial review being that "the
supreme court on such review shall determine the matter and certify its decision to the board and the commissioner' ".121 The court
has from the beginning taken the view that the "statute no doubt
gives us right to review the findings of the Commissioner on evi"
dence presented to him". '22
The court accordingly has been wholly
free to work out its own practice, unhampered by either statutory
or constitutional limitation, apart from the separation of powers
clause of the state constitution.
How, then, should the court determine its practice? What are
the criteria?
The arguments against administrative finality are centered in
the idea that there is security in the judicial process which an
119 In DODD, A)D nISTRATION OF WORKEN 's Co PENsATION 371 et seg., it is
indicated that the statutes of the following states make administrative determinations of fact final: California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin.
In Georgia and Iowa such findings are final if there is "sufficient competent
evidence".
That a statute provides for administrative finality does not always mean
that the courts in practice accord administrative finality. Even if review is
limited to questions of law, the court may still determine all jurisdictional
questions, may review the evidence to ascertain whether or not the finding is
based on sufficient evidence or is contrary to the clear preponderance of the
evidence, may decide whether or not the finding was unreasonable, and may
examine the entire record in order to determine a question of law where a
question of fact is so dependent upon questions of law as to be "a mixed
question of law and fact". For a collection of cases indicating that such
questions are deemed questions of law, see opinion of Brandeis, J., in St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed.
1033 (1936).
That statutes giving finality to administrative determinations have not been
altogether successful in preventing the courts from reviewing questions of
fact, see DoDD, ADmINISTRATION OF WORKA.EN'S COMPENSATION 380-81.
120 Thomas v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 162 Md. 509, 514, 160 AtL 793 (1932).
121 W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 78, art. V, § 4.
122 Poccardi v. Com'r, 79 W. Va. 684, 688, 91 S. E. 663 (1917).
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administrative process cannot or does not afford. Judicial independence is deeply rooted in centuries of tradition, whereas "legislative agencies, with varying qualifications, work in a field peculiarly exposed to political demands. Some may be expert and im'
At least where constitutional
partial, others subservient." 123
administrative findings of fact conare
involved,
making
rights
clusive "is to place those rights at the mercy of administrative
officials and seriously to impair the security inherent in our judicial
It has been said that "administrative justice, at
safeguards." 12
least in its crude beginnings, appears to have very much in it of
the oriental; to have very much in it of a reversion to justice without law. ' '123 Administrative agencies give rise to a hatred of
"bureaucracy", to a fear of a "new despotism". Indeed, since
there is even a constitutional requirement in some cases of an independent judicial finding of fact, should not such a judicial finding be made as a matter of policy where the constitutional limitation is not applicable?
On the other side of the question perhaps the most important
consideration is the persuasive fact that it is desirable to take full
advantage of the special qualifications and abilities of the administrative officials. The workmen's compensation commissioner'" is
a specialist; the judges are like general practitioners. Because the
commissioner devotes his full time to matters of compensation, his
decisions "express an intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions which may
lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth."",T In addition, the commissioner has an advantage which the judges do not
enjoy in that he confronts the witnesses instead of merely reading
a printed record. In many cases in which the medical testimony is
in conflict, the commissioner may personally examine the injured
man to determine the percentage of disability, or whether the
claimant is malingering, or whether the disability resulted from an
injury or from other causes, and the results of such a personal
123 Hughes, C. J., in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S.
38, 56 S.Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed. 1033 (1936).
124 Ibid.
125 Pound, The Growth of Administrative Justice (1924) 2 Wis. L. REV. 321,

325.

128 References to the workmen's compensation commissioner are, of course,
intended to include assistants such as the trial examiners.
127 Holmes, J., in Chicago, etc. Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U. S. 585, 598, 27 S. Ct.
326, 51 L. Ed. 636 (1907).
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examination cannot be adequately reflected in a printed record.
In addition, judicial review of facts tends to promote litigation, to
delay settlements, and to increase expense to the claimants. Informality of procedure and a relaxation of the technical rules of
evidence in hearings before the commissioner are desirable, and
judicial review naturally tends to cause a commissioner to apply
the same rules of evidence and procedure to which the reviewing
court is accustomed, with the consequence of undue formality and
the usual necessity that each party be represented by counsel even
in the vast bulk of cases which never reach the court. Another
effect of excessive judicial review may be to cause the commissioner
to give primary attention to making the record instead of devoting
his principal attention to the settlement and decision of controversies. As for the argument that there is greater security in the
judicial than in the administrative process one reply is that the
commissioner is exercising an essentially judicial function, and, as
the New York Court of Appeals has said of the industrial board
of that state, "has the dignity and the form of many of our courts,
the only distinction being that of name."128 Finally, and of the
greatest importance, administrative finality does not mean the withdrawal of all judicial protection, for under any view the court
may always set aside findings if they are not based upon evidence,
or if proper procedural requirements are not observed, or if a mis1 29
take of law is made, or if there is an abuse of discretion.
It seems almost too obvious to state that a problem so
essentially practical cannot be properly solved either by legal
niceties or by abstract thought. Above all, the answer is not to be
found in Montesquicu! But if the reasons given in the opinions
of the supreme court of appeals indicate the true motivating forces,
the basis of the determination has been essentially Montesquieu's
doctrine of the separation of powers. Indeed, if the opinions are
to be believed, the basis has been a mistaken application of that
doctrine.
In the first worlmen's compensation case to come before the
court,' while the act was still being administered by the Public
Service Commission, it was held that United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public
12S Helfrick v. Dahlstrom Al. D. Co., 256 N. Y. 199, 207, 176 N. E. 141 (1931).
Cf. Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 180, 185, 179 N. E. 684, 686 (1932) ("The board
member and the reviewing board do not constitute courts but only administrative tribunals.")
12D See note 119, supra.
130 De Constantin v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 75 W. Va. 32, 83 S. E. 88 (1914).
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Service Commission,'31 concerning the judicial review of ratemaking by the commission, was controlling as to the judicial review
of its workmen's compensation findings. That case held that on
account of the legislative character of rate-making the appellate
jurisdiction of the supreme court could not be invoked to review
an order of the commission, because the jurisdiction of the court
was "limited by the Constitution and statutes to judicial matters,
in judicial proceedings". Accordingly, it was held that only the
original jurisdiction of the court "by process akin to mandamus
or prohibition" could be invoked. And in a mandamus or prohibition proceeding it is not for the court to substitute its judgment
for that of the commission. The obvious fallacy in this reasoning
is that the United Fuel Gas case does not apply to workmen's compensation because that ease was predicated on the proposition that
rate-making was legislative, whereas compensation hearings arc
judicial or quasi judicial. But this apparently was not recognized
until some time later when a new explanation, also based in part
upon a concept of separation of powers, was advanced: "The Compensation Commissioner is not a part of the judiciary of the state,
and under the constitution appeals to this Court lie only from
judicial decisions of inferior courts. '11' 2 Because an appeal to the
court from the commissioner is "aldn to mandamus", it follows,
as the court said in the first syllabus in the first workmen's compensation case raising the question of the extent to which the court
should accord finality to administrative findings of fact, that
"under its supervisory power over the Public Service Commission,
this court takes cognizance of questions of law only."' 8 31 This is
'31

73 W. Va. 571, 80 S. E. 531 (1914).

The case is discussed at length

&upra,p. 284, et seq.
132 Proffitt v. Com'r, 108 W. Va. 438, 151 S. E. 307 (1930). In the following cases the court has reiterated that the supervisory power of the court Is
under its original jurisdiction by mandamus: Poccardi v. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
75 W. Va. 542, 84 S. E. 242 (1914) ; Hall v. Com'r, 109 W. Va. 230, 153 S. E.
510 (1930); Saunders v. Com'r, 112 W. Va. 212, 164 S. E. 39 (1932); Peerless Coal & Coke Co. v. Com'r, 113 W. Va. 6, 166 S. E. 529 (1932) ; Lively v.
Com'r, 113 W. Va. 242, 167 S. E. 583 (1933). It is interesting to observe that
for the purpose of determining whether or not testimony before the commissioner is privileged so far as an action for libel is concerned, it is held that the
commissioner acts in a "quasi judicial capacity" and there is privilege to the
same extent as before a court. Higgins v. Williams Pocahontas Coal Co., 103
W. Va. 504, 138 S. E. 112 (1927).
133 Poccardi v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 75 W. Va. 542, 84 S. E. 242 (1914).
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an irresistible conclusion from the court's premises."' Both the
rule and the reasons for the rule are thus definite and clear, if the
court's language is to be taken at its face value without further
investigation. But even though the court reiterates the same rule
in many syllabi, and even though the court itself has intimated 3 '
and many West Virginia lawyers apparently believe that "the
syllabus is the law", it is obvious that the only profitable inquiry
is what the court does and not what it says either in its syllabi or
in its opinions, for the law in action does not always coincide with
the law in books.
It is repeatedly declared that: "A finding of fact made by the
State Compensation Commissioner will not, as a general rule, be
set aside if supported by substantial evidence. " 136 This is no
doubt an accurate statement of what the court does, but only in the
sense that more findings supported by substantial evidence are
affirmed than reversed and hence that such findings will not be
set aside "as a general rule". The vital fact lies in the implication
that findings supported by substantial evidence are sometimes set
aside, for this implication is borne out by what the court does. A
dozen or more cases carry syllabi substantially as follows: "A
134 For example, in State e fel. Dodd v. Hill, 84 W. Va. 468, 100 S. E. 286
(1919) the court applied the following doctrine with respect to the writ of
mandamus: "If, as we believe and hold, the matters stated are fairly considered within the scope of the authority conferred by the legislature, and
the officer upon whom such authority devolved duly considered them, as he
solemnly swears he did before deciding to withhold approval, the writ ought
not to issue. For, while this court may by mandamus compel action in good
faith by an officer clothed with discretionary power, we will not award the
writ for such purpose unless it appears that he has clearly and wilfully disregarded his duty, or that his action was flagrantly wrong working unjust
results, or that his decision was due to caprice, passion, partiality or corruption.- Under such a view, of course, mandamus cannot be used even to secure a judicial review of the good faith determination of questions of law.
135 Se, e. g.: State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 802, 822 (1892)

("Under a provision of our constitution, this Court prepares the syllabus in
each case reported, and that duty is not left to the reporter. It is to the
syllabus, therefore, and not to the opinion, that we are accustomed to look for
precedents binding upon this Court."); Bank v. Burdette, 61 W. Va. 636, 637,
57 S. E. 53 (1907) ("Now our constitution requires the court to make the
The
syllabus, and it is that which is the real decision over the opinion.")
United States Supreme Court declared in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S.
349, 356 (1910): "The syllabus--which in West Virginia is the law of the
case, whatever may be the reasoning employed in the opinion of the court-is
as follows . . .' That a syllabus, however, must be read in the light of the
facts of the case, see, e. g.': Nees v. Julian Goldman Stores, 106 W. Va. 502,
506, 146 S. E. 61 (1928) ; Barron v. B. & 0. R. R., 116 W. Va. 21, 23, 178 S. E.
277 (1935).
IseE.g.: Anderson v. Com'r, 113 W. Va. 742, 169 S. E. 386 (1933).
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finding of fact made by the State Compensation Commissioner
should be treated as a finding of a judge, or the verdict of a jury,
and will not, as a general rule, be set aside if there is substantial
evidence to support it. "137 Were these syllabi to be accepted at
their face value, the attitude expressed in the following passage
would be the only proper one: "While we might have rendered
a different conclusion from the evidence had we been called upon
to do so, sitting in the first place, we cannot disturb the finding
here."1 8 Such an attitude is undeniably taken in numerous cases,
but the significant fact is that such language appears only in cases
in which the commissioner's findings are affirmed. In the cases
which reverse the commissioner's findings the usual explanation is
merely that the findings are contrary to the "clear preponderance
of the evidence", although in some cases no explanation exists except for a discussion of the evidence and a statement of the conclusion that the opposite finding should have been made. To ascertain the rule of action in such cases, no language, no abstraction,
no generalization will suffice. A detailed review of the facts of
particular cases is necessary.
More than half the cases may be summarily eliminated from
the discussion at the outset. These are the cases in which the finding is affirmed.'3 9 Little can be learned from them. The facts
are stated and discussed, and the rule that the finding has the effect
of the finding of a judge or the verdict of a jury is repeated and
applied. The only noteworthy cases affirming findings are those in
which the court "recommends" or "suggests" that the case be
137E. g.: Dowdy v. Com'r, 112 W. Va. 428, 164 S. E. 495 (1932).
138 Id. at 432.

- 9Cases involving primarily questions of fact and affirming the administrative findings: Poccardi v. Com'r, 79 W. Va. 684, 91 S. E. 663 (1917); MeShan
v. Heaberlin, 105 W. Va. 447, 143 S. E. 109 (1928); Postlethwait v. Com'r,
106 W. Va. 57, 144 S. E. 717 (1928); Lacy v. Com'r, 106 W. Va. 555, 146 S.
E. 375 (1929); Heaton v. Com'r, 106 IV. Va. 563, 146 S. E. 368 (1929); Stone
v. Comp. App. Bd., 106 W. Va. 572, 146 S. E. 372 (1929) ; Caldwell v. Com'r,
107 W. Va. 272, 148 S. E. 75 (1929) ; Venilli v. Com'r, 107 W. Va. 544, 149 S.
E. 612 (1929); Martin v. Com'r, 107 W. Va. 583, 149 S. E. 824 (1929);
Conovas v. Ott, 108 W. Va. 397, 151 S. E. 309 (1930); Stepp v. Ott, 108 W.
Va. 422, 151 S. E. 318 (1930); Kincannon v. Ott, 108 W. Va. 428, 151 S. E.
311 (1930); Watkins v. Com'r, 109 W. Va. 409, 157 S. E. 89 (1930); Steve
v. Com'r, 110 W. Va. 160, 157 S. E. 163 (1931) ; Dowdy v. Com'r, 112 W. Va.
428, 164 S. E. 495 (1932); Edwards v. Com'r, 112 IV. Va. 504, 165 S. E. 669
(1932); Leroy v. Com'r, 113 W. Va. 210, 166 S. E. 689 (1932); Moore v.
Com'r, 113 W. Va. 227,167 S. E. 584 (1933); Andrews v. Com'r, 113 W. Va.
238, 167 S. E. 588 (1933); Davis v. Com'r, 113 W. Va. 569, 169 S. B. 171
(1933); Oyler v. Com'r, 113 W. Va. 574, 169 S. E. 161 (1933); Anderson v.
Com'r, 113 W. Va. 742, 169 S. E. 386 (1933).
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reopened for further evidence, the court's recommendation being
"merely gratuitous and .... [having] no legal significance. "14
It is in the cases in which findings are reversed that the rule
of action may be discerned. But even of these cases a. large group
may be eliminated as unfruitful. Many findings are reversed because it does not appear from the record whether or not there was
sufficient evidence to support the finding, such cases being remanded for a further development of the evidence, sometimes with
specific instructions as to what further inquiries ought to be
made.' 4' Although such eases are interesting from the standpoint
of determining what evidence may be held sufficient, it is the cases
in which the court reverses without remanding for further findings
that best indicate the extent of administrative finality.
Such decisions reversing findings of the commissioner may be
conveniently classified into three groups: (1) those involving
questions as to whether or not inferences of fact should be drawn
from undisputed evidence; (2) those in which the finding is held
contrary to the "clear preponderance of the evidence"; and (3)
those in which no reason for the reversal is given other than the
court's disagreement with the finding.
(1) Inferences from Undisputed Facts. Poccardi v. Public
Service Commission, 4" the first West Virginia case involving a
review of an administrative finding of fact, involved the questio
whether or not a hernia resulted from an accidental injury. The
evidence was not in conflict. The commission had ruled that the
claimant had not proved that the accidental injury had caused the
hernia. The court declared that the "only question is the weight
140 In Postlethwait v. Com'r, 106 W. Va. 57, 144 S. E. 717 (1928), after
affirming the commissioner's order, the court added: "As the misfortune of the
applicant is so serious, we are of opinion that his case should be reopened if
he can materially develop it further, which privilege we are satisfied will be
granted him by the Commissioner." In Stone v. Comp. App. Bd., 106 W. Va.
572, 146 S. E. 372 (1929), the court declared, after affirming the order: "We
would recommend that the Compensation Commissioner reopen the case, take
further evidence, if any is available, and give further consideration to this
matter. Of course, this suggestion is merely gratuitous, and has no legal
significance."
14' Foughty v. Ott, 80 W. Va. 88, 92 S.E. 143 (1917) ; Conley v. Com'r, 107
W. Va. 546, 149 S.E. 666 (1929); Machala v. Ott, 108 W. Va. 391, 151 S.E.
313 (1930); Holland v. Com'r, 112 W. Va. 507, 165 S. . 675 (1932); Pripich.
v. Com'r, 112 W. Va. 540, 166 S.E. 4 (1932); Bowling v. Com'r, 112 W. Va.
604, 166 S.E. 9 (1932); Strieklin v. Com'r, 112 W. Va. 661, 166 S.E. 364
(1932); Gillam v. Com'r, 113 W. Va. 727, 169 S.E.397 (1933); James v. App.
Bd., 117 W. Va. 493, 185 S.E. 909 (1936).
142 75 W. Va. 542, 84 S.E. 242 (1914).
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to which inferences arising from the facts are entitled", reviewed
the evidence, and concluded that "the facts disclosed by the xecord
establish the claim". The rationale of the decision, not stated in
the body of the opinion, is disclosed in the second syllabus: "In
the absence of conflict in the evidence adduced to show a claimant's
right to participation in the Workmen's Compensation Fund, the
Commission is regarded, in this court, as a demurrant to the evidence, and, if the evidence would sustain a verdict of a jury in
favor of the claimant, the claim is regarded as sufficiently proved."
In other words, even though the commission's finding was adverse
to the claimant, there must be a finding in favor of the claimanl
if the evidence would sustain a jury verdict in favor of the
claimant. This is decidedly different from the West Virginia practice with respect to setting aside jury verdicts. The finding of a
jury of laymen will stand unless it is contrary to the "the decided
preponderance of the evidence". But where the finding of the
supposedly expert commission is adverse to the claimant, it will
be set aside if the evidence permits an inference to support the
143
opposite finding.
Two years later, in Poccardi v. Commissioner,"' the court
apparently changed its mind. The commissioner had found as a
fact that the claimants had not proved themselves dependents of
the deceased. Although it was shown that the deceased had supported the claimants there was no evidence of remittance by the
deceased to the claimants within one year prior to the death. The
evidence was not in conflict, the only question being whether or not
an inference should be drawn from past support that the claimants
i-4The decisions which so hold seem to go even a step further than the
scintilla-of-evidence rule which has been consistently rejected by the West Virginia court in jury cases since 1900. Under this rule a verdict may be directed in favor of one party only if no evidence whatever favors the other
party, and if there is a scintilla of evidence in favor of the other party a verdict may not be directed. This rule was applied, for example, in Carrico v.
W. Va. C. & P. Ry., 35 W. Va. 389, 14 S. E. 12 (1891). However, since the
decision of Ketterman v. Dry Fork R.R., 48 W. Va. 606, 37 S. E. 683 (1900)
the West Virginia court has refused to apply the scintilla rule. Under the
modern practice a verdict may be directed .in favor of one party if the evidence of the opposite party is insufficient to justify a verdict in his favor.
According to Poccardi v. Pub. Serv. Comm., and the cases which follow it,
the rule seems to be that where the evidence is undisputed a scintilla of evidence in the claimant's favor is sufficient to reverse a finding against the
claimant. A scintilla of evidence in jury cases prevented a directed yerdict
in favor of the opposite party; in compensation cases, a scintilla of evidence
sometimes prevents not merely what would correspond to a directed verdict,
but it prevents an actual finding in favor of the opposite party.
144 79 W. Va. 684, 91 S. E. 663 (1917).
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were dependent upon the deceased at the time of the death, a
question parallel in all respects with the question in Poccardi v.
Public Service Commission. Instead of reversing the finding, as
in the earlier case, the court affirmed it. This would not be inconsistent with the previous case if the reason for the affirmance
had been that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a jury
verdict in favor of the claimants. But no such insufficiency of the
evidence was found. Instead, the court declared of the commissioner's finding: " . . . . we think his finding should be treated
substantially as the findings of a judge, or the verdict of a jury,
and should not be set aside if there is evidence which will support
it." The court's language approximates an express denial of the
rationale of the earlier case: "On this evidence the Commissioner
might, perhaps, have found differently, but was he bound to do so,
and can we properly say he erred in his conclusions?"
The third case, Poccardi v. Ott,143 seemingly reverted to the
technique of the first case, without recognizing the inconsistency of
the two earlier cases. The commissioner had found that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the claimant's dependency upon
the deceased. Uncontradicted evidence had been introduced to
show that the deceased had supported the claimant during the year
prior to his death. The court did not point out, as it might have
done, that such evidence distinguished the case from Poccardi v.
Commissioner, but, instead, the court declared: "Evidence that
would sustain the vdrdict of a jury, if one were rendered upon the
proof before the compensation commissioner upon the fact of
dependency where that is the ground on which the claim is predicated, must be regarded as sufficient proof." The commissioner
was thus reversed because of evidence which would sustain a jury
verdict finding the opposite from what the commissioner had found.
The court divided on a question whether or not an inference
should be drawn from undisputed facts in Caldwell v. Commissioner.146 The claimant had received a gunshot wound in his leg
twelve years before he injured the leg at his work. Shortly after
the injury an abscess formed at the site of the old wound. One
doctor testified tha it was "merely possible" that the injury "set
up the abscess". Another doctor testified: "The present trouble
may have been aggravated by the blow . . . but the trouble
145 82 W. Va. 497, 96 S. E. 790 (1918).
146 106 W. Va. 14, 144 S. E. 568 (1928).
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primarily is an old one." The commissioner denied compensation.
The majority of the court reversed, declaring: "The reasonable
inference from these undisputed facts is that the injury aggravated the gunshot wound, and caused him to lose time
from his work, and therefore he is entitled to compensation."
The dissenting judge, after quoting from medical treatises, 14 7 cited
Poccardi v. Commissioner for the proposition that the commissioner's finding should be treated as the "finding of a judge and as
the verdict of a jury" and declared: "We are thoroughly committed to the rule that such finding or verdict should not be reversed in this court, unless we can say that it is plainly wrong. I
cannot see how a 'merely possible' inference can establish any
conclusion plainly right or plainly wrong." It will be observed
that the court divided on precisely the same ultimate question as
that on which the early three cases were in disagreement.
147 One of the most striking consequences of judicial review of administrative
findings in West Virginia compensation cases is reliance by judges upon their
own research in medical treatises. The dissenting judge in the Caldwell case
preferred to read medical books and form his own opinion rather than accept
opinions of doctors: "In The Practice of Surgery, a standard treatise by Dr.
Russell Howard, an abscess is defined as a local collection of pus in the body,
which is caused by one of the pyogenic organisms. The organism may become embedded in the tissues in several ways, one of which is by means of
a wound .... Dr. Howard says: 'Foreign bodies may remain for years in the
tissues without causing the least inconvenience, but at any time infection by
microorganisms may ensue and an abscess form.' . . . In connection with Dr.
Howard's book I have also examined Johnson's Surgical Diagnosis and Gould
and Pile's Cyclopedia of Medicine and Surgery (both of which are accepted
as standard works by the medical profession) and find no reference to a
bruise as causing or as fomenting an abscess in the tissues of the body."
In
Poccardi v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 75 W. Va. 542, 549, 84 S. E. 242 (1915), the
finding rested in part upon the question whether or not a hernia is always
accompanied by pain. This question was settled by quoting from the Encyclopedia Britannica. In Bailey v. Com'r, 109 W. Va. 324, 327, 154 S. E. 764
(1930), the court discredited expert testimony apparently on the basis of its
own research on a strictly medical question. The opinion of the expert witness was rested in part upon the Wasserman test to determine the presence
of syphilis. The court quoted from CaOSSEN ON DuoNosIs to the effect that
this test should not be regarded as conclusive.
Such excursions by judges into the realm of medicine are no doubt a natural consequence of the judicial review of findings of fact where medical
questions are involved. Although a particular judge may be competent to
decide for himself questions upon which medical experts are in disagreement,
it is at least questionable whether or not a brand of justice which is dependent
upon a layman's understanding of medical treatises will command high respect.
The disposition of Conley v. Com'r, 107 W. Va. 546, 149 S. E. 666 (1929), in
which the court remanded "to the Commissioner with the recommendation
that he have the medical department examine the works of Dr. Henderson and
Dr. Stressman as well as other authorities" seems definitely preferable.
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Two recent cases involving inferences that deaths resulted
from the employment further establish the practice of reversing
a finding of the commissioner against the claimant if from undisputed evidence it is reasonable to draw an inference in favor
of the claimant. In D emastes v. Commissioner 48 the deceased had
met an unwitnessed death while working alone in the woods. The
court held that on account of blood found on his body and on
account of his failure to mark brush on his way to the spring
where his body was found, as it was his duty to do, the inference
should have been drawn that his death was caused by an accident
resulting from employment. In Watkins v. Commissioner149 the
commissioner had denied compensation for the death of a deputy
prohibition commissioner who had been fatally shot while he was
performing his duties. No evidence was introduced to show the
reason for the shooting. The court reversed the finding that it had
not been proved that the death resulted from the employment because "this Court is committed to the rule of liberal construction
in favor of the claimant in compensation cases" and because it
was "reasonable to infer" from the circumstances that the death
resulted from the employment.
Goble v. Commissioner8 0 probably goes even further. The
court expressly stated that "there is no controversy of fact". The
workman sustained an injury. Later he had arthritis. The company physician expressed an opinion that the arthritis "may have
been produced or aggravated by the injury". The court further
stated with respect to the arthritis that "no one, except the company physician, attempts to express opinions as to its cause or the
effect of the injury in producing or aggravating it." No other
material facts appeared. Solely on the basis of the "well settled principle of law" that "the claimant is entitled to all reasonable inferences in his favor from undisputed facts in support
of his claim, as would be accorded to him upon a demurrer to his
evidence", the court reversed the commissioner's denial of compensation.
(2) Findings Contrary to "Clear Preponderanceof the EBidence". Under the rule as frequently stated in the syllabi that
the findings of the commissioner will be given as much weight as
the verdict of a jury, the court in numerous cases has declared that
148 112 W. Va. 498, 165 S. E. 667 (1932).
149114

W. Va. 507, 172 S. E. 715 (1934).

1o III W. Va. 404, 162 S. E. 314 (1932).
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findings of the commissioner will be set aside only if contrary to
the "clear preponderaihce of the evidence". Of course, this phrase
is almost empty, so far as the literal meaning of the words is concerned. Its meaning can be determined only from the manner in
which the court applies it to various fact situations. An examination of the cases reveals that the meaning of the phrase in compensation cases is different from its meaning in jury cases.
The following is probably as accurate an explanation of the
practice with respect to jury verdicts as can be made in general
terms: "The verdict must be plainly against the decided weight
and preponderance of the evidence, before it will be set aside....
the call to set aside 'must be very loud and plain.' The verdict
must be palpably unjust. A doubtful case, a slight weight and
preponderance of evidence against the verdict, is not a sufficient
cause for setting it aside."' 5' The holding in the case from which
this passage was taken was that a verdict depending solely on conflicting oral evidence will not be set aside on the ground alone that
the verdict is plainly against the decided weight of the evidence.
Other jury cases indicate that the attitude of this case is representative.' 52
The attitude is different in compensation cases. One of the
clearest of such cases is Sedinger v. Commissioner.15 On the sole
question of fact, whether or not blindness was caused by an injury,
medical testimony was conflicting. In support of the commissioner's denial of compensation was the testimony of one eye specialist
that "it would be.impossible for me to say that it was due to the
injury claimed....", and the testimony of another specialist that
"I cannot believe that the atrophy is due to his alleged injury.
Syphilis is suspected." The theory of syphilis was discredited by
the fact that blood tests were negative. Both the doctors who
stated that the blindness was caused by the injury had made prior
151 Coalmer v. Barrett, 61 W. Va. 237, 241, 56 S.E. 385 (1907).
152It is said in Estep v. Price, 93 W. Va. 81, 115 S.E. 861 (1923): "If
there had bee6 a verdict for plaintiff and a motion to set aside, the court
would, in considering the motion, discard all of defendant's evidence in conflict
with that of plaintiff's and then if such evidence together with all the
justifiable inferences which the jury could reasonably draw therefrom, was
sufficient to sustain the verdict, the motion to set aside would bo refused."
See, also, Buck v. Newberry, 55 W. Va. 681, 47 S. E. 889 (1904); Hetzel v.
:emper, 102 W. Va. 567, 135 S.E. 667 (1926); McGraw v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
106 W. Va. 714, 146 S.E. 823 (1929), 108 W. Va. 308, 151 S.E.183 (1929)
(finding of lower court); LeGrand v. Hamrick, 116 IV.Va. 572, 182 S.E. 577
(1935).
153 109 W. Va. 51, 152 S.E.857 (1930).
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contradictory statements. In this state of the evidence the court
reversed the commissioner's finding on the ground that the finding
was contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence. The
holding quite clearly indicates that the phrase "clear preponderance of the evidence" is nothing more than a convenient explanation
for the result when the court substitutes its judgment for that of
the commissioner, and that the phrase does not in compensation
cases have the meaning attached to it in jury cases.
Similar cases involving conflicting evidence in which findings
supported by substantial evidence were reversed as being contrary
to the clear preponderance of the evidence are Hamlet v. Commissioner,"4 Epperson v. Commissioner,r 5 and Wills v. Commissioner.

1

6

(3) Reversals Withwut Explanation Other Thwn Court's
Disagreement with Finding. In Bradley 'v. Commissioner 57 the
award of compensation hinged upon the question of fact whether
or not the injury resulted from the use of short fuses in violation
of a statutory provision. The only evidence for the-claimant was
his own testimony. Three items of circumstantial evidence introduced in behalf of the employer tended to show the use of short
fuses. The weight of each such item of evidence was carefully
discussed in the- opinion of the court. For example, the mine
electrician and the foreman gave uncontradicted testimony that
they found pieces of short fuse at the place of the accident two or
three hours after its occurrence. But despite the fact that the
commissioner's denial of compensation was based upon this and
other similar evidence, the court set aside the finding. The explanation approximates a statement that the court was substituting
its judgment for that of the commissioner: "In view of the time
that 'had elapsed after the accident before the examination of the
working place, the inconsistencies in the evidence of those claiming
to have made the investigation, and other circumstances casting
doubt upon the alleged discoveries, we are of opinion that the employer has not carried the burden of disproving the story of the
claimant, and establishing the theory that the injury resulted from
his use of short fuse." In other words, the court apparently re154113 W. Va. 247, 167 S. E. 586 (1933).
1t5 113 W. Va. 559, 169 S. E. 168 (1933).
196 114 W. Va. 822, 174 S. E. 323 (1934).
157 110 W. Va. 89, 157 S. E. 42 (1931).
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versed the commissioner's finding for no better reason than that
the court disagreed with the finding.
Another such case is Bailey v. Commissioner,"-" which was
taken twice to the supreme court. The issue of fact was whether
lameness was attributable to an injury or to syphilis. Medical
testimony was in conflict. The court compared the reputations of
the respective doctors, and considered the basis of the opinions of
each. The opinion of a doctor who testified against the claimant
was discredited because his opinion was based in part upon a fact
stated in a hospital report which did not appear in the record.
The opinion of the other doctor who testified against the claimant
was discredited on account of its reliance upon the Wassermann
test. The court, apparently upon the basis of its own research,
quoted from a medical treatise to the effect that too much reliance
should not be placed upon this test. Another reason for rejecting
the opinion of this doctor was the absence of any information in
the record as to the manner in which he learned of certain other
facts upon which his opinion was apparently based in part. The
court accordingly concluded: "For all of which, we are of opinion
that the Commissioner gave a significance to the opinions of Drs.
Cox and Kessel which the evidence does not warrant." The case
was returned to the commissioner for his further consideration
with the suggestion that the evidence be further developed, particularly with respect to the hospital report and the other facts
upon which the doctor's opinion was based. The commissioner conducted a second hearing at which new evidence was introduced
but failed to procure the evidence suggested by the court. The
commissioner made an award based on a 60% disability rating.
On the second appeal the court declared: "The commissioner in
failing to test the opinions of Drs. Cox and Kessel, as suggested by
this Court, and in entering a substantial award, is presumed, at
least, to have abandoned the theory that the sole cause of the increased disability is syphilitic disease. It remains to determine (1)
the percentage of disability, and (2) whether syphilitic disease
exists as a contributing cause."
On the first of these questions
the court referred to medical testimony of several years previously
that the claimant was at that time entitled to "at least 40% disability", to other medical testimony that "apparently he has shown
15s

109 W. Va. 324, 154 S. E. 764 (1930), 110 W. Va. 151, 158 S. E. 675

(1931).
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a very considerable amount of disability", and to the joint statement of two other doctors that claimant "is 100o disabled from
doing manual labor". The court, without further explanation of
any kind, then declared: "In view of all the evidence, we are
inclined .... to fix his disability at 100 per centum; and it will
be so ordered." The second question put by the court was disposed of in a single cavalier sentence: "According to the expert
opinion for the claimant, which should be accepted, the injury,
which occurred October 26, 1923, is responsible for his present disability." The court did not in any manner attempt to rationalize
its conclusions. It did not explain why the expert opinion for
the claimant should be accepted and why the expert opinion against
the claimant should be rejected. It did not say that the 60%
disability rating was contrary to the "clear preponderance" of
the evidence. It did not say that the finding was not based upon
sufficient evidence. Even the syllabus did not suggest a basis for
the decision but was limited to one incomplete sentence: "A case
in which the ruling of the compensation commissioner is reversed
on a finding of fact." Unless there are other aspects of the case
which do not appear in the opinion of the court, the decision is
clearly one in which the court merely substituted its own opinion
as to the weight of the evidence for that of the commissioner. The
decision is squarely opposed to statements in other cases, such as:
"In reviewing the action of the compensation commissioner, this
Court takes cognizance of questions of law only . . . We do not
decide upon questions of controverted fact . . . ." Such a statement apparently yields when the court disagrees with the commissioner's findings.
59
In Scott t,.Comnmissioner'
an award had been granted on the
basis of a finding of 83% disability, but the claimant contended
that he was totally disabled. Three doctors were of opinion that
he could perform some kinds of work other than that which he had
been doing, and the record disclosed that he could do light work
about his house and that he could drive a car for a short time.
Nevertheless, the court discussed the evidence and concluded: "We
are of the opinion that claimant is totally and permanently injured within the meaning of the statute." No explanation was
given except that the opinion of the court was different from that
of the commissioner.

19 112 W. Va. 608, 166 S. E. 274 (1932).
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The W~rkmen's Compensation Appeal Boarcl. In 1935 the
act was amonded to establish the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board 6f three members to whom a claimant or an employer
may appeal from findings of the commissioner. 0 0 A similar board,
consisting of the governor, the commissioner of labor, and the
commissioner of health, was created in 1925111 but was abolished
in 1929.82 It might seem reasonable to expect that the court would
give greater effect to the findings of such a board than it has given
to the findings of the commissioner. The cases do not indicate,
however, that the court has done so.
Of the cases decided by the board which functioned from 1925
to 1929, only six appeals from findings of fact were taken to the
court, of which five10' affirmed the findings of the board and one' 04
reversed and remanded the case to the commissioner for the taking
of further evidence. In one of the cases affirming the findings of
the board, the court made what it called a "merely gratuitous"
suggestion that the commissioner reopen the case and take further
evidence." ' No special significance can be attached to this unusual
procedure, for the same had been done a year earlier in a case
affirming a finding of the commissioner.' 0 Examination of the
six cases reveals no indication that any case might have been disposed of differently if the appeal had been directly from the commissioner instead of from the board.
Findings of fact of the board established in 1935 have been
reviewed in three cases, one of which involved an affirmance of
the board's finding, 6 7 one a decision reversing and remanding for
further consideration, 88 and one a final decision of reversal.'
Only the latter decision, Rasmus v. Appeal Board, is of special
significance. The question of fact was whether or not a workman
who had died of heat prostration was exposed by reason of his
employment to special or peculiar danger not experienced by other
Acts 1935, c. 78, art. V.
26, Acts 1925, c. 58, § 57.
162 Acts 1929, c. 71, § 43.
163 McShan v. Heaberlin, 105 W. Va. 447, 143 S. E. 109 (1928); Lacy v.
Com'r, 106 W. Va. 555, 146 S. E. 375 (1929); Heaton v. Com'r, 106 W. Va.
563, 146 S. E. 368 (1929); Stone v. App. Bd., 106 W. Va. 572, 146 S. E. 372
(1929) ; Martin v. Com'r, 107 W. Va. 583, 149 S. E. 824 (1929).
164 Conley v. Com'r, 107 W. Va. 546, 149 S. E. 666 (1929).
1o Stone v. App. Bd., 106 W. Va. 572, 146 S. E. 372 (1929).
168 Postlethwait v. Com'r, 106 W. Va. 57, 144 S. E. 717 (1929).
107 Moore v. Com 'r, 191 S. E. 292 (W. Va. 1937).
168 James v. App. Bd., 117 W. Va. 493, 185 S. E. 909 (1936).
269 Rasmus v. App. Bd., 117 W. Va. 55, 184 S. E. 250 (1936).
18o
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persons in the community. The commissioner's award of compensation was reversed by the board. The court stated that the question before it was whether or not the finding of the board was
"clearly wrong". In deciding this question the court definitely
considered the weight of the evidence. The temperature in the
general locality was 89 degrees at 8 A.M. and 100 degrees at noon.
The deceased worked in an open junkyard exposed to the sun
"with metal beneath him, metal above his head, metal in part surrounding him and large quantities of metal piled upon the ground
on two sides of him", and he worked within three or four feet of
an operating gasoline engine. In the light of these facts, the
court declared: "We do not regard the proof to the effect that
it was cooler in the cab of the crane than it was upon the ground
surrounding the crane as being of any particular worth." Two
dissenting judges pointed out that the testimony that it was cooler
in the cab than on the ground was clear and unequivocal and was
not controverted and argued: "Even admitting that the claim
is one upon which reasonable men may differ, then the Board
should be upheld since it is essentially a fact-finding tribunal."
The decision probably indicates that the court gives no more effect
to the finding of fact of the appeal board than to the commissioner's
findings.
The Rasmus case is also of importance for its decision as to
the effect to be given by the board to findings of the commissioner.
The court held that the finding of the board "is not to be circumscribed nor trammeled by the finding of the Compensation Commissioner, but that it proceeds to make such disposition of the case
on appeal as in its opinion the state of the proof taken before the
Compensation Commissioner demands, being free to act in the
premises uninfluenced by the finding of the Compensation Commissioner." This holding was challenged and reaffirmed in Moore
10
v. Commissioner.
Concusions as to Judicial Review of Administrative Action
in Workmen's CompensatianCases. Although reasoning based upon separation of powers has led the court consistently to pay lip
service to a rule that the findings of the workmen's compensation
commissioner will be given as much weight as the verdict of a
jury or the findings of a judge, and although the court has
reiterated in many cases that the commissioner's findings will be
170

191 S. E. 292 (W. Va. 1937).
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set aside only if contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence, examination of the facts of cases in which the court has
reversed the commissioner's findings reveals that the court has frequently substituted its judgment for that of the commissioner on
fact questions. It is readily demonstrable that statements such as
the following should be heavily discounted: "In reviewing the
action of the Compensation Commissioner, this Court takes
cognizance of questions of law only ....
We do not decide upon
questions of controverted fact ..... "171 Such a statement represents only an ideal. It embodies a conclusion drawn by logical
processes from the doctrine of separation of powers, but it constitutes in practice no more than a convenient formula for explaining
decisions affirming administrative findings. A chance remark in a
recent opinion more accurately reflects the rule of action: "
where in our judgment the finding of the commissioner is contra to
the preponderance of the evidence, his order will be reversed.""'
The distinction drawn by the federal courts between "juris.
dictional" or "constitutional" facts and other facts has never been
made in West Virginia.
The court's liberality toward claimants is perhaps best indicated by the now well-established practice, in cases in which the
question is whether or not an inference should be drawn from undisputed facts, of reversing a finding adverse to the claimant if
there is evidence which would support a finding in the claimant's
favor. Indeed, the court's liberality toward claimants may be the
best explanation of many reversals of the commissioner's findings.
It seems quite significant that in every case in which a finding has
been reversed the court has held in favor of the claimant. And in
some cases a sympathy for the claimant can easily be discerned in
the court's opinions. 73 However, too much weight should not be
given to the fact that an administrative finding against an employer has never been reversed, for not until 1929 did the employer
have a right of appeal to the court, 74 and it happens that in no
case has an employer's appeal involved primarily a question of
fact.
'171 Martin v. Com'r, 107 W. Va. 583, 586, 149 S. E.
172 Wills v. Com'r, 114 W. Va. 822, 824, 174 S. E. 323

824 (1929).
(1934).
173 A good example is Bradley v. Com'r, 110 NV. Va. 89, 157 S. E. 42 (1931),
in which the court called the claimant "a blind, helpless man", quoted from
a letter of counsel that he was "in a pitiable condition", and commended
counsel for the gratuity of their services.
See W. VA. CODE (Barnes 1923) c. 15P, § 43; W. Va. Acts 1929, c. 71,
§ 43.
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In workmen's compensation cases, as in other West Virginia
cases, separation of powers has afforded no assistance in the solution of problems of judicial review. On the contrary, it may be
that it has done positive harm, for the doctrine of separation of
powers seems to be responsible for the court's unreal language that
judicial judgment is not substituted for administrative judgment.
Of course it is true that if, as is asserted, what the court usually
calls an "appeal" is only a proceeding "akin to mandamus", and
if, as is held in a legion of cases, judicial judgment will not be
substituted for administrative judgment in a proceeding in mandamns, then it follows that great weight must be given to administrative findings irrespective of more practical factors. But such
an approach is wholly artificial. No argument should be needed to
convince that the weight to be given to administrative findings
should be determined by an investigation into facts with respect
to administration, the special competency of the conunissioner and
his examiners, the nature of the issues he is called upon to determine, the extent to which medical knowledge is needed, the importance of confronting the witnesses and of examining the injuries,
the tendency or lack of tendency toward arbitrary administrative
action, the relative susceptibility of the commissioner and of the
judges to political or other ulterior influence, the practical effects
of review upon the efficiency of the administrative process, the incieased delay and expense caused by judicial review, and, since
1935, the effects upon the whole problem of the establishment of
the appeal board.
Logic and the theory of separation of powers are not the tools
needed for the solution of a problem so essentially practical.
INCORPORATION oi TowNs

No group of West Virginia decisions on separation of powers
is more instructive than the series of cases which deal with the
incorporation of cities, towns and villages by the circuit courts.
The constitution, art. V1, § 39, provides: "The Legislature shall
not pass local or special laws .... incorporating cities, towns, or
villages . . . ." Accordingly, a statute was early enacted prescribing conditions for the incorporation of cities, towns, and villages, and providing that upon satisfactory proof of compliance
with the statutory conditions, the circuit court should direct the
clerk to issue a certificate of incorporation. In re Town of Union
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Mines175 was the first case in which the constitutionality of the
statute was challenged. It was contended that the statute "confers on the Circuit Court legislative powers". The court, after
quoting article V, observed: "It has been found to be wholly imThen, as to the
practicable to make such separation perfect."
nature of the power exercised by the circuit court, the court
straddled: "In discharging these functions, the Circuit Court does
not act under the judicial branch of the government and is not
subject to its supervision, except by mandamus or prohibition in
a proper case, but acts as a part of the legislative branch of government.... Hence its action in discharging these legislative judicial
functions can not be reviewed by this Court by a writ of error or
other ordinary appellate writ notwithstanding their judicial character.... The Circuit Court being engaged in the discharge of a
legislative function in aid of the legislative department of the
state government, the petitioners had no right to appear and contest the issuance of the certificate of incorporation in such manner.
as to be made parties litigant in a judicial sense, any more than
before a committee of the legislature . . . . The matter of the incorporation of cities, towns and villages belongs distinctively to
the legislative not to the judicial department."1 10 This language
is not to be attributed to lack of understanding of separation of
powers, but rather to such insight into the nature of separation of
powers that the court recognized that the power exercised by the
circuit court could not properly be characterized by only one label
but that it combined the attributes of the legislative and the
judicial, so that neither label alone would suffice.17 7 The power
was accordingly "legislative judicial". The case may thus be
regarded as a drop of realism in a sea of abstraction, for it is undeniable that no possible analysis can be made to prove that either
the term "legislative" or the term "judicial" is a precise characterization of what the circuit court did. The plain fact is that
such terms as "legislative" and "judicial" are round and square
holes, and that the pegs which represent the functions performed
are sometimes round, sometimes square, and usually of an extremely irregular shape. The court's ufnorthodox characterization
of the power in this case as "legislative judicial" is an attempt to
175 39 W. Va. 179, 19 S. E. 398 (1894).
276 Italics supplied.
177 Judge Dent wrote the opinion. That Judge Dent well understood the

doctrine of separation of powers is indicated by his language in other opinions.
See note 49, supra.
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make a new category, a hole that will more nearly fit an odd-shaped
peg. The holding, as expressed in the syllabus, was that the
statute, "in so far as it confers on the Circuit Court functions in
their nature judicial and administrative, although in furtherance
of the legislative department of the state government, is constitutional and valid." This syllabus, if later cases may be believed,
established the law, even though the court declared in its opinion
that "there is no case in a judicial sense, in which to raise the
question of the constitutionality of this law."
1
Elder v. Incorporators of Central City 78
followed the Union
Mines case, in holding, in language, and in spirit, except for the
last sentence of the opinion. The syllabus was the same as the
syllabus of the earlier case, and the opinion declared that the function of the circuit court was "at least, an administrative or quasi
judicial function, which the Circuit Court may be authorized to
perform." However, the last sentence of the opinion declared:
"But a majority of the court being of opinion that the matter
is only administrative, and that this Court has no jurisdiction in
a matter merely quasi judicial, the writ of error must be dismissed
as improvidently awarded." This is significant for its use of the
term "quasi judicial", since it was the first holding or declaration
that the supreme court "has no jurisdiction in a matter merely
quasi judicial".
Bloxton v. MoWlwrter 7 9 in denying a writ of prohibition
against the circuit court's issuance of a certificate of incorporation,
added little, except for its statement that the circuit court's jurisdiction was "partly legislative and partly judicial and administrative".
Before the next decision the statute was amended so as to
provide that the circuit court could at its discretion direct the
clerk to issue a certificate of incorporation. The added element of
discretion in the circuit court presented a new question. In exercising discretion as to whether or not a certificate should be issued,
did the circuit court act judicially or legislatively? In Morris v.
Taylor,'80 this question was answered: "The discretion vested in
such courts . . . . is administrative and judicial, not legislative."
The court specifically held that the exercise of discretion by the
178 40 W. Va. 222, 21 S. E. 738 (1895).

179 46 W. Va. 32, 32 S. E. 10 4 (1899).
1so TO W. Va. 618, 74 S. E. 872 (1912). This decision was followed in Baker
v. Workman, 72 W. Va. 518, 78 S. E. 670 (1913).
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circuit court did not violate article V. Judge Poffenbarger declared that discretion "does not necessarily signify legislative discretion. Discretion does not belong exclusively to the legislature
. . . . discretion . . . . is neither a criterion nor a determining
factor". The court bolstered its opinion with a quotation from
Story that the true meaning of separation of powers is "that the
whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised
by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the
other departments". If this test is used, the decision is easy:
"Under this statute the court does not exercise the whole legislative power, respecting the incorporation of towns, and the delegation of authority, if any, is therefore, not inhibited by the constitution, if Story's theory is correct." The court then proceeded
to consider a further objection that the circuit court had excluded
a portion of the territory from the proposed corporation after
the voters had voted to incorporate. It was declared that even if
the allegation were true that a majority of the voters had protested
against the issuance of the certificate after a portion of the territory had been excluded, "this is immaterial and does not invalidate
the certificate". In other words, it was held that the circuit court
bad power to override the voters on the question of the inclusion
or exclusion of territory. And the circuit court in determining
what territory should be included acts administratively and
judicially, and not legislatively. The decision to this effect is one
of the West Virginia court's most liberal decisions on any separation of powers question. The court went the whole way in adopt.
ing Story's interpretation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
It might well have gone even further and included in its opinion
a discussion of reasons of expediency in favor of giving circuit
courts discretion in the incorporation of cities, towns and villages,
a discussion of the efficiency of the method chosen by the legislature, a discussion of the efficiency of possible alternative methods,
a discussion of the reasons that underlie the doctrine of separation
of powers and their applicability or inapplicability to the exercise
of this particular power by the circuit court. It is suggested that
the West Virginia supreme court, in its much stricter opinions of
the past ten years, would not so readily strike down on the basis
of a tyranny of labels legislative efforts to establish efficient methods
of administering government, if it were to become imbued with
the wisdom that pervades the 1911 opinion of Judge Poffenbarger
in Morris v. Taylor.
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Thus far, it had been consistently held that the circuit court
could properly perform its statutory function in the incorporation
of cities, towns and villages, but it had not yet been held that the
supreme court could exercise any power of review of the circuit
court's action. This step remained to be taken in West v. West
Virginia Fair Ass'n,181 in which, on a writ of error from an order
of the circuit court granting a certificate of incorporation, the
supreme court determined whether or not the action of the circuit court was arbitrary or capricious. The court expressly recognized that no statutory provision was made for review by the supreme court. It did not, however, hold that a writ of error was
appropriate, but declared: "If there has been an abuse of discretion, it may in a proper proceeding be reviewed and corrected.
Whether the proper procedure has been followed, we will not stop
to discuss; the case is here, and should Ibe adjudicated without
The court accordingly proceeded to discuss the
further costs."
evidence and to conclude that the action of the circuit court was
not capricious. The supreme court has thus taken upon itself the
power of review of the incorporation of cities, towns and villages,
and, if anything is to be learned from the workmen's compensation
cases, a power to determine whether or not action is arbitrary
182
easily becomes a power to exercise the ultimate judgment.
CERTIFICATES AND LICENSES

Cases concerning the grant, refusal and revocation of certificates of convenience and licenses to do business and to practice
professions present similar problems which may be considered together. No group of West Virginia cases on judicial review of
administrative action is more confused; no group of such cases
affords a more convincing demonstration of the artificiality of the
doctrine of separation of powers as it has been interpreted.
Two 1927 decisions concerning issuance by the State Road.
Commission of certificates of convenience to operate bus lines are
83
most instructive. In the Reynolds case' the supreme court held
the action of the commission in awarding certificates to certain applicants and denying certificates to others to be judicial and therefore denied writs of prohibition to restrain a circuit court from
'18197 W. Va. 10, 125 S. E. 353 (1924).
182 In Houseman v. Town of Anawalt, 85 NV. Va. 60, 100 S. B. 848 (1919),
it was held that a circuit court in forfeiting the charter of a town acted judicially and that the supreme court therefore had jurisdiction on writ of error.
183 Reynolds Taxi Co. v. Hudson, 103 W. Va. 173, 136 S. E. 833 (1927).
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reviewing the commission's action by certiorari. In the Quesenberry case" it was held that the circuit court had no jurisdiction
to review by certiorarithe choice made by the comnmission among
the applicants for the award of a certificate, on the ground that
the action of the commission was nonjudicial. The reason for the
opposite results of the two cases is stated in clear-cut fashion in
the Quesenberry case: "Where the granting or refusing of the
certificate affects a right of property, illustrated in the ferry cases
cited, and in the Reyiwlds case cited, the action of the Commission
i' judicial in its nature; but where no such right is involved the
action of the Commission is ministerial and'administrative, and
does not, come within the realk of the judiciary." Here is a
definite principle which is well worth examining.
Two questions are raised: (1) What is the nature of the
property right which determines whether the action of the commission is judicial or nonjudicial? (2) Why does the presence or
absence of such a property right make the action judicial or nonjudicial?
A property right was involved in the Reynolds case because
the bus line for which the certificate was awarded would compete
with "established public carriers". The four applicants were a
subsidiary of the Monongahela West Penn Public Service Company (which owns and operates a system of electric railway lines),
a subsidiary of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, an independent
taxi company, and an independent bus company. The commission
had granted certificates to the two independent companies and had
denied certificates to the two subsidiary corporations, and on application of the two parent corporations and the two subsidiaries
the circuit court had awarded writs of certiorari. The court
denied prohibition against the circuit court because "there can
be no doubt of the right of an established public carrier, which is
furnishing necessary service, to protest the granting of a certificate
of convenience to an applicant proposing to furnish competing
service." Apparently it was the property right of the parent corporations, which were not applicants, and not that of the subsidiaries, the applicants, with which the court was concerned.
In the Quesenberry case the court found that no property right
was involved for the reason that: "One who applies for a certificate or license has no property right involved. It is a privilege
equally available to all persons. But after the permit has been
184 Quesenberry v. State Road Comm., 103 W. Va. 714, 138 S. E. 362 (1927).
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issued to him and becomes final, he has obtained a valuable right
which cannot be revoked except for cause, and which will be protected by the courts." The distinction, then, is clear: one who is
doing business has a property right in avoiding competition; one
who is applying in the first instance for a certificate of convenience
has no property right. But is it true that because Quesenberry
was applying for a certificate he had no property right involved?
The applications were made early in 1924. The certificate was
granted to Quesenberry and refused to the Transportation Company June 10, 1925. The court specifically declared: "It appears
that up to June 10, 1925, both applicants had operated over the
route under their taxi licenses ... " Furthermore, it was not
until April 26, 1926, that the commission entered a further order
granting a certificate to the transportation company but not revoking Quesenberry's certificate, and the court said: "It is frue
that Quesenberry had begun to operate and had expended money
and energy in perfecting his organization, relying upon the award
of his certificate ... ' This is passed over with the court's statement that the commission "was influenced by the fact that it had,
by its premature action, caused Quesenberry to expend money and
purchase equipment, and therefore concluded not to require him to
stop." Such a statement does not explain the fact that both applicants were doing business before any certificate was granted, and
that Quesenberry had made a considerable investment. The court
does attempt to meet this difficulty with the explanation that when
the certificate of June 10, 1925, was awarded it was understood
that the commission would reopen the hearings on the applications
and take further evidence. But this further fact means only that
the award of the certificates was not finally decided until April 26,
1926, and at that time it appeared not only that both applicants
had been doing business before June 10, 1925, but also that Quesenberry had since that time spent money and purchased equipment.
Yet, in the face of a frank recognition of that fact, the court held
that Quesenberry had no property right in the grant of a certificate, citing with approval the Reynolds case holding that established carriers had a property right in not having additional
competition. The only conclusion to be drawn from the two cases,
taken together, is that the right to continue to do business at all
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is not a property right but that the right to continue to do business
without competition is a property right.'5 s
The holdings are even more difficult to digest in their application of the separation of powers doctrine. When the State Road
Commission conducts a hearing and decides whether or not one
with a considerable investment shall be permitted to continue to
operate at all and enters an order accordingly, the commission acts
legislatively, but when the commission conducts a hearing and decides whether or not an "established carrier" shall be permitted to
continue to operate without competition and' enters an order accordingly, the commission acts judicially!
Even though the court's opinions may not be wholly convincing that a property right was involved in the Reynolds case
and not in the Quesenberry case, let it be assumed that such were
the facts of the two cases. Would it then follow that the commission acted judicially in the case involving the property right and
nonjudicially in the case involving no property right? The character of the action of the commission in the two cases being precisely the same in all other respects, does the presence or absence
of a property right change the character of its action? If comparisons be made with the functions of courts and legislatures, it
may be observed that courts frequently pass upon questions which
involve no property lights, as, for example, in cases involving freedom of speech, of the press and of religion, and much legislation
affects property rights, as, for example, the enactment of a tax
statute. If comparisons be made with functions of administrative
tribunals, no support is found for the proposition that the presence
of a property right determines whether or not action is judicial.
The functions of assessing taxes 8" and of fixing public service
rates for the future. 7 involve property rights of the first order and
yet are held nonjudicial. And it is specifically held8 8 that "a
185 The question before the commission in the Quesenberry case was not only
whether or not a certificate should be granted to the transportation company,
but was also whether or not Quespnberry's certificate should be revoked. It
is assumed that if the revocation of a certificate is judicial, then the determination whether or not to revoke a certificate must be judicial even though the
decision is not to revoke the certificate.
L86 Assessments have not always been considered nonjudicial. See discussion .upra, p. 273, et seq.
187 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed.
150 (1908); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 73 W. Va. 571, 80,S.
E. 931 (1914).
188 Moore v. Strickling, 46 W. Va. 515, 33 S. E. 274 (1899).
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public office is not property, within the meaning of the constitutional provision that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law and the judgment of his
peers' "; yet it is held that removal from office is judicial. 18 9 So
far as West Virginia cases are concerned, the use of a property
right as a criterion for determining whether or not action is judicial
is unique in these State Road Commission cases and is inconsistent
with many cases concerning other administrative tribunals or officials.
Even if one questions the conclusions of the court in the
Reynolds and Quesenberry cases that a property right was involved in the former and not in the latter and that the presence or
absence of a property right makes the action of the commission
judicial or nonjudicial, one may still agree with an expression of
the court that may be of greater consequence than any of the talk.
about separation of powers: "Their [State Road Commissioners']
judgment and discretion is likely to be better and sounder for all
concerned than those who are not better informed though more
learned in the law. We do not think that it was ever contemplated by the lawmakers that every one who made application for
a certificate and failed, having no other right thereto than the
fact that he made application, in due form and was prepared to
give acceptable service, could appeal to the courts to control the
discretion of the Commission in that regard. It would cause delays and uncertainties to the detriment of the public needs, besides congesting the courts with complaints of disappointed office
seekers of questionable merit."I" Such language puts the question
of judicial review upon its true basis. The determination of the
extent of judicial review should involve wholly practical considerations such as those referred to by the court, not abstract conceptions founded upon the theory of separation of powers. There
is not, and perhaps cannot be, a satisfactory method for deter
mining whether a function such as the granting of certificates of
convenience and necessity should be called judicial or legislative,
when the truth probably is that it partakes to some extent of the
character of both. No assistance is found in solving a problem as
189 Arkle v. Board of Com'rs, 41 W. Va. 471, 23 S. E. 804 (1895); State
ex rel. Board of Education v. Martin, 112 W. Va. 174, 163 S. E. 850 (1932);
Copley v. Trent, 117 W. Va. 768, 188 S. E. 138 (1936).
goQuesenberry v. Stale Road Comm., 103 W. Va. 714, 720-21, 138 S. E.

362 (1927).
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to the extent to which courts should review administrative action
by making the problems referable to the doctrine of separation of
powers. That doctrine frequently, if not usually, is positively an
obstacle to the proper decision of a difficult case. It caused considerable apparent confusion in the Reynolds and Quesenberry
cases. If problems of judicial review of administrative action were
to be studied on the basis of such practical considerations as those
which the court took into account in the language quoted above, if
arguments of counsel were directed to questions of efficiency and
convenience, and if the court were to decide cases upon such a
basis, without becoming concerned with ill-understood conceptualistic notions, the administration of government surely would be vastly improved.' t
Spurdone v. Shaw,' 2 in holding that the revocation by the
tax commissioner of a license to dispense nonintoxicating beer was
judicial and therefore that a circuit court could be compelled by
mandamus to entertain an appeal from the ruling of the tax commissioner, 19 3 is consistent in result with the distinction drawn in
the Reynolds and Quesenberry cases, but the reason given was not
that the license was a property right but that "As the tax com191 The Reynolds and Quesenborry cases are not wholly consistent with
earlier West Virginia cases involving similar licenses or rights. In Belington
& Northern R. R. v. Town of Alston, 54 W. Va. 597, 46 S. E. 612 (1904), an
injunction against the repeal by a town council of the railroad's right of
way through the streets was dissolved. The court found that since the right
of way was not a franchise a statute requiring notice for repeal of a franchise was not applicable, and no notice was required. The court specifically
declared that the railroad could have the repeal "reviewed and reversed by
proper judicial method of review". It cannot be ascertained from the opinion
whether the court regarded the council's action as judicial or legislative. The
court did state that "the defendant's council is clothed with limited legislative, judicial and executive or administrative functions . . ."
In Wheeling & Elm Grove R. R. v. Town of Triadelphia, 58 W. Va. 487, 52
S. E. 499 (1906), after a thorough discussion, the court held the revocation
by a town council without a hearing of a railroad's right of way to use streets
could properly be enjoined, as it was nonjudicial. The court indicated that
the remedy would have been certiorariif the action were judicial. The decision is discussed with approval in the Reynolds case.
Ellis v. State Road Comm., 100 W. Va. 531, 131 S. E. 7 (1925), in holding
that certiorari and not mandamus is the proper method for review of the
action of the State Road Commission in revoking a taxicab permit and chauffeur's license, was a forerunner of the distinction drawn in the Reynolds and
Quesenberry cases.
192 114 W. Va. 191, 171 S. E. 411 (1933).
193 The writ of mandamus was denied in the case because the petitioner
sought to compel the circuit court of Marion County to entertain her appeal,
and the court found that only an appeal to the circuit court of Kanawha County
was appropriate.
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missioner is authorized to act only for specified causes, his deterruination involves the exercise of judicial or quasi judicial discretion, which may, therefore, be reviewed by the judiciary."
In two 1935 decisions involving the revocation of licenses the
court encountered more difficulty with separation of powers. In
the Hedrick case' 94 the question was the kind of notice which the
board of dental examiners must give a dentist before revoking his
license to practice. In deciding this question the court declared:
"The Board is not a judicial tribunal and the hearing before it is
not a law suit. Technical rules of procedure are inapplicable to its
proceedings."
In saying that the board is not a "judicial tribunal" the court probably did not mean that the board is not a
tribunal which acted judicially, for even a board of education in
removing a supervisor of schools is held 95 to be an "inferior tribunal" as that term is used in article VIII of the constitution.
The court probably meant only that the board is not a court, and
hence that the procedure of a lawsuit need not be followed. In
the Eddy case, 96 however, the court based its decision upon a flat
statement that the revocation by the board of optometry of a
practitioner's license is not judicial. The constitutionality of the
statute was challenged on the ground that it placed the power of
revocation of licenses, a judicial power, in a board consisting of
optometrists whose business interests were served by keeping down
competition in the profession. The court rejected this contention
by saying: "In this petitioner loses sight of the fact that revocation of a license is no more a judicial function than that of
licensing; that both are a part of the regulatory measure.' '1 7 The
distinction so finely drawn in the Reyiwlds and Quesenberry cases
was apparently forgotten, and even Spurdone v. Shaw, decided
only two years previously, was overlooked. The case constitutes
still another demonstration of the desirability of minimizing the
theory of separation of powers in the decision of cases concerning
judicial review of administrative action. The court might well
194 Board of Dental Examiners v. Hedrick, 116 W. Va. 222, 179 S. E. 809
(1935).
'9r State ex rel. Board of Education v. Martin, 112 W. Va. 174, 163 S. E. 850

(1932).

'9 Eddy v. West Virginia Board of Optometry, 116 W. Va. 698, 182 S. E.
870 (1932).
'97 The court weakened somewhat its position to this effect by following
this language with a quotation from a treatise: "The maxim that no man shall
be judge in his own case 'applies to judicial officers, but not to officers whose
duties partake of an administrative character, and are only quasi-judicial.' "
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have decided the question whether members of the board could
properly revoke the license of an optometrist without denominating
the action either judicial or nonjudicial. The question was a practical one - whether or not the self-interest of the members of the
board was such that it was unfair to permit them to pass upon
the revocation of a license of another optometrist. The court is
obviously more likely to reach a proper decision on such a question
if the argument of counsel and the court's deliberation are directed
to practical considerations than if the real problem is obscured by
the conceptualism of separation of powers.
APPOINTMIENT AND

REMOVAL

OF OFFICERS

Although the cases involving appointments are of relatively
little interest, the West Virginia law with respect to removal of
officers is one of the most fertile of grounds for an enlightening
study of judicial review of administrative action and the doctrine
of separation of powers.
Despite the provision of article VI, § 40 of the constitution.
providing that "The Legislature shall not confer upon any court
or judge the power of appointment to office, further than the same
is herein provided for", the power may constitutionally be conferred upon the circuit courts to appoint jury commissioners"09
and probation officers,"1 9 but not a prosecuting attorney.0 0 The
constitutionality of the power to appoint jury commissioners is
justified on the ground that they are officers of the court and not
officers of the state, and the word "office" as used in the constitutional provision includes only the latter. Such an interpretation
was apparently assumed in the cases involving the appointment of
probation officers, for the contention of unconstitutionality was
"based upon the theory of inhibition against encroachment by any
one of the three departments of the state government upon the
powers of the others". The court rejected this contention: "All
authority, however, recognizes the impossibility or impracticability
of wholly avoiding every form of encroachment by each department
upon the province of the others . . . No one department can
fully and completely fulfill or discharge the duties allotted to it
without at least in part exercising some function belonging to one
198 State v. Mounts, 36 W. Va. 179, 14 S. E. 407 (1892).
199 Hall v. County Court, 82 W. Va. 564, 96 S. E. 966 (1918) ; Locke v. County
Court, 111 W. Va. 156, 161 S. E. 6 (1931).
200 Poling v. County Court, 116 W. Va. 580, 182 S. E. 778 (1935).
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or both of the others. . . ." The court did not stop to consider
whether the making of an appointment is judicial or nonjudicial;
it merely declared the impracticability of applying strictly the
doctrine of separation of powers and therefore found that the
court may properly be authorized to make the appointment. It
is to be regretted that the court has not always approached
separation of powers questions with such an attitude.
The questions raised in the removal cases are of practical importance because of the probability that an existing statute will be
held unconstitutional if the doctrine of separation of powers is
strictly interpreted and applied. The statute20 1 provides for removal by the governor of certain elective state officers if they are
disqualified from holding the office, or "for official misconduct,
malfeasance in office, incompetence, neglect of duty, or gross immorality". Under the statute the governor may remove such an
officer only upon the basis of evidence submitted at a hearing before the governor. The statute further provides: "Any such officer against whom charges may have been brought as aforesaid,
feeling aggrieved by his removal from office by the governor, may
present his petition in writing to the supreme court of appeals....
After argument by counsel, the court shall decide the matter in
controversy, both as to the law and evidence, as may seem to it to
be just and right, and may affirm the order of removal, or may
permanently suspend, set aside and vacate such removal and restore such officer to his office. ....
"
If the separation of powers doctrine is strictly applied, the
power of removal cannot be both executive and judicial. If itis
judicial, may the governor exercise it? If it is executive, may there
be an "appeal ' 2 2 from the governor's decision to the supreme
court of appeals? The dilemma is prima facie perfect.
201 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 6, art. 6,

§§

5, 6.

It is provided by c. 6, art. 6, § 4 that any officer appointed by the governor
may be removed by the governor "at his will and pleasure". This statute goes
much further than the constitutional provision, article VII, § 10, which provides that the governor may remove such an appointive officer "in case of
incompetency, neglect of duty, gross immorality, or malfeasance in office".
C. 6, art. 6, § 7 provides for removal of certain county officers by the circuit court.
202 If
the power of removal were held to be executive, so that the governor
could properly exercise it even under a strict interpretation of the doctrine of
separation of powers, there would be grave question whether the statutory
review by the supreme court of appeals would be constitutional. It was held
in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 73 W. Va. 571, 80 S. E. 931
(1914), that there could be no appeal from legislative action of the Public
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On the question whether the power of removal for cause is
judicial or executive, cases in other jurisdictions hold both ways,"'
and the question on its merits might reasonably be decided either
way. The West Virginia cases, however, have held consistently
and definitely that the power is judicial. In one case204 the court
held unconstitutional a statute conferring upon the county court
power to remove a justice of the peace, on the ground that the
removal of an officer is a judicial function and that under article
VIII, § 24 of the constitution 20 5 the legislature may confer upon
county courts only nonjudicial powers. In a later case 00 a
statute conferring upon the circuit court power to remove county
commissioners was held constitutional. And in two recent cases"'
it has been held that the removal by a board of education of; a supervisor of schools and the removal of a teacher by the state superintendent of free schools are judicial acts and hence reviewable by
the circuit court upon certiorari. In the second of theses cases
Service Commission to the supreme court. It would no doubt be held that
for similar reasons there can be no appeal from executive action of the governor to the supreme court. The United Fuel Gas case held, however, that the
court could review the action of the commission "by process akin to mandamus
or prohibition" within the original jurisdiction of the supreme court. A
similar technique cannot so easily be applied to the court's review of the removal of an officer by the governor, for the statute, in providing that the court
shall decide "as may seem to it to be just and right", calls for an independent
finding by the court, and an independent judicial finding is far beyond the
scope of mandamus or prohibition, or even anything "akin to mandamus or
prohibition". Furthermore, the statute. expressly calls the review an "appeal": "The supreme court shall consider and decide the appeal upon the
original papers and documents . ." The revisers' note to this statute twice
refers to the review as an "appeal", and the following section of the Code,
referring back to this section, calls it an "appeal".
203 See, for example, cases cited in Arkle v. Board of ComI'rs, 41 W. Va. 471,
23 S. E. 804 (1895).
204 Arkle v. Board of Coin 'rs, 41 W. Va. 471, 23 S. E. 804 (1895).
205 "Such courts [county courts] may exercise such other powers, and perform such other duties, not of a judicial nature, as may be prescribed by
law."
The court has not consistently held that this clause is a limitation upon
the powers that may be conferred upon the county courts. For example, in
Poling v. County Court, 116 W. Va. 580, 182 S. E. 778 (1935), it was held that
the county court could constitutionally be empowered to appoint a prosecuting
attorney because: "Since, in moulding county courts, the constitution has entirely disregarded the separation of governmental powers commanded in article
V, and has blended in such courts both administrative and judicial powers, there
would be no inherent impropriety in having county courts fill a vacancy in the
office of prosecuting attorney--a purely administrative act."
208 McDonald v. Guthrie, 43 W. Va. 595, 27 S. E. 844 (1897).
207 State ez rel. Board of Education v. Martin, 112 W. Va. 174, 163 S. R.
850 (1932) ; Copley v. Trent, 117 W. Va. 768, 188 S. E. 138 (1936).
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the supreme court of appeals affirmed the action of the circuit
court upon a writ of error.
The West Virginia law being rather definitely established
that the removal of an officer is judicial, may the legislature confer the power of removal upon the governor? If not, the statute
is unconstitutional. Of course, if the court is to follow the inflexible attitude taken in the Hodges case,210 in which the water
power act of 1929 was held unconstitutional in its entirety merely
because an appeal was allowed to a circuit court from legislative
action of the Public Service Commission, the sta ute in question,
in permitting the governor to exercise a function I eld to be judicial
would be easily stricken down as unconstitutiondl. Even though
the court has followed the Hodges case in several more recent decisions, 20 9 the decision is so unnecessarily extreme in its interpretation of the separation of powers clause that it is unsafe to assume that the attitude there taken will be .adhered to in future
decisions.
Indeed, an examination of the various constitutional provisions
concerning removal of officers yields convincing evidence that it
could not have been the intent of the framers of the West Virginia
constitution that the separation of powers clause should be interpreted as laying down such an inflexible rule.
Article IV, § 6 provides: "All officers elected or appointed
under this Constitution, may, unless in cases herein otherwise provided for, be removed from office for official misconduct, incompetence, neglect of duty, or gross immorality, in such manner as
may be prescribed by general laws. . . ." It was in pursuance of
this authority that the legislature conferred the power of removal
of certain elective state officers upon the governor, for the constitution did not otherwise provide for the removal of these officers. However, there are four other provisions of the constitution
with respect to removal of officers, and one general provision for
impeachment.
Article VII, § 10 provides: "The Governor shall have power
to remove any officer whom he may appoint in case of incompeten208 Hodges v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 110 W. Va. 649, 159 S. B. 834 (1931 ). This
case is discussed at length below, p. 352, et seq.
200 Baker v. County Court, 112 W. Va. 406, 164 S. E. 515 (1932) ; Danielley
v. City of Princeton, 113 W. Va. 252, 167 S.E. 620 (1933); Staud v. Sill, 114
W. Va. 208, 171 S.E. 428 (1933); Buckeye Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Smith,
114 W. Va. 284, 171 S. E. 650 (1933). These cases are discussed below,
p. 361, et seq.
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cy, neglect of duty, gross immorality, or malfeasance in office ... "
Since the Federal Constitution does not prohibit a state from violating the doctrine of separation of powers by its Constitution,21
this provision means either that the removal of such appointive
officers for cause is an executive function or that the governor
may exercise a nonexecutive function. There is no other alternative, except to repudiate the whole theory of separation of powers.
Article IV, § 9 provides: "Any officer of the State may be
impeached for maladministration, corruption, incompetency, gross
immorality, neglect of duty, or any high crime or misdemeanor.
The House of Delegates shall have the sole power of impeachment.
The Senate shall have the sole power to try impeachments . . ."
This provision means either that removal by impeachment is legislative, or that the house and senate of the legislature may exercise
a nonlegislative power. And the same is necessarily true of article
VIII, § 17, which permits removal of judges for specified causes
"by a concurrent vote of both houses of the Legislature", and of
article VI, § 25, which permits each house of the legislature to
expel one of its own members.
Article IX, § 4 provides that certain county officers "shall be
subject to indictment for malfeasance, misfeasance, or neglect of
official duty and upon conviction thereof, their office shall become
vacant." In effect, this section confers upon the circuit courts the
power to remove certain county officers. It must therefore be true
that either the removal of such officers is judicial or the circuit
courts are authorized by the constitution to perform a nonjudicial
function.
To find the intent of the framers of the constitution, that
instrument should be read as a whole.21 ' If all the provisions for
removal of officers are read together, since there is probably no
inherent difference in the character of the function of removing
an appointive state officer, a judge, and a county officer, it would
seem that the conclusion should be, not that the removal of these
officers is, respectively, executive, legislative, and judicial, but that
it is the intent of the framers of the constitution that the separation
210

Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 83, 23 S. Ct. 28, 47 L. Ed. 79 (1902).

g.: State v. Harden, 62 W. Va. 313, 58 S. E. 715 (1907) (syllabus 3):
'In ascertaining the intention of the people in adopting a constitution all parts
of the constitution must be considered, every article, section, clause, phrase and
word allowed some effect, and all parts, clauses, phrases and words harmonized,
if possible."
211 E.
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of powers clause is not intended to be literally interpreted in its
application to the removal of officers.
The removal provisions of the constitution thus reveal a truth
of broad significance with respect to the doctrine of separation of
powers. Madison and Story did not understand that doctrine to
require such a strict interpretation as that made by the West Virginia court in cases such as the Hodges case. The removal provisions seem to indicate that the framers of the constitution did
not so understand it.
ErEcoxs

The constitution, article IV, § 11, provides: "The Legislature
shall prescribe the manner . . . of determining contested elections."
For various offices different methods of contesting elections have
been prescribed by statute. The county court is judge of the elec212
tion of its own members and of all county and district officers.
Each house of the legislature determines contests of the election
of its own members. 13 A contest of the election of a governor2 is
14
determined by a joint session of both houses of the legislature,
and a contest of the election of certain other state officers and
judges is decided by a "special court" consisting of three person,
selected by the contestant, the contestee, and the governor.2 1
The cases indicate that in determining election contests the
joint assembly of the legislature acts quasi judicially,21 that the
county court acts quasi judicially, 17 and that the "special court"
is "legislative in character." 218
The mere statement of these results is sufficient to show that
the court has not been strict in its application of the doctrine of
separation of powers in the election cases. Most striking is the
decision that the, joint assembly of the legislature acts "in a quasi
judicial capacity" in determining a contest of the election for
governor.2 19 It cannot be denied that such action by the joint
212 W.

VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 3, art. 9, § 1.

213 Id., e. 3, art. 9, § 9.
234

Id., e. 3, art. 9, § 12.

-15 Id., e. 3, art. 9, § 13.

216 Goff v. Wilson, 32 W. Va. 393, 9 S. E. 26 (1889).
217 Brazie v. Com'rs, 25 W. Va. 213 (1884) ; Baer v. Gore, 79 W. Va. 50, 90
S. E. 530 (1916). Cf. Cunningham v. Squires, 2 W. Va. 422 (1868); Burke
v. Supervisors, 4 W. Va. 371 (1870) ; Dryden . Swinburne, 15 W. Va. 234
(1879); Dryden v. Swinburne, 20 W. Va. 89 ( 882); Williamson v. Musick,
60 W. Va. 59, 53 S. E. 706 (1906).
218 McWhorter v. Dorr, 57 W. Va. 608, 50 S. E. 838 (1905).
219 Goff v. Wilson, 32 W. Va. 393, 9 S. E. 26 (1889).
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assembly is a clear violation of the literal words of article V:
nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one
......
[department of the government] at the same time...."
IThe function of the county court in deciding an election contest is said to be "mainly ministerial", but it is nevertheless "quasi
judicial, so far as it is their [the commissioners'] duty to determine,
whether the papers laid before them by the clerk and pirporting
to be returns, are in fact such genuine, intelligible, and substantially authenticated returns as are required by law."2 20 Consistently
with this analysis it is held2 2' that a circuit court has jurisdiction
by certiorarito review the action of the county court in determining
an election contest, and, if the value of the office is more than
$100,222 the supreme court of appeals has jurisdiction by writ of
error.

It might be thought that if the function of both the joint session of the legislature and the county court in deciding election
contests is quasi judicial, the performance of an identical function
by the special statutory court would be of the same character.
Apparently, however, it is true here as in some of the tax cases 22 1
that the character of an act depends not only upon what is done
but also upon the nature of the official or tribunal performing it.
At all events, in McWhorter v. Dorr224 the court specifically rejected a contention that such a special court is an inferior judicial
tribunal within the meaning of article VIII, § 1 of the constitution and that a writ of prohibition against its exceeding its jurisdiction would therefore lie. Stress was laid upon the fact that
"The pay and mileage of the members of the tribunal are the same
as the pay and mileage of members of the Legislature." Another
contributing factor was that "The fact that no appeal or review is
provided for cannot be attributed to an oversight or inadvertence
by the Legislature." It was accordingly held that the statute had
created "a special tribunal, legislative in its character, to hear and
determine contests as to the election of the officers named, wholly
separate from the judicial power 6f the State and not reviewable
by it - a special tribunal at once exclusive and conclusive." No
way to reconcile the decision with such cases as State ex rel. Board
Brazie v. Com'rs, 25 W. Va. 213, 221 (1884).
Dryden v. Swinburne, 15 W. Va. 234 (1879).
This is difficult to reconcile with the holding in Moore v. Strickding, 46
W. Va. 515, 33 S. E. 274 (1899), that "A public office is not property ...
22S See discussion supra, p. 279, et seq.
.224 57 W. Va. 608, 50 S. E. 838 (1905).
220
221
222

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1938

75

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1938], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
of Education v. Martin,225 holding that a board of education is an
"inferior tribunal", is apparent.
An amendment of 1916226 added to the statute the following
provision: "Either party to such contest feeling aggrieved by the
final decision of such special court may present his petition in
writing to the supreme court of appeals.... praying for the suspension, setting aside, or vacation of such final decision."
Of
course, the tribunal being legislative under McWtorter v. Dorr,
there can be no appeal to the supreme court of appeals, according
to the holding of United Fuel 'Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission. 22T The amendment is therefore unconstitutional unless it can
be construed as an enlargement of the original jurisdiction of the
supreme court "by process akin to mandamus or prohibition".
Anderson v. Bowen 228 is of interest for the frankness with
which the court indicated that an argument based upon separation
of powers would not be taken seriously: "Power in the legislature
to authorize the board of election supervisors, exeated by the act,
to perform duties and functions that are generally regarded as
being quasi-judicial, is clear and undoubted. If judicial power
-cannot be conferred upon such a body, legislative and administrative power respecting elections and election contests, can be
delegated to it, by virtue of sec. 11, Art. IV of the Constitution,
and. if necessary to uphold the act, it would have to be interpreted
as conferring legislative power." One wishes that the court had
consistently taken such an attitude in other decisions.
In Baer v. Gore229 an election contest was decided by a county
court, appealed to the circuit court, and taken by writ of error to
the supreme court. As the statute, conferred no right of review,
the challenge of the jurisdiction of the supreme court might
reasonably have been upheld, as several earlier cases2 0 had
denied such jurisdiction in the supreme court unless specifically
conferred. This contention, however, was brusquely rejected. The
112 W. Va. 174, 163 S. E. 850 (1932).
-8 W. Va. Acts 1916, 3d E. Sess., c. 2, § 15.
227 73 W. Va. 571, 80 S. E. 931 (1914).
See discussion stpra, p. 284, at seq.
228 78 W. Va. 559, 89 S. E. 677 (1916).
C29 79 W. Va. 50, 90 S. E. 530 (1916).
230 McLean v. State, 61 W. Va. 537, 56 S. E. 884 (1907) (tax); Bluefield
226

Water Works Co. v. State, 63 W. Va. 480, 60 S. B. 403 (1908) (tax); Ritchie
County Bank v. County Court, 65 W. Va. 208, 63 S. E. 1098 (1909) (tax);
HEowell v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 78 W. Va. 664, 80 S. E. 105 (1916) (Public
Service Commission). See also the later decision in Royal Glen Land & Lumber
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 91 W. Va. 446, 113 S. E. 749 (1922).
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court also did violence to the hitherto rather well established view
that the constitutional power of the circuit court to perform administrative or legislative functions is somewhat broader than the corresponding constitutional power of the supreme court. Counsel's
argument that the supreme court -was without jurisdiction because
the action was nonjudicial was rejected in the following manner:
"If sound, the proposition urged against the right denied or restricted applies with the same degree of consistency to the right
conferred by the primary act on the circuit courts." The court
did not mention at least five previous cases 23 1 holding that the
by the
supreme court could not review nonjudicial acts23performed
2
circuit courts within their constitutional power.
ESTABLISHMENT OF FERRIES

Article VIII, § 24 of the constitution gives to county courts
authority over the establishment of ferries "under such regulations as may be prescribed by law". Article VIII, § 12 provides:
"The circuit court shall have the supervision and control of all
proceedings before justices and other inferior tribunals, by mandamus, prohibition and certiorari." Article VIII, § 3 gives the
supreme court "appellate jurisdiction in civil cases ... concerning
a mill, road, way, ferry or landing . . ." Statutes 113 provide for
an "appeal" from the county court to the circuit court in cases of
the establishment and regulation of ferries and for the award by
the supreme court of "an appeal from, or a writ of error or super231 Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Board of Public Works, 28 IV. Va. 264
(1886) (tax); Mackin v. County Court, 38 W. Va. 338, 18 S. E. 632 (1893)
(tax); In re Town of Union Mines, 39 W. Va. 179, 19 S. E. 398 (1894) (incorporation of city); Elder v. Incorporators of Central City, 40 W. Va. 222, 21
S. E. 738 (1895) (incorporation of city); Copp v. State, 69 W. Va. 439, 71
S. 2E.
580 (1911) (tax).
32
In Poteet v. County Com'rs, 30 W. Va. 58, 3 S. E. 97 (1887), it was held
that the action of the county court in ascertaining and declaring the result
of a vote on the relocation of a county-seat is judicial and hence reviewable
by the circuit court on certiorari. Accord: Welch v. County Court, 29 W. Va.
63, 1 S. E. 337 (1886); Brown v. Randolph County Court, 45 W. Va. 827, 32
S. E. 165 (1899); State ex rel. Marcum v. County Court, 90 W. Va. 105, 110 S.
E. 482 (1922). In Hickenboatom v. County Court, 95 W. Va. 253, 120 S. H.
767 (1923), in which it was held that the commissioners of a county court in
canvassing the returns of a vote in a road bond election act nonjudicially, the
court declared: "This court bases its conclusion in the Poteet case and the
Brown case largely on the ground of necessity, in order to afford some remedy
This is one
against fraud and illegality in county-seat relocation elections."
of few instances in which the court has specifically recognized that necessity
may color its views on a question of separation of powers.
233 W. VA. RLv. CODE (1931) c. 58, art. 3, § 1; c. 58, art. 5, § 1.
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sedeas to, a judgment" of the circuit court in cases concerning
ferries.
The principal question usually presented to the county court
in determining whether to grant or refuse an application for the
establisbment of a ferry is the question whether or not there is a
sufficient "public need" for the new ferry. Although it might,
perhaps, be reasonably thought that the question whether or not
the public need is sufficient is legislative and not judicial, the
supreme court has consistently assumed both its own jurisdiction
and that of the circuit court to substitute judicial judgment for
the judgment of the county court on the question whether an application for the establishment of a new ferry should be granted or
rejected. Thus, in the leading case,2 4 the question was said to be
"whether the general public interest would be promoted in the
particular case by the establishment of two ferries so close to each
other over the same stream", but the court did not discuss the
question of its jurisdiction. In a later case 233 the court adverted to
the fact that the establishment of a ferry is within the police jurisdiction of the county court and that therefore it might be thought
that the discretion of that court is not reviewable. This idea was
rejected, however, with the simple statement: "But the legislature
took a different view in giving an appeal in a ferry case." Later
ferry cases 233 have not discussed jurisdiction, but in each case the
court has made an independent judicial inquiry into the suifficiency
of the public need for a new ferry.
Of course, whether the determination of public need is legislative or judicial, the result the court has reached may probably
be justified upon the basis of the various constitutional provisions
referred to above. And since in each of the ferry cases the establishment of the new ferry was resisted by the owner of an existing
ferry, a property interest was involved in each case upon the basis
of which the action could be called judicial, if the distinction drawn
by the court in cases concerning the issuance by the State Road
Commission of certificates of public convenience and necessity were
to be applied.23
Williamson v. Hays, 25 W. Va. 609 (1885).
Ferry Co. v. Russell, 52 W. Va. 356, 43 S. E. 107 (1902).
230 Polley v. Gilleland, 72 W. Va. 301, 78 S. E.96 (1913) ; Egerton v. Flesher,
76 W. Va. 519, 86 S. E.34 (1915) ; Greene v. Lane, 100 W. Va. 399, 130 S.E.
234
235

522 (1925).

23TReynolds Tax Co. v. Hudson, 103 W. Va. 173, 136 S. E. 833 (1927);
Quesenberry v. State Road Comm., 103 W. Va. 714, 138 S.E. 362 (1927). See
discussion supra,p. 331, et seg.
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CoUNTY BOUNDARY DisPunms

A statute218 provided for the settlement of county boundary
disputes by the appointment by the circuit court of commissioners
to establish the true line. In Summers County v. Monroe County,2 3 a circuit court dismissed the petition of a county for the appointment of commissioners, and the county obtained a writ of
error to the supreme court, which held that "under that statute a
circuit court does but -perform a purely ministerial, not a judicial,
function, nor one of discretion", and hence that the supreme court
was without jurisdiction. 240 The principal significance of the ease
lies in its recognition that the circuit court could properly perform
a nonjudicial function, in contrast with several decisions since 1931
holding statutes unconstitutional on account of provisions for the
exercise of nonjudicial functions by circuit courts.241
SALE OF LANi) POR TAXES
In pursuance of a statutory provision 242 a circuit court issued

orders directing and confirming the sale for the benefit of the
school fund of land upon which taxes were delinquent, and an ap2
peal was taken to the supreme court in McClure v. Maitland. 13
It was held that the proceeding in the circuit court, being ex parte,
was neither a suit nor a controversy and therefore that the action
of the circuit court was nonjudicial. The appeal was accordingly
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In its assumption that the
action of the circuit court was valid, the case is in striking contrast
with the 1933 decision of Staud v. Sill,2 " in which a statute was
held unconstitutional in its entirety because it permitted a circuit
court to confirm a sale of land under a trust deed.
Va. Acts 1872-3, c. 114, p. 291; W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c. 39,
The statute was fundamentally altered in the Code revision of 1931.
See W. VA. REv. CoDE (1931) c. 7, art. 2, § 1.
239 43 W. Va. 207, 27 S. E. 307 (1897).
240 The court apparently thought it necessary to declare: " It is the character of the act, not the tribunal doing it, which gives cast to that act." That
this is not always so, see discussion above, p. 279, t seq.
241 Many cases have recognized that circuit courts may properly perform
nonjudicial functions. See notes 264, 265, 266, 267, and 268, infra. Yet, since
1931 four statutes have been held unconstitutional because they conferred
nonjudicial powers upon circuit courts. See discussion infra, p. 352, ot seq.
242 W. Va. Acts 1872-3, c. 134.
243 24 W. Va. 561 (1884).
244 114 W. Va. 208, 171 S. E. 428 (1933). See discussion infra, p. 363, ot seq.
238

W.

§ 18.
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CAWMPGN EXPENDTURES

246
Sutherland v. Miller 24 held unconstitutional a statute empowering a circuit judge in an ex parte proceeding to determine
whether "the interests of public justice require . . . a judicial inquiry" into the question whether certain candidates for office have
engaged in corrupt and illegal practices contrary to the provisions
of the statute. A writ of prohibition was awarded against a circuit judge to restrain him from further proceeding in inquiring
into the campaign expenditures of a successful candidate for the
office of United States senator. The decision was based upon (1)
violation of article V, (2) unlawful delegation of legislative power,
the exercise of which was "made to depend upon the mere will
or caprice of the grantee of the power", and (3) violation of a
provision of the Federal Constitution vesting exclusive power in
the senate to judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its
own members. The court supported its decision as to separation
of powers as follows: "The privilege of a successful candidate
in an election to fill the office of United States senator is made to
depend in a large measure, in the first instance, upon the ex parte
opinion of a single judge, one selected by a candidate defeated in
the same election for the same office . . ." The decision on this
point does not constitute, as some other decisions247 seem to do, a
blind application on a strictly logical basis of the conceptualism
of separation of powers. Adequate reasons of expediency may
exist for denying to the legislature the power to require a circuit
it was upon the
judge to perform the function in question, and
2 48
basis of such reasons that the case was decided.

245 79 W. Va. 796, 91 S. E. 993 (1917).
240W . Va. Acts 1915, c. 27, § 15.

247 See discussion of "The Hodges Case and Its Aftermath", infra, p. 352,
Ot seq.
248 The court, of course, should not decide, either on the basis of reasons of
expediency or on any other basis, the question of legislative policy as to
whether or not it is desirable to confer upon the circuit court the power to
determine whether or not a judicial inquiry should be made into campaign
expenditures. The only question for the court is the constitutionality of a
statute conferring such power upon the circuit court. But in the absence of
clear historical guidance or binding precedents, the court must interpret a
broad constitutional provision such as the separation of powers clause by
deciding the desirability that the legislature should have power to enact the
statute. And in this case, the question for the court, i. e., the desirability of
having the power in the legislature to confer upon the circuit court the power
to determine whether or not a judicial inquiry should be made into campaign
expenditures is, practically though not theoretically, the same as the question
for the legislature, i. e.,the desirability of conferring upon the circuit court
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APPROVAL OF BOND ISSUES

A statute249 provides that the attorney general of the state
must either approve or disapprove the validity of bond issues of
municipalities, counties and school districts. Any person in interest or any taxpayer of the political division issuing the bonds
present his or its petition to the supreme court of appeals...
praying that the action of the attorney general in applroving or
disapproving such bond issue, as aforesaid, be reversed or modified.
... The case shall be proceeded with as in cases of original jurisdiction. The court shall decide the matters in controversy and
ente!r such order thereon as to it may seem to be just."
Inasmuch as the attorney general is one of the seven
executive officers of the state who make up' the "executive department" under article VII, § 1 of the constitution, the question arises
whether or not the approval or disapproval of a bond issue is an
executive or a judicial act, for if it is judicial the court might hold
that the separation of powers clause is violated by the exercise of
the power by an executive officer, and if the act of the attorney
general is executive, the question arises whether or not the court
may properly review it and decide "as to it may seem to be just."
In Slate ex rel. Allen v. England '0 the constitutionality of the
statute was sustained. The court's opinion was directed only to
the question of the jurisdiction of the court; the question whether
or not the attorney general could properly exercise judicial power
apparently was not raised. It is not clear whether the court regarded the act of the attorney general as executive. After asking
itself the question, "But do his duties involve purely judicial action or discretion?" the court declared: "The purpose [of the
legislature] was to make his duties supervisory and ministerial,
although calling for his opinion and judgment on the law. His
duties in this respect are not different from almost any other minisDoes this mean that the duties of
terial or executive officer."
the attorney general were not judicial or merely that they were
not "purely judicial"? 'Whether the court's treatment of this
question is attributable to vagueness of expression or whether it is
attributable to an unusually realistic insight into the nature of the
Cmay

the power to determine whether or not a judicial inquiry should be made into
campaign expenditures.
249W. Va. Acts 1917, c. 57, § 3; amended by W. Va. Acts 1923, c. 14, §' 24;
W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 13, art. 1, §§ 25, 26.
250 86 W. Va. 508, 103 S. E. 400 (1920).
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question cannot be ascertained from the opinion. But it is not
unreasonable to interpret this part of the opinion as meaning that
the attorney general, in approving or disapproving a bond issue,
performs an act which is neither wholly executive nor wholly
judicial. For example, in so far as there are no parties and no
hearing the act is nonjudicial, and in so far as the decision rests
upon the application of principles of law to given facts, the act
is judicial. It is somewhat judicial and somewhat nonjudicial; to
regard it as wholly one or the other would be inaccurate. Powers
of this kind cannot be fitted into rigid categories with precision.
Powers may fall partly into one category and partly into another,
and this is true in the case of the attorney general's approval or
disapproval of a bond issue. If this is what the court meant in
its opinion in the England case, then it is to be regretted that the
thought is not stated with greater clarity, for the court in later
cases could have benefited immensely by following such a sound
precedent.
After inquiring into the character of the attorney general's
act, the court proceeded to hold that in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction it could properly review the act. The basis of this
conclusion was: "We have numerous cases where the acts of
ministerial and executive officers, though involving judgment on
the law, have been controlled . . ." And the court then examined
the merits of the case, apparently substituting its judgment for
the attorney general's on the question whether the bond issue
should be approved or disapproved. Here again, the court in its
opinion did not squarely face the issue. The early part of the
opinion must be interpreted as meaning either that the act of the
attorney general is not judicial or that it is not "purely judicial".
Since the court did substitute its judgment for that of the attorney
general and had power to substitute its order for the attorney general's, it would seem that the action of the court must have been
of the same character as the action of the attorney general and
hence either nonjudicial or not "purely judicial". A strict interpretation of the separation of powers clause would call for the
conclusion that the court could not properly exercise such a
function. 25 1 It seems unfortunate that the court did not recognize
this line of reasoning and specifically reject it. It might well have
251 See, for example, the language of the first syllabus in United Fuel Gas Co.
v. Public Service Commission, 73 W. Va. 571, 80 S. E. 931 (1914), to the effect
that the supreme court's jurisdiction "is limited to matters purely judicial".
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pointed out what would be the consequence of a strict interpretation of separation of powers, and then have said with Madison and
Story that the separation of powers clause is not to be thus strictly
interpreted.
Although the court's language in the England case is not as
clear as might be wished, the holding of the case, to the effect that
the separation of powers clause does not prohibit the legislature,
if it sees fit, from authorizing an executive officer to do an act
which may be reversed, affirmed, or modified by the supreme court
of appeals, in accordance with the independent judgment of the
court, should be regarded as a precedent for a liberal view of the
doctrine of separation of powers. Much unnecessary difficulty
would have been avoided in later cases if the court had consistently
followed the attitude taken in this decision.

THE Hodges CASE

AND ITs, AFTERMATH

Before 1931, the role of separation of powers in the West
Virginia cases was of much greater consequence in the writing of
opinions than in the decision of cases. In the tax cases the talk
seems to revolve around seven labels, but most of the holdings
are in harmony with results that would be reached by a more
pragmatic approach. In the Public Service Commission cases, the
practice has been to accord a high degree of finality to findings of
fact of the commission, despite a decision of the United States
Supreme Court ostensibly founded upon separation of powers
which requires in many cases an independent judicial inquiry, and
the court has exercised the power to modify legislative orders of the
commission although it is well established elsewhere that a court
possessing solely judicial powers may not modify legislative orders.
In the workmen's compensation cases the separation of powers
theory leads to the opposite result from that which usually obtains
in practice. In a few cases concerning other administrative agencies, the theory of separation of powers has loomed rather large
in the results of cases, but for the most part such use as was made
of that theory before 1931 did not lead to results unjustifiable
under wholly pragmatic tests.
In 1931, however, in Hodges v. Public Service Commission,252
252

110

W.

Va. 649, 159 S. E. 834 (1931).

The case is noted in (1932) 38

W. VA. L. Q. 154.
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and in several subsequent cases 3 decided upon the authority of
the Hodges case, the doctrine of separation of powers has brought
about consequences which from the standpoint of efficiency in government may well be considered unfortunate. The Hodges case
held the water power act of 1929254 unconstitutional in its entirety
because a provision for appeal from the Public Service Commission
to a circuit court was regarded as conferring legislative duties upon
the circuit court in violation of the separation of powers clause. 2
As this decision and the cases which follow it are so far-reaching in
their consequences, a detailed examination of the opinion seems
appropriate.
The water power act was a comprehensive statute filling thirty
pages of the Acts of 1929. It was declared in § 1: "In order to
conserve and utilize the energy of the power streams it is hereby
declared to be the policy of the state to encourage water power
development. It shall be the aim to secure for a given stream or
watershed the greatest proper and practicable utilization of the
power of such stream or watershed." Various powers were accordingly conferred upon the Public Service Commission, including
the authority to grant licenses for the construction of dams. The
act declared that-the commission should "weigh, from the standpoint of the state as a whole and the people thereof, the advantages
and disadvantages arising therefrom before acting upon any application for a license." By § 13 it was provided that any party
aggrieved by any decision of the commission granting or refusing
a license "may appeal ... to the circuit court of Kanawha county
with trial de novo in said circuit court ...
"
The circuit court
was to use the record before the commission in connection with any
additional evidence offered by any party. Provision was made
for "appeal" to the supreme court of appeals.
The commission granted a license to the West Virginia Power
& Transmission Company to construct a series of dams on the Cheat
253 Baker v. County Court, 1 2 IV. Va. 406, 164 S. E. 515 (1932) ; Danielley
v. City of Princeton, 113 W. Va. 252, 167 S. E. 620 (1933); Staud v. Sill, 114
W. Va. 208, 171 S. E. 428 (1933) ; Buckeye Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Smith,
114 W. Va. 284, 171 S. E. 650 (1933).
264W. Va. Acts 1929, c. 58; W. V.A. Rrv. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 9.
255 The court gave as an incidental reason for holding the act unconstitutional

the fact that it conferred legislative powers upon the governor, who was required to sit with the commission in granting or refusing a license. This aspect
of the case is ignored in the ensuing discussion.
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River and its watershed. "Citizens of West Virginia ' ' 210 resisted
the application before the commission and appealed to the circuit
court, which reversed the commission and remanded the proceeding,
and the applicant secured an appeal to the supreme court.
After stating the facts, finding that constitutional questions
were properly raised, making observations about the presumption
of constitutionality, and quoting article V, the court began its discussion of separation of powers. The first paragraph on this subject was devoted to the historical background of article V, with
references to Blackstone, Montesquieu, Paley, Story, Hamilton,
Willoughby, Bryce, Cooley, and Ordronaux. The court concluded,
in words quoted from another court, that "All writers on constitu256 One of the most subtle aspects of the Hodges case is the manner in which
the court avoided the application of the firmly established principle that
a constitutional question may not be raised by one who has no personal or
property interest in the subject matter of the action. The only parties who
were challenging the constitutionality of the water power act were "citizens
of West Virginia", who could show neither personal right nor property right
in the determination of the question presented. The court expressly recognized
this: "The applicant challenges the right of the protestants to raise constitutional questions on the ground that they have no personal or proprietary
interest in the subject matter. Lack of such interest would ordinarily sustain
this challenge." But the court found a method whereby such citizens whose
rights are not involved may raise constitutional questions.. This method consisted in a simple declaration that "we have no jurisdiction to entertain tids
appeal unless it be conferred by the act", and a statement that "since our
jurisdiction herein depends entirely upon the validity of the act, it is our duty
to scrutinize the act before considering the merits of this proceeding, lest that
consideratioh should be vain." Accordingly, the court proceeded to consider
the substantive question of constitutionality and concluded that the act was
unconstitutional "in its entirety". The case thus recognized that no parties
had standing to raise the constitutional question and at the same time held the
statute unconstitutional. So far as appears from the opinion of the court it
would seem that since the protestants had no standing to raise constitutional
questions, and since no one but the protestants sought to raise such questions,
it would follow that no such questions may be raised in this proceeding for any
purpose and that the further question of jurisdiction which depends upon constitutionality is immaterial.
However, it appears in the petition of the applicant (but not in the opinion
of the court) that not only constitutional questions but also other questions
were raised. The court therefore had to determine whether or not it had
jurisdiction to decide the nonconstitutional questions which presumably were
properly raised. Whether or not any party challenges the jurisdiction of
the court, it must not act without jurisdiction, and since the court assumed
that its jurisdiction depended upon the act, it had no jurisdiction if the entire
act was unconstitutional. Therefore, the court had no choice but to determine
the constitiftional question.
The soundness of the court's assumption that "we have no jurisdiction to
entertain this appeal unless it be conferred by the act" may be challenged on
the authority of Baer v. Gore, 79 W. Va. 50, 55, 90 S. E. 530 (1916), in which
the court held: "Nor can the right of review on writ of error reasonably be
denied on the ground that the legislature did not expressly authorize it."'
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tional law are agreed that the functions of the three departments
should be kept as distinct and separate as possible."
It is questionable whether an examination of the authorities
referred to by the court confirms the court's conclusion. It is true
that all the authorities cited paid their tribute to the theory of
separation of powers. But the vital fact is that the court did not
give effect to the qualifications which most of these writers placed
upon their acceptance of that theory.2' 7 For example, STORY Ow
THE CONSTITUTION (5th ed.) C. VII, was cited. The court might
have quoted from this chapter (but did not) as follows: "But
when we speak of a separation of the three great departments of
government, and maintain that that separation is indispensable
to public liberty, we are to understand this maxim in a limited
sense. It is not meant to affirm that they must be kept wholly and
entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link of connection or dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest
degree. The true meaning is, that the whole power of one of these
departments should not be exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of either of the other departments; and
that such exercise of the whole would subvert the principles of a
free constitution. This has been shown with great clearness and
accuracy by the authors of the Federalist. It was obviously the
view taken of the subject by Montesquieu and Blackstone in their
commentaries . . . . The slightest examination of the British constitution will at once convince us that the legislative, executive,
and judiciary departments are by no means totally distinct and
separate from each other. ' 258 Since the water power act did not
vest in the circuit court the "whole power" of the legislative department, it seems that Story, and, according to Story, Montesquieu,
Blackstone, and the authors of the Federalist would not interpret
the theory of separation of powers as forbidding the circuit court
from reviewing the action of the commission as provided by the
water power act. Among the more modern writers, the court cited
Willoughby but apparently ignored the following statements of
that author: "Thus it is not a correct statement of the principle
257 To say that the court did not give effect to the qualifications is not to
say that the court was wholly unaware of them. In a later paragraph the court
did say that courts have not drawn abstract analytical lines of separation and
that courts recognize necessary areas of interaction. But these observations of
the court only led to its curious concluding statement of the paragraph: "It
would therefore seem that the plain language of article V calls not for construction,
but only for obedience." (Italics supplied.)
258 STOaY ON THE CONSTTUTION (5th ea. 1891), c. VII, p. 393.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol44/iss4/3

86

Davis: Judicial Review of Administrative Action in West Virginia--A Stud
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
of the separation of powers to say that it prohibits absolutely the
performance by one department of acts which, by their essential
nature, belong to another.... Generally speaking, it may be said
that when a power is not peculiarly and distinctly legislative,
the legislature
executive, or judicial, it lies within the authority of
'2 9
to determine where its exercise shall be vested. C
The next paragraph of the court's opinion observed that "this
historical background is reflected perfectly in the constitution of
West Virginia", pointing out that articles VI, VII, and VIII
deal respectively with the legislative, executive, and judicial
Such observations are true as far as they go, but why
powers.
should they not go further? The court might have taken cognizance of the many well-known instances in which the constitution
did not adhere rigidly to the theory of separation of powers, sucl
as, for example, the legislature's judicial power of impeachment,
the governor's legislative power of veto,28 0 and the removal power
(whatever its character), which is given in some cases to the
governor, in some to the legislature, and in others to the courts. 20 '
The court itself has declared in a later case :212 "In moulding
county courts, the constitution has entirely disregarded the separation of governmental powers commanded in article V, and has
blended in such courts both administrative and judicial powers."
In the Hodges opinion, however, the court mentioned only those
parts of the constitution which supported its conclusions.
The court next proceeded to the consideration of counsel's
argument that. the power to review the commission's order may
constitutionally be conferred upon the circuit court under article
VIII, § 12, of the constitution, which provides that the circuit
courts shall have "such other jurisdiction, whether supervisory,
original, appellate or concurrent, as is or may be prescribed by
law", and that by reason of this clause the court had upheld
enactments imposing on circuit courts jurisdiction in such legis(1910) § 743.
Madison regarded the power to "1put a negative on every law" as legislative. Federalist, No. XLVII. And it is probably generally so regarded.
The West Virginia court, however, in State v. Mounts, 36 W. Va. 179, 14 S.E.
407 (1892), reasoned from the separation of powers clause of article V ' to the
conclusion that the veto power was "deliberative, but not legislative" . An
act which was to go into effect ninety days after its passage was accordingly
held to have become law ninety days after the action of the legislature and not
ninety days after the approval of the governor.
261 See the discussion of the removal power, sui'ra, p. 341, et seq.
262 Poling v. County Court, 116 W. Va. 580, 584, 182 S. E. 778 (1935).
259 2 WILLOUGHBY ON THE CosTITUTIoN

260
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lative matters as valuation of property for taxation and the incorporation of towns.2" 3 (Counsel failed to direct the court's attention to other cases upholding the exercise by circuit courts or
the supreme court of functions which may be regarded as nonjudicial, such as cases involving establishment of ferries, 264 sale
of school lands, 26 ' settlement of boundary disputes,26 approval of
bond issues, 2 7 and appointment of officers.206 ) The court rejected the argument by discrediting but not overruling the cases
dealing with tax assessments and incorporation of towns. One
of the principal reasons given was: "The phrase 'other jurisdiction' in section 12 is general. The inhibition in article V against
the exercise of dual authority is specific." It seems regrettable
that the court did not explain this reason, for in the absence of
explanation one might think that article V, dealing with all agencies of all departments of the government, is relatively general,
and that section 12, dealing with only one particular part of the
judicial department of the government, is relatively specific.
The court discredited a previous holding 269 that a circuit court
could properly direct the clerk to issue certificates of incorporation
for cities, towns or villages, upon proof of compliance with certain
statutory conditions. The court declared that the case "overlooks
both the positive inhibition in article V and the entire constitutional design to separate the powers of government, as set forth
in articles V, VI, VII and VIII." It is interesting to note in
this connection that the court in the earlier case quoted and discussed article V and declared that "It has been found to be wholly
impracticable to make such separation perfect." The earlier case,
however, was saved from overruling by the following language:
"This construction of section 12 is not to be taken as unsettling
the practice of circuit courts to incorporate towns and to entertain appeals from boards of equalization and review on the valu203 The t&ax cases are discussed, szipra, p. 272, et seq., and the cases involving
incorporation of towns axe discussed, supra, p. 327, et seq.
264 Williamson v. Hays, 25 W. Va. 609 (1885) ; Ferry Co. v. Russell, 52 W.
Va. 356, 43 S. E. 107 (1902) ; Polley v. Gilleland, 72 W. V. 301, 78 S. E. 96
(1913) ; Egerton v. Flesher, 76 W. Va. 519, 86 S. E. 34 (1915); Greene v.
Lane,
100 W. Va. 399, 130 S. E. 522 (1925).
2
06McClure v. Maitland, 24 W. Va. 561 (1884).
266 Summers County v. Monroe County, 43 W. Va. 207, 27 S. E. 307 (1897).
267 State ex reZ. Allen v. England, 86 NV.Va. 508, 103 S. E. 400 (1920).
2
6s State v. Mounts, 36 W. Va. 179, 14 S. E. 407 (1892); Hall v. County
Court, 82 W. Va. 564, 96 S. E. 966 (1918) ; Locke v. County Court, 111 W. Va.
156, 161 S. E. 6 (1931).
266 In re Town of Union Mines, 39 W. Va. 179, 19 S. E. 398 (1894).
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ation of property for taxation. This practice has been pursued
in such a great number of cases and over so many years, that we
are of opinion that it should not be disturbed now." In this curious statement the court implicitly recognized that the statute in
the Hodges case is indistinguishable from the statutes upheld in
previous cases, and expressly recognized that the practice of upholding such statutes is established by a great number of cases
extending over many years. It might reasonably be thought that
the presumption of constitutionality coupled with such a well
established practice of upholding similar statutes which the court
is unable to distinguish would be sufficient to sustain the statute
in the Hodges case. Of course, the court did feebly attempt to
distinguish the assessment and city incorporation cases by saying
of the procedure in those cases: "However, this procedure applies
to local matters only; and we feel no obligation because of submission thereto, to approve the further delegation of legislative
functions to the judiciary, particularly in a proceeding of statewide interest, such as this." For its conclusion that the court will
permit what it deems to be a violation of the constitution in local
matters but not in matters of "statewide interest", the court gave
no reason other than custom. Ordinarily, in the absence of such
a judicial pronouncement, one might suppose that the geographical
extent of the interest aroused in a function performed by a circuit
court has no bearing upon the constitutional authority to perform
that function. 70
The crux of the holding lies in the conclusion that the clause
of article VIII, § 12, conferring upon the circuit courts "such
other jurisdiction. . . as is or may be prescribed by law", is limited
to "jurisdiction essentially juridical", and in the adoption of the
view that the function to be performed by the circuit court under
270 There is a difference between a statement that the geographical extent of
the interest aroused in a function performed by a circuit court has no bearing upon the constitutional authority to perform that function, and a statement that the separation of powers clause applies equally to state officials and
tribunals and to local officials and tribunals. The writer is of the opinion that
the latter statement is not true, but that, on the contrary, there is merit in the
observation of Judge Dent in Wheeling Bridge & T. Ry. v. Paull, 39 W. Va.
142, 145, 19 S. E. 551 (1894): " .... While we find that the constitution, as
much as possible keeps the heads of the three departments comparatively distinct and independent of each other, yet as we move down the scale these several
powers become more complicated and interwoven with each other, until we find
the common council of every village exercising legislative, executive and judicial functions, indiscriminately, by authority of the same constitution which
declares that these functions shall be kept distinct."
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the water power act is legislative. There is no doubt merit in the
court's interpretation of the words "other jurisdiction" to mean
judicial and not legislative jurisdiction, for the framers of the
constitution may not have intended that the legislature should
under this clause confer strictly legislative powers upon the circuit
court. It is not so difficult to agree with an early West Virginia
holding that the legislature could not constitutionally confer upon
a circuit court the power to repeal a municipal ordinance.27' But
is the function of the circuit court under the water power act comparable to the enactment or repeal of an ordinance or a statute?
The essence of the court's opinion on the character of the function of the circuit court is that the power of the commission, in
the words of the act, "to weigh, from the standpoint of the state
as a whole and the people thereof, the advantages and disadvantages arising therefrom before acting upon any application for a
license" involves a determination of policy which is said to be
"clearly legislative in character", and the "legislature intended
the circuit court to try and determine these legislative matters de
The
novo, without regard to the findings of the commission."
court quoted from other courts to the effect that "The question
of what the public convenience requires is a political, not a legal
one", and that "Whether a drainage ditch proposed to be constructed . . . will be conducive to the public health, convenience
o1- welfare, or whether the route thereof is practicable, are questions of governmental or administrative policy, and are not of
judicial cognizance, and jurisdiction over them by appeal or otherwise cannot be conferred upon the courts by statute."
Did the water power act require the circuit court to make such
a determination of policy that its action was "clearly legislative
in character"? The policy of the state was declared by § 1 of the
act: "In order to conserve and utilize the energy of the power
streams it is hereby declared to be the policy of the state to encourage water power development. It shall be the aim to secure
for a given stream or watershed the greatest proper and practicable
utilization of the power of such stream or watershed." The principal function of the circuit court in the Hodges case was to conduct
a hearing to determine whether or not this declared policy would
be furthered by the grant of the license to the West Virginia Power
& Transmission Company to construct a series of dams on the Cheat
271

Shepherd v. Wheeling, 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S. E. 635 (1887).
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River and its watershed. The court was not to determine the
fundamental policy of the state; that policy had been declared by
the legislature. The court was only to apply that policy to a given
set of facts, and to reach a decision upon the basis of evidence introduced by parties on both sides. There was a controversy between the applicant for the license and the citizens who resisted
the application. The function performed by the court was strikingly similar to its function in ordinary litigation. There is a difference between the legislature's determination of the policy of the
state in § 1 of the act, and the court's application of that declared
policy to the particular facts. True, the legislature had determined policy in only a general way, and the court determined a
more specific policy in order to adjudicate the particular controversy. But deciding what policy should be applied to particular
12
facts has always been the very essence of the judicial function.2
Surely it cannot be denied that the great body *of the common law
is based largely upon judicially determined policy. Both courts
and legislatures determine the policy of governments, the legislatures declaring it in statutes to be applied to all cases arising in
the future, the courts deciding it retroactively with respect to
particular controversies. The circuit court in the Hodges case did
only what courts have done from time immemorial. Yet, because
of this, the water power act was held unconstitutional in its entirety !
Even if the function of the circuit court under the water
power act were not wholly within the scope of what courts traditionally have done, still the act should not be held unconstitutional,
for it is believed that the separation of powers clause, properly interpreted, does not forbid a court to exercise a power somewhat
judicial and somewhat legislative, if the legislature sees fit to confer such a power upon the court. All powers are not wholly
judicial, wholly legislative, or wholly executive. Some powers fall
into a borderland, defying classification. Indeed, some powers may
partake of the characteristics of all three departments of the government and cannot with precision be said to belong to one any
more than to another. And if there is to be efficiency in govern272 An illustrative West Virginia decision is Monongahela West Penn Public
Service Co. v. State Road Comm., 104 W. Va. 183, 139 S. E. 744 (1927), in
which the court quoted at some length from opinions of other courts to .show
that it was the policy of the state to protect the property interests of existing
carriers as against the interests of those who seek to compete.
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ment the separation of powers principle cannot be inflexibly applied to such borderland or unclassifiable powers. The legislature
in enacting the water power act found it desirable that the circuit
court should review the action of the commission in granting a
license. It would be reasonable to hold that unless the power of
review is wholly nonjudicial the legislative purpose will not be
thwarted by the theory of separation of powers.
In the record in the Hodges case is much testimony to the
effect that the legislative policy of the water power act was unsound.2 73 It is possible that the court, finding itself in sympathy
with such views, conceived that its duty was a broad one of statesmanship, to protect the state against unwise legislation, and that
the court sacrificed the means, the separation of powers clause, to
the end, ridding the state of an undesirable statue. The more the
opinion is read, the more plausible becomes the explanation that
the court was influenced by such extra-legal factors. But the difficulty with this explanation is that the court in four succeeding
cases, 27 4 apparently not involving such questionable legislation, has
based its decisions upon the authority of the Hodges case. In fact,
the court in a later case -7" refers to the opinion in the Hodges case
as a "learned and logical opinion.... (showing much research)
...
", quotes from it for nearly two full pages, and then calls it a
"sound exposition of the constitutional limit on the legislative
power to encumber the judiciary with duties and powers which
should be exercised by the other coordinate branches of the government."
Danielley v. City of Princeton276 held the state water commission act of 19292'T unconstitutional in its entirety because the
provision for review by the circuit court of an order of the commission was deemed a violation of the separation of powers clause.
The offending provision was: "Such circuit court of the county
shall have jurisdiction, by certiorari,to review any order of said
commission upon the application of any person or intervener
E. g., pages 690-707.
274 Baker v. County Court, 112 W. Va. 406, 164 S. E. 515 (1932) ; Danielldy

273

v. City of Princeton, 113 W. Va. 252, 167 S. E. 620 (1933); Staud v. Sill, 114
W. Va. 208, 171 S. E. 428 (1933); Buckeye Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Smith,
114 W. Va. 284, 171 S. E. 650 (1933) (decided only on the authority of Staud
v. Sil, sup ra).
275 Baker v. County Court, 112 W. Va. 406, 409-11, 164 S. E. 515 (1932).
The case is noted in (1933) 39 W.
276 113 W. Va. 252, 167 S. E. 620 (1933).
VA. L. Q. 336.
277 W. Va. Acts 1929, c. 14; W. VA. Rsv. CODE (1931) c. .16, art. 11.
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aggrieved by such order. Upon the hearing, such circuit court....
shall determine all questions arising on the law and evidence and
render such judgment or make such order upon the whole matter, as law and equity may require." 2 18 The commission had found
that the sewage of the city polluted the stream and, in pursuance
of power granted by the act, ordered that the city install one of
two specified systems of sewage disposal. The city had the case
removed to the circuit court by certiorari, and the overruling of
the city's demurrers was certified to the supreme court. The court
held: "A hearing before the Commission involves the determination (1) of whether the act complained of is a statutory pollution,
and if so (2) of the proper sewage treatment or system of filtration
to reduce the pollution. The first determination is quasi-judicial;
the second is executive or administrative . . . A review of the
system. ., adopted by the Commission... would require the court
itself to exercise discretion, i. e., executive power."
Therefore,
largely on the authority of the Hadges case, the whole act was
stricken down.
The comment upon the Hodges case is applicable to the
Danielley case. But the Danielley case adds one very puzzling
question about the West Virginia doctrine of separation of powers.
Why is the exercise of discretion as to the proper method of sewage
disposal executive ? Surely it would be within the legislative power
to prescribe what method of sewage disposal should be used in certain classes of cases. And, in accordance with the view hereinabove set forth, it might well be held that the decision of controversies concerning the proper method to be followed in particular
cases is judicial.
Baker v. County Court270 held unconstitutional a statute28
authorizing the county court to fix compensation of certain officers,
including deputy sheriffs, and providing "that any taxpayer feeling aggrieved at the allowance made by the county court to the
sheriff, and any sheriff feeling that the business of his office cannot be conducted properly by the maximum allowance by the county court for office expenditures, or the number of deputies and their
salaries, shall be allowed the right of appeal to the circuit court of
such county for the purpose of determining the equity of such
maximum allowance." The court declared that whether the duty
278 Id., § 7.
279 112 W.
2SOW. Va.

Va. 406, 164 S. E. 515 (1932).
Acts 1919, c. 57, § 8; W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 7, art. 7, § 7.
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of fixing salaries was "legislative or ministerial" was unimportant,
as it was nonjudicial. With this part of the opinion it is not so
difficult to agree as it is with the court's statement that the statute
gave to the circuit court "the power of substituting its judgment
for that of the county court." The court did not discuss this interpretation of the statute but merely announced its conclusion.
Does the mere word "appeal" in the statute call for the substitution of the circuit court's judgment ?2s1 Or is it the words, "for
the purpose of determining the equity of such maximum allowance", that call for such a result? Since the constitutionality of
the statute is at stake, any uncertainty in its meaning should be
resolved in favor of that interpretation which will render it valid.
In the United Fuel Gas case,2 8 2 it was held that an "appeal" from
the Public Service Commission to the court would be unconstitutional, but that: "[The act] in only one place refers to the proceeding in this court as an appeal. The petition and proceedings
prescribed are as well, if not better, adapted to a petition or proceeding upon mandamus or prohibition, and as we can not assume,
for constitutional reasons, that the legislature intended to confer
appellate jurisdiction, we find warrant and authority for construing the statute as intended to confer original jurisdiction by process akin to mandamus or prohibition." Why should not the statute
in the Baker case be similarly interpreted? The function of the
circuit court would then be limited. to the determination of the
reasonableness of the action of the county court, a judicial function,
and, whatever the character of the county court's action, the statute
would be constitutional. As pointed out hereinafter, the court's
failure so to interpret the statute raises serious doubts as to the
validity of much existing legislation.
84
Staud v. Sill 2s2 held unconstitutional In its entirety a statute
enacted in 1933 which required confirmation by the circuit court
Williamson v. Hays, 25 W. Va. 609, 614 (1885), the court declared
281 In
of a somewhat similar statutory provision: "The mode of reviewing these cases
is called in this statute an appeal; but this is obviously a mere blunder ...."
One wonders why in the principal case the court did not invoke the principle
that an ambiguous statute should be so construed as to render it constitutional.
282 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 73 W. Va. 571, 580, 80 S. E.
931 (1914). This case is discussed at length, supra, p. 284, et seq.
The decision is followed in Buck283 114 W. Va. 208, 171 S. E. 428 (1933).
eye Savings & Loan Ass'n v., Smith, 114 W. Va. 284, 171 S. E. 650 (1933).
Both cases also held that the act could not constitutionally be applied retroactively.
284 W. Va. Acts 1933 (Reg. Sess.) c. 34.
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of sales of property under trust deeds. The basis of the holding
was the doctrine enunciated in the Hodges case that a circuit court
may not be required to exercise a nonjudicial function. The statute
provided that the trustee in selling property under a trust deed
should make a written report of the sale to the circuit court together with a petition for confrmation of the sale, and that "in
case the court or judge shall be satisfied that the said sale was in
all respects regular and that the sale price reported is reasonably
adequate under all the circumstances, he shall confirm such sale;
otherwise the court or judge shall have discretion to direct a resale
. . .and in determining all questions in respect to adequacy of
price, the court or judge may consider the appraisement of the
property, and as well affidavits filed pro and con and all evidence
taken upon the inquiry." The court apparently did not hold that
the determination of the adequacy of the price was a nonjudicial
function. The basis of the decision was rather: "It will be noted
that there are no parties to the petition of the trustee ...It makes
-no difference whether the creditor, the debtor or anyone else feels
or is aggrieved .... No issue is made up .... There is no cause of
action nor ground of equitable relief required to be alleged and
there is nothing in the proceeding that would enable anyone at a
later time to plead elsewhere that any rights had been adjudicated
by it."
These reasons, the only ones given, 28 5 seem to add up to little
more th n a statement that the court's function under the statute
is not concerped with litigation. The court seems to say that in
order that the circuit court's action may be judicial there must be
parties, someone aggrieved, an issue, and a cause of action or a
ground of equitable relief. Such may be the ingredients of an
ordinary lawsuit, but are these elements necessary for judicial
action? Courts have traditionally supervised the acts of fiduciaries
and protected the interests of iicompetent persons, whether there
is litigation or not. Whether or not mortgage debtors in some situations require protection comparable to that afforded incompetents,
285 The court also said: "No notice is prescribed except where the sale
occurs in the vacation of the court and then the trustee merely proclaims on
This
the day df sale when he will present his petition for confirmation."
statement is true of the act of 1933, but that act only amended an existing
statute, W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 38, art. 1, § 8, and an elaborate provision
for notice by publication, posting and service is made in c. 38, art. 1, § 4.
No reason is apparent why the notice provisions of § 4 would not apply to the
act after the 1933 amendment.
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and whether or not trustees under deeds of trust are to be treated
as some other fiduciaries are treated are questions of legislative
policy which the legislature should be free to decide as it sees fit.
Many functions long performed by courts are not concerned with
litigation, such as, for example, duties connected with decedent's
estates, bankruptcies, trusts, receiverships, guardianships. 25 The
reasons the court gives in Staud v. Sill apply equally to most
such functions. Surely the court did not intend to hold all such
functions outside the scope of proper judicial power.
An existing guardianship statute2 7 affords a good example:
... when it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of a cir-

cuit court on a bill in chancery, or by petition in a summary way,
filed for the purpose by the guardian, that the proper maintenance
and education, or other interests of an infant, require that the
proceeds of his real estate, beyond the annual income thereof,
should be applied to the use of such infant, it shall be lawful for
the court to order the sale of, or to authorize a loan upon, his
real estate, or such part thereof as may be necessary for the purpose, and, from time to time, make such decrees and orders as may
be proper to secure the due application of the proceeds of such
sale or loan. .

.

. " All of the reasons given in Staud v. Sill for

holding the action of the circuit court nonjudicial are equally applicable to this guardianship statute. There are no parties, no
aggrieved person, no issue, no cause of action, no ground of equitable relief. Does the court mean by its decision in Staud v. Sill
that statutes such as the guardianship statute are unconstitution288
al?
2 8

-

In Daniels v. Rogers, 111 W. Va. 587, 163 S. E. 416 (1932), a statute,
VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 44, art. 1, § 1, empowering a circuit court to compel an administratrix to file an inventory with a commissioner of accounts was
held not to violate article V.
287
. VA. REV. CODE (1931) C. 44, art. 10, § 13.
288 Another good example of a similar statute is NV. VA. REV. CODE (1931)
c. 44, art. 6, §§ 34, permitting fiduciaries to apply to the circuit court for
"authority or direction" with respect to the investment of funds. Do the
provisions that notice shall be served on the beneficiaries of the trust funds
and that the beneficiaries "shall be made defendants" distinguish the statute
from that involved in Staud v. Sill? If the language of the court in that
case is taken literally, the two statutes are distinguishable, but the court's
statement that "there are no parties" is hardly accurate. There may or may
not be parties in addition to the trustee under the deed of trust, depending
upon whether or not anyone sees fit to resist the application. If, in a trustee's
application for authority to invest, the beneficiaries do not choose to oppose
the application, then for all practical purposes the trustee is the only party.
See also W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 61, art. 7, § 2.
W.
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EXISTWnG LEGISLATION OF DOUBTFUL CONSTITUTIONALITY

Doubts with respect to the constitutionality of the public
service commission act,28 of a statute providing for removal of
certain elective officers by the governor, 90 of a guardianship
22
statute,29' and of a statute concerning investments by fiduciaries,
have already been discussed. If the Hodges case and the cases
which follow it are to be applied with logical consistency to other
statutes, much other existing legislation may be unconstitutional.
The board of embalmers and funeral directors may grant,
refuse, revoke and suspend licenses to engage in the business of
embalming or funeral directing. 22 The right of "appeal" is
given from the board's decision to the circuit court. It is provided
that on the appeal to the circuit court, "Such court shall thereupon hear and determine such case as in other cases of appeal."
This apparently means that the court may substitute its judgment
for that of the board. According to the 1935 decision in the
Eddy case, 291 "revocatio4 of a license is no more a judicial function
than that of licensing; . . . both are a part of the regulatory
measure." If the Hadges case is followed, and if the Eddy case
is followed, the entire act setting up the board of embalmers and
funeral directors is unconstitutional!
Provision is made by statute"' for the sterilization of inmates
of certain institutions who are "insane, idiotic, imbecile, feebleminded or epileptic". Several factors are to be taken into account
by the public health council in determining whether or not an inof society".
mate should be sterilized, including "the welfare ....
,Am appeal lies from the decision of the council to the circuit court,
which may "affirm, revise or reverse in whole or in part ... and
" According to the
enter such order as it deems just and right....
Hodges case, weighing advantages "from the standpoint of the
state as a whole and the people thereof" is legislative. If the
Hodges case is followed, and if the determination of what is for
"the welfare . . . of society" is also legislative, then since under
the statute the circuit court may substitute its judgment for that
289 See pp. 293, 305, &upra.

290 See p. 339, supra.
201 See p. 365, supra.
292 See note 288, supra.
203 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) C. 30, art. 6, § 7.
294 Eddy v. West Virginia Board of Optometry, 116 W. Va. 698, 700, 182 S.
E. 870 (1935).
295 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 16, art. 10, §§ 1-2.
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of the cotmeil, the entire act providing for sterilization of mental
defectives is unconstitutional!
The public health council is given power to amend regulations
under the public health laws, a violation of which constitutes a
misdemeanor. 20 The power is rather clearly legislative. "Any
person aggrieved by any order of the public health council.. . may
In the Baker case it was
S.. appeal to the circuit court... "297
held that the words, "shall be allowed the right of appeal to the
circuit court of such county for the purpose of determining the
equity of such maximum allowance", gave the circuit court power
to substitute its judgment for that of the county court. If it is
the word "appeal" that accounts for this result, and if the Baker
case is followed, the entire act setting up the public health council
is unconstitutional !
The department of mines may enter an order "restraining
further mining operations in proximity to any well, except under
such conditions as the department may impose' ".298 Provision is
made for appeal to the circuit court, which "shall promptly decide the matter in controversy as may seem to it to be just and
right." 29 9 According to the Danielley case, determining what
method of sewage disposal should be used is "executive". If the
determination of what conditibns to impose upon further mining
in proximity to a well is like deciding upon a method of sewage
disposal, and if the Danielley case is followed, all legislation in
chapter 22 of the Code with respect to far-reaching functions of
the department of mines, or, at least, a large portion of such
legislation, depending upon separability, is unconstitutional!
The commissioner of securities has power to limit the price
at which securities may be sold, and may prescribe the amount of
commission to be allowed on sales of securities.2 00 Such price-fixing
the West Virginia court regards as legislative.30 1 The circuit
court has power to review orders of the commissioner.302 It is
provided that "The finding of the commissioner as to the facts, if
supported by evidence, shall be conclusive." However, it is also
20 I0d., c. 16, art. 1, § 3.
207 Id., c. 16, art. 1, § 13.
298

Id., C. 22, art. 4, § 12. See also id., c. 22, art. 2, § 18; c. 22, art. 4, §§ 3-4.

209 Id., c. 22, art. 4, § 13.

300 Id., e. 32, art. 1, § 8.
-o1 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 73 W. Va. 571, 580, 80 S. E.
931 (1914).
302 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 32, art. 1, § 19.
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provided that the court may enter a "judgment or decree, affirming, modifying or setting aside, in whole or in part, any order of
the commissioner ... " The West Virginia court apparently has
never determined the effect of a provision conferring upon a reviewing court the power to modify, but the United States Supreme
Court has consistently held that the action of a court having the
power to modify is of the same character as the action of the
tribunal whose order is reviewed.30 3 If, therefore, the West Virginia court follows the well established rule of the United States
Supreme Court, and if the strict attitude of the Hodges, Baker,
Danielley and Staud cases is followed, the entire Blue Sky Law,
or a large portion of it, depending upon separability, is unconstitutional !
Chapter 30 of the Code deals with professions and occupations,
including physicians, dentists, pharmacists, nurses, optometrists,
certified public accountants, veterinarians, chiropodists, architects,
engineers, osteopaths, midwives, and chiropractors." 4 In article
1 is a general provision that a person whose license is refused, suspended or revoked by a board may petition the circuit court, which
"may enter an order affirming, revising, or reversing the decision
of the board if it appears that the decision was clearly wrong."
If, as was held in 1935 in the Eddy case, 00 the revocation of a
license is legislative, if, as the United States Supreme Court has
consistently held, 08 the power to modify or revise makes the action
of the court of the same character as the action of the board, and
if the West Virginia court persists in its attitude taken in the
Hodges case and others like it, then the entire chapter 30 is unconstitutional!
303 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed.
150 (1908) ; Keller v. Potomac Elee. Co., 261 U. S. 428, 440, 43 S. Ct. 445, 67
L. Ed. 731 (1923) ; Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 52 S. Ct. 617,
76 L. Ed. 1226 (1932). These cases do not involve statutes making administrative findings conclusive if supported by the evidence. But it would seem
that such a provision is immaterial, as long as the court has the power to
modify. The only effect of the conclusiveness of the findings if supported by
the evidence is that the court's power to modify will be exercised only in cases
in which the evidence does not support the findings. No case has bedn found
which passes upon this unusual combination of a provision for conclusiveness
with a provision for judicial power to modify. Of course, the court might
hold that this feature of the statute distinguishes the cases above cited.
304 The general provision for review, contained in W. VA. Rsv. CoDE (1931)
c. 30, art. 1, § 9, specifically excepts attorneys at law, and the article on embalmers and funeral directors has its own provision for review.
30- Eddy v. West Virginia Board of Optometry, 116 W. Va. 698, 700, 182
S. E. 870 (1935).

3er See note 303, supra.
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Why multiply examples? The Code is filled with statutes
creating administrative tribunals, and provision is usually made
for some kind of judicial review. Enough has been said to show
that the validity of much existing legislation is at least questionable if the court is to apply with logical consistency its holdings
in the Hodges case and those which follow it. The purpose of this
demonstration, of course, is not to prove existing legislation unconstitutional but to indicate the far-reaching effect of decisions
such as that in the Hodges case. Should all of this legislation be
stricken down without reasons more persuasive than those set forth
in the opinions of the Hodges, Baker, Danielley and Staud cases.!
CONCLUSION

Problems concerning the extent to which courts should review
action of administrative officials and tribunals are intensely practical. They cannot be solved by abstract speculation about the
theory of separation of powers. The solutions should depend
upon factors such as the competency and fairness of the particular
official or tribunal, the relative need for legal training or for
specialized training in some other field in order that the issues may
be properly decided, the importance of the rights involved considered in connection with whatever additional security may be
afforded by the relatively cumbersome judicial process as compared with the more facile but sometimes arbitrary administrative
process, 0 7 the public confidence in and respect for the particular
agency, the importance in certain classes of cases of confronting
witnesses instead of reading a printed record, the presence or absence of opportunity for review by an appellate administrative
body, the increased delay and expense resulting from appeals, the
additional burden which review imposes upon courts, the importance of informality of procedure before administrative tribunals
and the extent to which a full review by a court accustomed to
strict legal procedure tends to cause undue formality at an administrative hearing, the facts that "Responsibility is the great developer of men" 30 8 and that one whose findings are to be reviewed
307 Mr. Justice Brandeis, who has often -favored administrative finality where
others have opposed it, declared in behalf of a unanimous court in Ng rung Ho
v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 42 S. C.t. 492, 66 L. Ed. 938 (1922): "The difference
in security of judicial over administrative action has been adverted to by this
court."
30 In

dissenting in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S.
38, 92, 56 S. Ct. 720, S0 L. Ed. 1033 (1936), Mr. Justice Brandeis declared:
"In deciding whether the Constitution prevents Congress from giving finality
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may tend to direct his primary efforts to preparing the record instead of to the proper settlement and decision of cases, the relative
susceptibility of the particular tribunal and of courts to political
or other ulterior influence.
In a few cases the West Virginia court has referred to some
such factors in its opinions. In other cases such factors have remained inarticulate but nevertheless may have been influential or
decisive. But judicial opinions dealing with review of administrative action usually have been devoted principally to the theory
of separation of powers, often suggesting what has been called a
"tyranny of labels". Thus, according to the opinions, the review
of tax assessments revolves around seven undefined and undefinable labels. The role of separation of powers in public, utility
cases may be of serious consequence, for many West Virginia decisions in this field seem to deny the degree of judicial review required by the Federal Constitution as interpreted by a 1920 decision of the United States Supreme Court. The consistent West
Virginia practice in public utility cases is apparently in violation
of the Federal Constitution, and if, as seems to be true, although
the West Virginia court's language is not entirely clear, this practice is required by an interpretation of article V, then the separation of powers clause of the state constitution as interpreted by
the West Virginia court is unconstitutional under the Federal
Constitution. In the review of workmen's compensation cases, the
court consistently pays lip service to the finality which it apparently deems the separation of powers to require, but, for reasons not
stated in the opinions, the court in practice often does not accord
such finality. In the review of action of miscellaneous agencies,
judicial opinions usually talk the language of a strict doctrine of
separation of powers, although the results of many cases seem to
indicate a much more liberal interpretation.
Broadly speaking, the theory of separation of powers has
usually pervaded West Virginia judicial opinions, but, until 1931,
most of the results of cases have probably been in a general way
to findings as to value or income where confiscation is alleged the Court must
consider the effect of our decisions not only upon the function of rate regulation, but also upon the administrative and judicial tribunals themselves.
Responsibility is the great developer of men. May it not tend to emasculate
or demoralize the rate-maing body if ultimate responsibility is transferred to
others? To the capacity of men there is a limit. May it not impair the quality
of the work of the courts if this heavy task of reviewing questions of fact is

assumed?"
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consistent with results that might have been reached by a more
pragmatic approach. Since 1931, however, everal important
statutes have been held unconstitutional in their entirety because
they violated an unusually strict interpretation of separation of
powers; indeed, the holdings have been so extreme that doubt has
been cast upon the constitutionality of much existing legislation.
The thesis of this article is that the theory of separation of
powers as it has usually been interpreted in the opinions of the
West Virginia court, and especially as interpreted in several cases
since 1931, has been positively harmful in attempting to solve problems with respect to the extent to which courts should review
administrative action. The soundness of Montesquien's theory,
limited as Madison and Story limited it, is not questioned: "His
[Montesquieu's] meaning, as his own words import, and still more
conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount
to no more than this, that where the whole power of one department
of the government is exercised by the same hands which possess
the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles
30 9
of a free constitution are subverted.'
But the West Virginia
court has too often interpreted literally or very strictly the words
of article V: " .... nor shall any person exercise the powers of
more than one [department of the government] at the same time.
"
A literal interpretation of this clause, and even a strict
interpretation, must be rejected as unsound and unworkable. The
reasons are quite overwhelming:
1. The answers to 20th century questions about West Virginia tax officials, the public service commission, the workmen's
compensation commissioner, and other agencies, must be found in
modern experience, and not in the abstract writings of an 18th
century French philosopher who speculated about other problems
and other conditions in another place at another time.
2. A strict interpretation of the separation of powers clause
is historically unsound.31 0
3. The founders of the West Virginia constitution, in drafting other provisions, were not themselves guided by a strict interpretation of separation of powers. For example, the constitution confers legislative powers upon the governor, judicial powers
309 Quoted from MADISON, FEDERALIST, NO. XLVII (1788).
310 For careful historical summaries, see Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separationof Powers" (1935) 2 U. oF Cm. L. REV. 345; Fairlie,
The Separation of Powers (1923) 21 MicH. L. REV. 393.
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upon the legislature, both judicial and nonjudicial powers upon
the county courts, and the removal power (whatever its character)
is conferred upon courts, governor, and legislature.
4. The theory of separation of powers as interpreted by the
West Virginia court is dependent upon the impossible task of applying with precision terms Which have no precise meaning. Such
terms as "judicial", "legislative" and "executive" are not susceptible of definition.11'
5. Even though the application of such terms to particular
functons might be possible without definition, the West Virginia
court has been unable to apply these terms consistently. For
example, the assessment of property for taxation has been regarded
as nonjudicial, judicial, nonjudicial, and judicial, in that order.
The same function performed by a county court has been called
judicial, nonjitdicial and quasi judicial. The court has denominated one fundtion "legislative judicial". In several cases, whether
a function is judicial or nonjudicial seems to depend not upon
the character 6f the function but upon the nature of the tribunal.
312 Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.
S. 189, 211, 48 8. Ct. 480, 72 L. Ed. 845 (1928): "It does not seem to need
argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not
and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action
with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that
it is, or that the Constitution requires."
CAm ozo, THE GROwTH 0r THE LAW (1924) 132: "I have been surprised
to see how many partisans the notion of a separation of powers rigid and
perpetual - the judges the interpreters, the legislature the creator -- is able
even in our day to muster at the bar.I
LASKI, AUTHORITY IN THE MODERx STATE (1919) 71: "It
[separation of
powers] is in fact a paper merit for the simple reason that in practice it is
largely unworkable ... The truth is that the business of government does not
admit any exact division into categories."
Interstate Commerce Commissioner Eastman, The Place of the Independent
Commission (1928) 12 CONST. REV. 95, 97: "The cataloging of the duties of an
independent commission by tags representing the three traditional subdivisions
of the Government is little more than an interesting mental exercise."
Indeed, there is nothing in the nature of things to require a tripartite division of governmental powers. The constitutions of two states, Indiana and
Oregon, provide four kinds of powers, including the "administrative"
with
the traditional three. One school of thought has advocated a two-fold division. The author of a text has classified governmental powers into five categories. In a sense, the West Virginia court recognizes seven, adding to the
traditional three the quasi judicial, the quasi legislative, the administrative
and the ministerial.
It is recognized that there are those who take a different view. For example,
in Green, The Separation of Governmental Powers (1920) 2 Im. L. BULL. 373,
legislation and adjudication are defined, and the conclusion is advanced that,
11... the cases show it [separation of powers] to be active, effective and capable of consistent application."
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The grant of a certificate of convenience to operate a bus line is
either judicial or legislative, depending upon the presence or absence of a property right; the revocation of a beer license is
judicial; the revocation of an optometrist's license to practice "is
no more a judicial function than that of licensing". These inconsistencies (and many others) spring not from judicial shortcoming
in applying labels, but from the impossibility of properly deciding
cases on the basis of a "tyranny of labels".
6. Many functions are not wholly judicial, wholly legislative,
or wholly executive. The failure of a strict interpretation to recognize this fact is the source of much confusion. The court has tried
to make pegs of very irregular shapes fit round or square holes.
7. Separation of powers is apparently responsible for the
court's unreal language in workmen's compensation cases to the
effect that the commissioner's findings will not be set aside unless
contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence. And examination of what the court has done, as distinguished from what it has
said, reveals that the court has frequently substituted its judgment
for that of the commissioner in reversing findings of fact.
8. Judicial opinions which talk the language of separation of
powers, even when the court reaches a result consistent with a
wholly pragmatic analysis, tend to obscure the nature of the problem. Argument of counsel should not be directed to speculations
about an abstraction but to an inquiry into concrete facts with
respect to convenience and efficiency in government.
9. Some administrators may be political appointees without
special training, incompetent, unintelligent, ignorant not only of
the specialized field in which they work but also of elementary
principles of law and justice. The court's holdings in the Hodges,
Baker, Danielley, and Staud cases seem to raise a constitutional
barrier in every case to a complete judicial review of nonjudicial
action, no matter how great the practical need for such review
may be. In the creation of new administrative agencies, a wise
legislative policy may sometimes require a rather complete judicial
review. As administrators become trained to their tasks, prove
their competency and fairness, and command the respect of those
whose rights they affect, the extent of judicial review may well be
diminished. The court's strict interpretation of separation of
powers in cases such as the Hodges case prevents the legislature
from carrying out such an obviously sensible program.
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10. If the court continues to interpret the separation of
powers clause as it was interpreted in the Hodges and succeeding
cases, much existing legislation will needlessly be held unconstitutional.
11. Every municipal charter which confers upon a municipal
council executive, legislative and judicial powers violates a literal
interpretation of article V.
12. "Effective regulation demands implementation with all
three of the governmental powers in question. The task of the
commission is unitary in nature, and to accomplish the task
properly it must have all the needed tools. We must choose between effective regulation on the one hand and, on the other, a rigid
adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers." '12
13. Able West Virginia judges in the past have rejected a
strict interpretation of the doctrine of separation of powers in
favor of a more pragmatic interpretation. Such judges include
Brannon, Dent, Holt, Poffenbarger. The flavor of Judge Brannon's
discussion, for example, is suggested by such words as "facility",
"necessity", "expediency", "usefulness' '.313
14. To interpret article V so as to place greater emphasis
upon essentially practical considerations would not require a
radical departure but only a choice among inconsistent precedents.
The extreme holdings since 1931 may harmonize with much of the
language of earlier cases, but many holdings before 1931 interpret
separation of powers liberally. Thus, the court has held that
circuit courts may exercise nonjudicial functions in assessing
312 Quoted from Stason, Administrative Tribunals-Organization and Reorganization (1938) 36 MIcH. L. REv. 533, 552.
313 An attitude similar to that of these West Virginia judges has often been
taken by the United States Supreme Court. It is described in Frankfurter
and Landis, Power of Congress over Procedurein Criminal Contempts in ' Inferior" Federal Courts-A Stvdy in Separation of Powers (1924) 37 HAze.
L. REv. 1010, 1014-16: "From the beginning that Court has refused to draw
abstract, analytical lines of separation and has recognized necessary areas of
interaction . . . Even more significant than the decisions themselves are the
considerations which induced them, and the insistence on an abstract doctrine
of separation of powers which they rejected. 'The necessities of the ease,'
'to stop the wheels of government,' 'practical exposition,' are the variations in
the motif of the decisions. The dominant note is respect for the action of that
branch of the government upon which is cast the primary responsibility for adjustint public affairs."
Powell, Separation of Powers (1912) 27 PoL. SOL Q. 215, 238: "The doctrine of the separation of governmental powers . . . as a complete denial of
the capacity of one department of the government to exercise a kind of power
assumed to belong peculiarly to one of the others, does not obtain in our
public law beyond the confines of the printed page."I
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property for taxation, in incorporating towns, in establishing
ferries, in selling school lands, in settling county boundary disputes,
in approving bond issues, and in appointing officers. The
supreme court of appeals itself now reviews tax assessments, at
And
the same time declaring the function to be "administrative."
the supreme court, though not required by statute to do so, has,
in modifying a legislative order of the public service commission,
exercised what is probably a legislative function. The supreme
court has apparently undertaken to substitute its judgment for
that of an executive officer, the attorney general, in determining
whether or not a municipal bond issue should be approved. The
court has specifically recognized that the public service commission exercises "quasi judicial", "legislative'', "ministerial" and
"executive" functions.114 Other instances of a sanctioned violation of a strict doctrine of separation of powers are discussed in
the foregoing pages.
15. Due process and other provisions of the bill of rights
constitute adequate safeguards against arbitrary action; the theory
of separation of powers is not a satisfactory tool to use for this
purpose.
This study has not attempted an answer to the question: To
what extent should courts review administrative action? Its
province is limited to pointing out some practical considerations
that should be taken into account, and to an attempted demonstration that separation of powers as often interpreted constitutes
an obstruction to the solution of the problem. The proper extent
of judicial review will no doubt vary from one agency to another,
and will change with respect to a particular agency as circumstances change. If a legislative committee has made adequate investigation into the work of a given agency, it may be appropriate
to provide by statute the extent of judicial review. Perhaps the
legislative policy in many cases should be so to draft the statute
as to leave open the question of the extent of judicial review. 315
The courts will then be free to determine the question as special
facts may require. If the obstruction of separation of powers
were removed by a more liberal judicial interpretation, the briefs
and arguments of counsel and the deliberations of the courts could
v. Black, 76 W. Va. 685, 692, 86 S. E. 666 (1915).
31 An example of a statute which thus leaves open the question of the extent of review is the workmen's compensation act, W. VA. R v. CODE (1931)
c. 23, art. 5, § 4, as amended by W. Va. Acts 1937, c. 104.
324Weil
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be directed to wholly practical considerations such as those herein
outlined, and the question would be determined by a relatively
scientific method instead of by futile speculations about an abstraction.
More than a century ago Mr. Justice Story discerned the
pitfall with respect to separation of powers which has caused the
West Virginia court so much difficulty: ". . . a perfect separation
is occasionally found supported by the opinions of ingenious minds,
dazzled by theory, and extravagantly attached to the notion of
simplicity in government .. ."I" Mr. Justice Story perceived a
truth not always recognized by the West Virginia court: "But
the true and only test must, after all, be experience, which corrects at once the errors of theory and fortifies and illustrates the
3' 17
eternal judgments of nature.
316 1 STORY ON THE CONSTITUTION

(5th ed. 1891) 396.

31T Id. at 405.
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